Crucified Kosovo With Photo Albums

After Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo is a second ISIS in Europe today. From June 1999, when NATO troops occupied Kosovo and brought to power militant Muslim Albanian Jihad fighters, systematic destruction of (Serbian Orthodox) Christianity is visible on every corner.

The most disappointed fact in post-war Kosovo reality is an ethnic and cultural cleansing of all non-Albanians and not-Albanian cultural heritage. The proofs are evident and visible on every corner of Kosovo territory. For instance, on the arrival of KFOR (international but in fact NATO „Kosovo Forces“) and UNMIK („United Nations Mission in Kosovo“) to Kosovo in 1999, all the names of the towns and streets in Kosovo were renamed to have (Muslim) Albanian names. The monuments to Serbian heroes like the monument devoted to duke Lazar (who led Serbian Christian army during the Kosovo Battle on June 28th, 1389 against the Muslim Turks) in Gnjilane, were demolished.

Serbs are getting killed, assassinated, wounded and abducted, their houses burned to the ground. The most infamous ethnic cleansing was done between March 17th and 19th 2004 – „The March Pogrom“, which resulted in the loss of several dozens of lives, several hundreds of wounded (including and the members of KFOR), more than 4.000 exiled Serbs, more than 800 Serbian houses set on fire and 35 destroyed or severely damaged Serbian Orthodox Christian churches and cultural monuments. For those readers who does not have time or financial support to visit Kosovo in order to check those evidences we recommend to visit free of charge You Tube web page searching the videos under the tags „Albanian terror“ and/or „Stolen Kosovo“ (the last one is the Czech documentary movie made in 2008 but originally banned by the Czech authorities to be shown in the Czech Republic that was a reason why the authors put it on the You Tube).

As of today, the number of Serbs that were killed or went missing in Kosovo after KFOR arrived, is measured in thousands, the number of demolished Orthodox churches and monasteries is measured in hundreds, and the number of burned down Serbian houses in tens of thousands.

Even though KFOR had as much as 50.000 soldiers in the beginning as well as several thousand of policemen and civilian mission members, none of the above mentioned crimes have been solved.

Murdering a Serb in Kosovo is not considered as a crime, on a contrary, the murderers of children and the elderly are being rewarded as heroes. The province is almost ethnically cleaned as around 250.000 ethnic Serbs left the territory of Kosovo. For the matter-of-fact, according to the last pre-war official Yugoslav census of 1991 there were 13% of non-Albanians in Kosovo. However, it is estimated that today 97% of Kosovo population is only Albanian. In the light of the main goal – the establishment of another Albanian state in the Balkans and Europe, as the first step towards pan-Albanian state unification – we can „understand“ why it is important to destroy any Serbian trace in the „territory defined by the aspirations“.

Here we present some documentary evidences of Kosovo ISIS: KOSOVO ISIS FROM 1999

Here we present some documentary evidences on Albanian terror over Kosovo Serbs: Albanian terror in Kosovo over the Serbs

The NATO’s Violations Of The “Just War” Principles In 1999

Current political process of acceptance of the quasi-independent state of Kosovo to the full UN’s UNESCO’s membership opened once again a question of the NATO’s military intervention against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (the FRY) in March−June 1999 as a foundation for Kosovo’s secession from Serbia and its unilateral proclamation of a quasi-independence in February 2008. Kosovo became the first and only European state up today that is ruled by the terrorist warlords as a party’s possession – the (Albanian) Kosovo Liberation Army (the KLA). The aim of this article is to investigate the nature of the NATO’s war on Yugoslavia in 1999.

Terrorism and Kosovo independence

The KLA terrorists with a support by the US’ and the EU’s administrations launched a full scale of violence in December 1998 for the only purpose to provoke the NATO’s military intervention against the FRY as a precondition for Kosovo secession from Serbia hopefully followed by internationally recognized independence. In order to finally resolve the “Kosovo Question” in the favor of the Albanians, the US’ Clinton administration brought two confronting sides to formally negotiate in the French castle of Rambouillet in France in February 1999 but in fact to impose an ultimatum to Serbia to accept de facto secession of Kosovo. Regardless to the fact that the Rambouillet ultimatum de iure recognized Serbia’s territorial integrity, the disarmament of terrorist KLA and did not mention Kosovo independence from Serbia, as the conditions of the final agreement were in essence highly favorable to the KLA and its secessionist project towards the independent Kosovo, Serbia simply rejected them. The US’s answer was a military action led by the NATO as a “humanitarian intervention” in order to directly support the Kosovo Albanian separatism. Therefore, on March 24th, 1999 the NATO started its military operation against the FRY which lasted till June 10th 1999. Why the UN’s Security Council was not asked for the approval of the operation is clear from the following explanation:

Knowing that Russia would veto any effort to get UN backing for military action, NATO launched air strikes against Serbian forces in 1999, effectually supporting the Kosovar Albanian rebels”.[1]

The crucial feature of this operation was a barbarian, coercive, inhuman, illegal, and above all merciless bombing of Serbia for almost three months. Nevertheless, that the NATO’s military intervention against the FRY – Operation Allied Force, was propagated by its proponents as a pure humanitarian operation, it is recognized by many Western and other scholars that the US and its client states of the NATO had mainly political and geostrategic aims that led them to this military action.

The legitimacy of the intervention of the brutal coercive bombing of both military and civilian targets in Kosovo province and the rest of Serbia became immediately controversial as the UN’s Security Council did not authorize the action. Surely, the action was illegal according to the international law but it was formally justified by the US’ administration and the NATO’s spokesman as a legitimate for the reason that it was unavoidable as all diplomatic options were exhausted to stop the war. However, a continuation of the military conflict in Kosovo between the KLA and Serbia’s state security forces would threaten to produce a humanitarian catastrophe and generate political instability of the region of the Balkans. Therefore, “in the context of fears about the ‘ethnic cleansing’ of the Albanian population, a campaign of air strikes, conducted by US-led NATO forces”[2] was executed with a final result of withdrawal of Serbia’s forces and administration from the province: that was exactly the main requirement of the Rambouillet ultimatum.

It is of the crucial importance to stress at least five facts in order to properly understand the nature and aims of the NATO’s military intervention against Serbia and Montenegro in 1999:

  1. It was bombed only the Serbian side involved in the conflict in Kosovo while the KLA was allowed and even fully sponsored to continue its terroristic activities either against Serbia’s security forces or the Serbian civilians.
  2. The ethnic cleansing of the Albanians by the Serbian security forces was only a potential action (in fact, only in the case of direct NATO’s military action against the FRY) but not a real fact as a reason for the NATO to start coercive bombing of the FRY.
  3. The NATO’s claim that the Serbian security forces killed up to 100.000 Albanian civilians during the Kosovo War of 1998−1999 was a pure propaganda lie as after the war it was found only 3.000 bodies of all nationalities in Kosovo.
  4. The bombing of the FRY was promoted as the “humanitarian intervention”, what means as legitimate and defensible action, that scholarly should mean “…military intervention that is carried out in pursuit of humanitarian rather than strategic objectives”.[3] However, today it is quite clear that the intervention had political and geostrategic ultimate objectives but not the humanitarian one.
  5. The NATO’s military intervention in 1999 was a direct violation of the UN principles of international conduct as it is said in the UN Charter that:

All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations”.[4]

What happened in Kosovo when the NATO started its military campaign was quite expected and above all wishful by the US’ administration and the KLA’s leaders: Serbia made much stronger military assault on the KLA and the ethnic Albanians who supported it. As a consequence, there was significantly increased number of the refugees – up to 800.000 according to the CIA’s and the UN’s sources. However, the US’s administration presented all of these refugees as the victims of the Serb-led policy of systematic and well-organized ethnic cleansing (alleged “Horse Shoe” operation) regardless on the facts that:

  1. Overwhelming majority of them were not the real refugees but rather “TV refugees” for the Western mass media.
  2. Minority of them were simply escaping from the consequences of the NATO’s merciless bombing.
  3. Just part of the refugees has been the real victims of the Serbian “bloody revenge” policy for the NATO’s destruction of Serbia.

Nevertheless, the final result of the NATO’s sortie campaign against the FRY was that the UN’s Security Council formally authorized the NATO’s (under the official name of KFOR)[5] ground troops to occupy Kosovo and give to the KLA free hands to continue and finish with the ethnic cleansing of the province from all non-Albanians. That was the beginning of the making of the Kosovo independence which was finally proclaimed by the Kosovo Parliament (without national referenda) in February 2008 and immediately recognized by the main Western countries.[6] At such a way, Kosovo became the first legalized European mafia state.[7] Nevertheless, in addition, the EU’s and the US’s policies to rebuild peace on the territory of ex-Yugoslavia did not manage to deal successfully with probably the main and most serious challenge to their proclaimed task to re-establish the regional stability and security: al-Qaeda linked terrorism, especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina but also in Kosovo-Metochia.[8]

Members of the U.S.’s sponsored Kosovo Liberation Army in 1999 during the NATO’s aggression on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia


According to the NATO’s sources, there were two objectives of the alliance’s military intervention against the FRY in March−June 1999:

  1. To force Slobodan Miloshevic, a President of Serbia, to accept a political plan for the autonomy status of Kosovo (designed by the US administration).
  2. To prevent (alleged) ethnic cleansing of the Albanians by Serbia’s authorities and their armed forces.

However, while the political objective was in principle achieved, the humanitarian one was with quite opposite results. By bombing the FRY in the three air strikes phases the NATO succeeded to force Miloshevic to sign political-military capitulation in Kumanovo on June 9th, 1999, to handle Kosovo to the NATO’s administration and practically to authorize the KLA’s-led Islamic terror against the Christian Serbs.[9] A direct outcome of the operation was surely negative as the NATO’s sorties caused approximately 3000 killed Serbian military and civilians in addition to unknown number of killed ethnic Albanians. An indirect impact of the operation cost a number of the ethnic Albanian killed civilians followed by massive refugee flows of Kosovo Albanians[10] as it provoked the Serbian police and the Yugoslav army to attack. We can not forget that a greatest scale of war crimes against the Albanian civilians in Kosovo during the NATO’s bombing of the FRY was most probably, according to some research investigations, committed by the Krayina refugee Serbs from Croatia who were after August 1995 in the uniforms of the regular police forces of Serbia as a matter of revenge for the terrible Albanian atrocities committed in the Krayina region in Croatia only several years ago against the Serb civilians[11] when many of Kosovo Albanians fought the Serbs in the Croatian uniforms.

The fundamental dilemma is why the NATO directly supported the KLA – an organization that was previously clearly called as a “terrorist” by many Western Governments including and the US’s one? It was known that a KLA’s warfare of partisan strategy[12] was based only on direct provoking of the Serbia’s security forces to respond by attacking the KLA’s posts with unavoidable number of civilian casualties. However, these Albanian civilian victims were not understood by the NATO’s authorities as a “collateral damage” but rather as the victims of deliberate ethnic cleansing. Nevertheless, all civilian victims of the NATO’s bombing in 1999 were presented by the NATO’s authorities exactly as a “collateral damage” of the NATO’s “just war”[13] against the oppressive regime in Belgrade.

Here we will present the basic (academic) principles of a “just war”:

  1. Last resort – All diplomatic options are exhausted before the force is used.
  2. Just cause – The ultimate purpose of use of force is to self-defend its own territory or people from military attack by the others.
  3. Legitimate authority – To imply the legitimate constituted Government of a sovereign state, but not by some private (individual) or group (organization).
  4. Right intention – The use of force, or war, had to be prosecuted on the morally acceptable reasons, but not based on revenge or the intention to inflict the damage.
  5. Reasonable prospect of success – The use of force should not be activated in some hopeless cause, in which the human lives are exposed for no real benefits.
  6. Proportionality – The military intervention has to have more benefits than loses.
  7. Discrimination – The use of force must be directed only at the purely military targets as the civilians are considered to be innocent.
  8. Proportionality – The used force has to be no greater than it is needed to achieve morally acceptable aims and must not be greater than the provoking cause.
  9. Humanity – The use of force cannot be directed ever against the enemy personnel if they are captured (the prisoners of war) or wounded.[14]

If we analyze the NATO’s military campaign in regard to just above presented basic (academic) principles of the “just war”, the fundamental conclusions will be as following:

  1. The US’s administration in 1999 did not use any real diplomatic effort to settle the Kosovo crisis as Washington simply gave the political-military ultimatum in Rambouillet only to one side (Serbia) to either accept or not in full required blackmails: 1) To withdraw all Serbian military and police forces from Kosovo; 2) To give Kosovo administration to the NATO’s troops; and 3) To allow the NATO’s troops to use a whole territory of Serbia for the transit purpose. In the other words, the basic point of the US’s ultimatum to Belgrade was that Serbia will voluntarily become a US’s colony but without Kosovo province. Even the US’s President at that time – Bill Clinton, confirmed that Miloshevic’s rejection of the Rambouillet ultimatum was understandable and logical. It can be said that Serbia in 1999 did the same as the Kingdom of Serbia did in July 1914 by rejecting the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum which was also absurd and abusive.[15]
  2. This principle was absolutely misused by the NATO’s administration as no one NATO’s country was attacked or occupied by the FRY. In Kosovo at that time it was a classic anti-terroristic war launched by the state authorities against the illegal separatist movement but fully sponsored in this case by the neighboring Albania and the NATO.[16] In the other words, this second principle of the “just war” can be only applied to the anti-terroristic operations by the state authorities of Serbia in Kosovo province against the KLA rather than to the NATO’s military intervention against the FRY.
  3. The Legitimate authority principle in the Kosovo conflict case of 1998−1999 can be applied only to Serbia and her legitimate state institutions and authority which were recognized as legitimate by the international community and above all by the UN.
  4. The morally acceptable reasons officially used by the NATO’s authorities to justify its own military action against the FRY in 1999 were quite unclear and above all unproved and misused for the very political and geostrategic purposes in the coming future. Today we know that the NATO’s military campaign was not based on the morally proved claims to stop a mass expulsion of the ethnic Albanians from their homes in Kosovo as a mass number of displaced persons appeared during the NATO’s military intervention but not before.
  5. The consequences of the fifth principle were selectively applied as only Kosovo Albanians benefited from both short and long term perspectives by the NATO’s military engagement in the Balkans in 1999.
  6. The sixth principle also became practically applied only to Kosovo Albanians what was in fact and the ultimate task of the US’ and the NATO’s administrations. In the other words, the benefits of the action were overwhelmingly single-sided. However, from the long-term geostrategic and political aspects the action was very profitable with a minimum loses for the Western military alliance during the campaign.
  7. The practical consequences of the seventh principle became mostly criticized as the NATO obviously did not make any difference between the military and civilian targets. Moreover, the NATO’s alliance deliberately bombed much more civilian objects and non-combat citizens than the military objects and personnel. However, all civilian victims of the bombing of all nationalities became simply presented by the NATO’s authority as an unavoidable “collateral damage”, but it fact it was a clear violation of the international law and one of the basic principles of the concept of a “just war”.
  8. The eighth principle of a “just was” surely was not respected by the NATO as the used force was much higher as needed to achieve proclaimed tasks and above all was much stronger that the opposite side had. However, the morally acceptable aims of the western policymakers were based on the wrong and deliberately misused “facts” in regard to the ethnic Albanian victims of the Kosovo War in 1998−1999 as it was primarily with the “brutal massacre of forty-five civilians in the Kosovo village of Račak in January 1999”[17] which became a formal pretext for the NATO’s intervention. Nevertheless, it is known today that those Albanian “brutally massacred civilians” were in fact the members of the KLA killed during the regular fight but not executed by the Serbian security forces.[18]
  9. Only the last principle of a “just war” was respected by the NATO for the very reason that there were no captured soldiers from the opponent side. The Serbian authorities also respected this principle as all two NATO’s captured pilots were treated as the prisoners of war according to the international standards and even were free very soon after the imprisonment.[19]

 Crucified Christian (Serb Orthodox) Kosovo after the war by the KLA’s members in power


 The crucial conclusions of the article after the investigation of the nature of NATO’s “humanitarian” military intervention in Kosovo in 1999 are:

  1. The NATO’s military intervention against the FRY during the Kosovo War in 1998−1999 was done primarily for the political and geostrategic purposes.
  2. A declarative “humanitarian” nature of the operation just served as a formal moral framework of the realization of the genuine goals of the post-Cold War US’s policy at the Balkans which foundations were laid down by the Dayton Accords in November 1995.
  3. The US’s administration of Bill Clinton used the terrorist KLA for pressing and blackmailing the Serbian Government to accept the ultimatum by Washington to transform Serbia into the US’s military, political and economic colony with a NATO’s membership in the future for the exchange of formal preservation of Serbia’s territorial integrity.
  4. The Western Governments originally labeled the KLA as a “terrorist organization” – that is combat strategy of direct provoking Serbia’s security forces was morally unacceptable and would not result in either diplomatic or military support.
  5. During the Kosovo War in 1998−1999 the KLA basically served as the NATO’s ground forces in Kosovo for direct destabilization of Serbia’s state security which were militarily defeated at the very beginning of 1999 by Serbia’s regular police forces.
  6. The NATO’s sorties in 1999 have as the main goal to force Belgrade to give Kosovo province to the US’s and EU’s administration in order to transform it into the biggest US’s and NATO’s military base in Europe.
  7. The NATO’s “humanitarian” intervention in 1999 against the FRY violated almost all principles of the “just war” and the international law – an intervention which became one of the best examples in the post-Cold War history of unjust use of coercive power for the political and geostrategic purposes and at the same time a classic case of coercive diplomacy that fully engaged the Western Governments.
  8. Some 50.000 NATO’s troops displaced in Kosovo after June 10th, 1999 did not fulfilled the basic tasks of their mission: 1) Demilitarization of the KLA as this paramilitary formation was never properly disarmed; 2) Protection of all Kosovo inhabitants as only up to January 2001 there were at least 700 Kosovo citizens murdered on the ethnic basis (mostly of them were the Serbs); 3) Stability and security of the province as most of the Serbs and other non-Albanians fled the province as a consequence of systematic ethnic cleansing policy committed by the KLA in power after June 1999.
  9. The US’s reward for the KLA’s loyalty was to install the army’s members to the key governmental posts of today “independent” Republic of Kosova which became the first European state administered by the leaders of ex-terrorist organization who started immediately after the war to execute a policy of ethnic cleansing of all non-Albanian population and to Islamize the province.
  10. The ultimate national-political goal of the KLA in power in Kosovo is to include this province into the Greater Albania projected by the First Albanian Prizren League in 1878−1881 and for the first time realized during the WWII.[20]
  11. Probably, the main consequence of the NATO’s occupation of Kosovo after June 1999 up today is a systematic destruction of the Christian (Serb) cultural inheritance and feature of the province followed by its obvious and comprehensive Islamization and therefore transformation of Kosovo into a new Islamic State.
  12. What concerns the case of the Kosovo crisis in 1998−1999, the first and authentic “humanitarian” intervention was that of Serbia’s security forces against the terroristic KLA in order to preserve the human lives of the ethnic Serbs and anti-KLA Albanians in the province.
  13. The Balkan Stability Pact for both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo-Metochia attempted to under-emphasize traditional concept of sovereignty giving a full practical possibility to the UN’s (in fact the West’s) administrative control over these two ex-Yugoslav territories.[21]
  14. The NATO’s “humanitarian” intervention in 1999 against the FRY clearly violated the recognized international standards of non-intervention, based on the principle of the “inviolability of borders” going beyond the idea of “just war” according to which the self-defence is the crucial reason, or at least formal justification, for the use of force.
  15. While the NATO declaratively fulfilled “the international responsibility to protect” (the ethnic Albanians) by heavily bombing Serbia and too much little extent Montenegro, bypassing the UN’s Security Council it is clear that this 78-days terror effort was counterproductive as “creating as much human suffer-refugees as it relieved”.[22]
  16. The fundamental question in regard to the Kosovo “humanitarian” interventions today is why the Western Governments are not taking another “humanitarian” coercive military intervention after June 1999 in order to prevent further ethnic cleansing and brutal violation of human rights against all non-Albanian population in Kosovo but above all against the Serbs?
  17. Finally, the NATO’s military intervention was seen by many social constructivists as a phenomenon of “warlike democracies” as a demonstration how the ideas of liberal democracy “undermine the logic of democratic peace theory”.[23]


Prof. Dr. Vladislav B. Sotirovic

© Vladislav B. Sotirović 2016



Disclaimer: The author is not morally, scientifically or legally responsible for any inaccurate or incorrect statement in the article.


[1] S. L. Spiegel, J. M. Taw, F. L. Wehling, K. P. Williams, World Politics in a New Era, Thomson Wadsworth, 2004, 319.

[2] A. Heywood, Global Politics, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, 320.

[3] Ibid., 319.

[4] J. Haynes, P. Hough, Sh. Malik, L. Pettiford, World Politics, Harlow: Pearson Education Limited, 2011, 639.

[5] The 1244 UN Security Council Resolution on June 10th, 1999. The KFOR’s basic responsibilities were:

  1. To protect aid operations.
  2. To protect all Kosovo population.
  3. To create a stable security in the province in order that the international administration can function normally.

[6] This recognition of the self-proclaimed Kosovo independence from a democratic country of Serbia with a pro-Western regime, basically gave victory to the Albanian Kosovo radicals of the ethnic cleansing after June 1999. The Albanians from Kosovo started their atrocities against the Serbs immediately after the Kumanovo Agreement in June 1999 when the KLA returned back to Kosovo together with the NATO’s occupation ground troops. Up to February 2008 there were around 200.000 expelled Serbs from Kosovo and 1.248 non-Albanians who have been killed in some cases even very brutally. The number of kidnapped non-Albanians is still not known but presumably majority of them were killed. There were 151 Serb Orthodox spiritual and cultural monuments in Kosovo destroyed by the Albanians in addition to 213 mosques built with financial support from Saudi Arabia. Before Kosovo independence was proclaimed, there were 80 percent of graveyards which were either completely destroyed or partially desecrated by the Albanians. On Kosovo right to independence, see [M. Sterio, The Right to Self-Determination under International Law: “Selfistans”, Secession, and the Rule of the Great Powers, New York−London: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2013, 116−129]. On secession from the point of the international law, see [M. G. Kohen, Secession: International Law Perspectives, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006].

[7] T. Burghardt, “Kosovo: Europe’s Mafia State. Hub of the EU-NATO Drug Trail”, 22-12-2010,

[8] J. Haynes, P. Hough, Sh. Malik, L. Pettiford, World Politics, Harlow: Pearson Education Limited, 2011, 588.

[9] On the “just peace”, see [P. Allan, A. Keller (eds.), What is a Just Peace?, Oxford−New York: Oxford University Press, 2006].

[10] According to the official Western sources, even up to 90 percent of the Kosovo Albanian population became refugees during the NATO’s military intervention. Therefore, it should be the largest displacement of the civilians in Europe after the WWII. Nevertheless, all of these Albanian refugees are unquestionably considered to be “expelled” from their homes by Serbia’s security forces and the Yugoslav army.

[11] For example, in the “Medak Pocket” operation on September 9th, 1993 there were killed around 80 Serbian civilians by the Croatian forces [В. Ђ. Мишина (уредник), Република Српска Крајина: Десет година послије, Београд: Добра воља Београд, 2005, 35] in which Kosovo Albanians served too.

[12] The “partisan” or “guerrilla” war is fought by irregular troops using mainly tactics that are fitting to the geographical features of the terrain. The crucial characteristic of the tactics of the partisan war is that it uses mobility and surprise but not direct frontal battles with the enemy. Usually, the civilians are paying the highest price in the course of the partisan war. In the other words, it is “war conducted by irregulars or guerrillas, usually against regular, uniformed forces, employing hit-and-run, ambush, and other tactics that allow smaller numbers of guerrillas to win battles against numerically superior, often heavily-armed regular forces” [P. R. Viotti, M. V. Kauppi, International Relations and World Politics: Secularity, Economy, Identity, Harlow: Pearson Education Limited, 2009, 544]. With regard to the Kosovo War in 1998−1999 the reconstruction of the Albanian guerrilla strategy is as following:

“…a police patrol is passing a village, when a sudden fire is open and some policemen killed and wounded. The police return the fire and the further development depends on the strength of the rebellious unit engaged. If the village appears well protected and risky to attack by the ordinary units, the latter stops fighting and calls for additional support. It arrives usually as a paramilitary unit, which launches a fierce onslaught” [P. V. Grujić, Kosovo Knot, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: RoseDog Books, 2014, 193].

[13] The “just war” is considered to be a war that has a purpose to satisfy certain ethical standards, and therefore is (allegedly) morally justified.

[14] A. Heywood, Global Politics, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, 257.

[15] М. Радојевић, Љ. Димић, Србија у Великом рату 1914−1915, Београд: Српска књижевна задруга−Београдски форум за свет равноправних, 2014, 94−95.

[16] For instance, Albania supplied the Albanian Kosovo separatists by weapons in 1997 when around 700.000 guns were “stolen” by the Albanian mob from Albania’s army’s magazines but majority of these weapons found their way exactly to the neighboring Kosovo. The members of the KLA were trained in Albania with the help of the NATO’s military instructors and then sent to Kosovo.

[17] R. J. Art, K. N. Waltz (eds.), The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics, Lanham−Boulder−New York−Toronto−Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2004, 257.

[18] В. Б. Сотировић, Огледи из југославологије, Виљнус: приватно издање, 2013, 19−29.

[19] On the NATO’s “humanitarian” intervention in the FRY in 1999, see more in [G. Szamuely, Bombs for Peace: NATO’s Humanitarian War on Yugoslavia, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2013].

[20] A Greater Albania as a project is “envisaged to be an area of some 90.000 square kilometres (36.000 square miles), including Kosovo, Greece, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro” [J. Haynes, P. Hough, Sh. Malik, L. Pettiford, World Politics, Harlow: Pearson Education Limited, 2011, 588].

[21] R. Johnson, “Reconstructing the Balkans: The effects of a global governance approach”, M. Lederer, P. Müller (eds.), Criticizing Global Governance, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, 177.

[22] A. F. Cooper, J. Heine, R. Thakur (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy, Oxford−New York: Oxford University Press, 2015, 766.

[23] J. Haynes, P. Hough, Sh. Malik, L. Pettiford, World Politics, Harlow: Pearson Education Limited, 2011, 225.

“Italia Irredenta” Territories And The London Treaty (April 26th, 1915)

It was in 2015 hundred years anniversary of secret treaty signed between three Entente members of the U.K., France and the Russian Empire on the one hand, and Italy on the other, in London on April 26th, 1915 nine months after the break up the Great War of 1914−1918.[1]

In a political-military effort to involve Italy into the war on their own side against the Central Powers members of Germany and Austria-Hungary within a month, these three Entente block members confirmed the Italian possession of the ex-Ottoman province of Libya (acquired by Italy in 1912) and the Dodecanese islands in the Mediterranean Sea, and also promised the Italian occupation and annexation of Italia Irredenta territories: the South Tirol, Trentino, the Istrian Peninsula, Gorizia, Postojna, Gradisca, the North Dalmatia with the cities of Zadar and Šibenik, most of the Adriatic islands and the city of Trieste with its hinterland.[2] Italy would also gain certain Ottoman territories in Asia Minor and Albania’s city of Valona and Saseno island in the case of the victory of the Entente Powers. It is obvious that the treaty was at a full extent against the post-war territorial interests of the Central Powers, i.e., of Austria-Hungary.

Italy entered the Great War on May 24th, 1915, but the opening of a southern front on the border between Italy and Austria-Hungary failed to change the balance of the war decisively. The fact is that after the November 1917 Russian Bolshevik Revolution[3] the German supported and financed Bolsheviks refuted all treaties concluded by the previous legal Imperial Russian administration and therefore did not recognize a validity of the 1915 London Treaty under the official explanation that it as a secret agreement can not be verified by the new people’s government of the Bolshevik (anti)Russia. However, the real reason for such a policy was that a new Bolshevik government in Russia, led by a Jew V. I. Lenin,[4] was a German marionette regime (as a biggest diplomatic victory of the Central Powers during the Great War) and therefore was protecting the interests of the Central Powers member states. As a result of the German-Bolshevik collaboration, a new (anti)Russian government of Bolsheviks signs with the Central Powers a Brest-Litovsk Treaty on March 3rd, 1918 that was the first peace treaty of the WWI.[5] In return for peace and the Bolshevisation of Russia, Lenin’s government ceded Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the West Belarus, Poland, Ukraine and parts of the Caucasus. Russia thus lost almost half of its European land possessions with 75% of its heavy industries with obligations to pay 6 billion gold marks in reparations to the Central Powers but the peace gave an opportunity to the Bolsheviks to consolidate their power in the civil war against their “white” opponents.[6] That was the biggest victory of the Central Powers during the Great War – a victory which could annul the 1915 London Treaty and the 1916 treaty between the Entente and Romania. However, the 1918 Brest-Litovsk Treaty was annulled by the victorious Entente Powers on November 11th, 1918, after the German defeat. Nevertheless, by the Bolsheviks ruled Russia could only manage to reclaim the Ukraine and its pre-war Asian territories after the Russian Civil War of 1917−1921 that followed the October Revolution.

As the 1917 London Treaty was a flagrant violation of the U.S. President Woodrow Wilson’s designs for the re-arrangement of the post-war Europe,[7] it received not full regard at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, where Italy was awarded much, though not all, of Italia Irredenta.[8] The Italian outrage against the violation of the legally valid 1915 London Treaty gave a direct stimulus to the populist irredentist groups on the Italian political scene among all the most important and powerful those led by Gabrielle D’Annunzio and Benito Mussolini. A mass Fascist movement in Italy was born in the area of Trieste on the border with a new state of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes after the WWI as a patriotic protest against a brutal violation of the full implementation of the London Treaty. It is true that the main points of the treaty have been realized after 1919 but not in full as it was agreed and signed between the Entente Powers and Italy. Immediately after the Paris Peace Conference Rome was even ready to send its military to occupy the Yugoslav lands not given to Italy according to the London Treaty but only due to the U.S. diplomacy and direct military threat to Italy by the U.S. navy located in the Adriatic Sea Rome finally left this issue unsolved till the WWII.

The main territorial gain for Rome after the war according to the 1915 London Treaty was surely the province of the South Tirol or Alto Adige, today an autonomous German speaking region in the North Italy but before 1918 a historic part of Austria and the Habsburg Monarchy (Austria-Hungary from 1867). Tirol became divided between Italy and the Republic of Austria after the WWI into the north (Austrian) and south (Italian) parts according to the final Peace Treaty of St Germain (September 10th, 1919) signed in the Parisian suburb of St Germain-en-Laye between the Entente Powers and their allied states and a new state of Austria (the German-speaking part of the former Austria-Hungary) within the framework of the Paris Peace Conferences. According to the St Germain Peace Treaty, Austria was forced to accept the break up of the Austria-Hungary Monarchy, creation of two new states of Czechoslovakia and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (the Kingdom of Yugoslavia from January 6th, 1929) but also and enlargement of the Kingdom of Romania (a Greater Romania) and Italy at the expense of the former Habsburg state’s lands. Italy, according to the 1915 London Treaty, received Trentino, Alto Adige, Trieste, Gorizia, Istria, part of Dalmatia, Fiume (Rijeka) and a main part of the Adriatic islands. The Yugoslavs got from the Habsburg Monarchy the present-day Slovenia, Croatia, Slavonia, part of Dalmatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Vojvodina (the South Hungary), Baranja and Srem while Romania received Transylvania, Bukovina and the East Banat. In addition, Austrian Galicia went to Poland. Austria (Österreich) thus became a land-locked Alpine country in territorial disputes with all her neighbors except with Switzerland.

The St Germen Treaty was signed with the greatest reluctance by all representatives of new Austria and the most disputed territory became the South Tirol (Alto Adige) with a German-speaking majority. The process of Italianization of Alto Adige was introduced and programmed by a new Italian Fascist government after 1922 of Benito Mussolini. The purpose was to destroy the regional German distinctiveness in order to closer include the South Tirol into the Italian national state. However, the main reason why Italy required Alto Adige from Austria-Hungary and got it by the signature of the 1915 London Treaty was to control strategically extremely important Brenner Pass as a passage through the Alps. In the other words, Italy required the region of South Tirol using the strategic claims but not ethnic or historic as it was the case with Trieste, Gorizia, Istria, Fiume (Rijeka), Dalmatia and the Adriatic islands.

Two the most important immediate consequences of the fact that the 1915 London Treaty was not implemented in full after the WWI have been the D’Annunziada by Gabriele D’Annunzio and a rising of the Fascist movement led by Benito Mussolini.

Gabriele D’Annunzio (1863−1938) was a well-known Italian writer and nationalistic political adventurer – a kind of Mussolini before Mussolini.[9] He started his active political life in 1897 when entered the Chamber of Deputies where he was supporting and the extreme right and the extreme left politicians. For the reason of personal debts he left his motherland Italy in 1910 but returned back as a nationalistic patriot in order to serve in the WWI, where became a war hero with a distinguished record in the Italian army, especially in the air force. He was one of the most ardent Italian patriots to fight for realization of all points of the 1915 London Treaty especially regarding the city of Fiume (Rijeka) on the Yugoslav littoral populated at that time by the majority of Italians. Appalled by the Italian failure to secure this disputed city between Italy and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes he simply staged a coup and occupied the city with the Italian volunteers (a la Garibaldi) for the sake to include Fiume into a Greater Italy. After the D’Annunziada he established in Fiume a sort of authoritarian right-wing regime later followed by Mussolini in Italy. Nevertheless, D’Annunzio succeeded to defy the Italian government even for sixteen months, until he became eventually forced to leave Fiume in January 1921 but mainly due to him and his adventure Italy finally received Fiume according to the Rome Agreements signed with the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes on January 27th, 1924[10] and crucially supported by Vatican.[11]

The East Adriatic territories afforded to the Kingdom of Italy according to the London Treaty of April 26th, 1915

Benito Mussolini (1883−1945) was a leader of the Fascist movement of Italy, son of a socialist and anticlerical blacksmith, largely self-educated, primary school teacher and journalist who organized his movement immediately after the WWI as a direct populist protest against the Entente’s policy of not respecting in full the Italian historic and nationality rights recognized by the 1915 London Treaty.[12] The first massive-protest manifestations by Mussolini’s fascists took place around the border with a new Yugoslav state which was protecting a Croat and Slovenian national pretensions on the disputed territories with Italy in Dalmatia. If the 1919 Versailles Treaty was “a bone in the throat” of Adolf Hitler, then for sure the post-war incomplete realization of the 1915 London Treaty played the same irritation role in the throats of both D’Annunzio and Mussolini. Mussolini like D’Annunzio broke with the Italian socialists over the WWI and went passionately to it supporting the Italian national-territorial claims which were guaranteed by the 1915 London Treaty. An idea of united ethnolinguistic Italy became one of the crucial reasons for Mussolini to establish on March 23rd, 1919 the Fascist movement that was originally under the name of the Fasci di Combattimento, which he sought to develop into an anti-socialist and anti-capitalist mass movement for the realization of the Italian ethnohistorical rights on the opposite side of the Adriatic Sea. From the mid-1920 Mussolini’s nationalism became more aggressive, with his emphasis on the Mare Nostrum policy in which the Adriatic Sea has to be converted into the Italian Lake as it was during the existence of the Republic of Venice. Here, we have to remind ourselves that Venice ruled Dalmatia, the Adriatic islands and Istria according to the legal contracts from 1000 to 1797 that became a crucial basis for the Italian legitimate claims on this province during the WWI and after as a last phase of the Italian Risorgimento.[13]

The fact is that the only reason for Rome to join the WWI on the Entente side in 1915 regardless on the fact that Italy was a member of the Central Powers from 1882 was to finish the process of the Italian national-state unification which started in 1861 with a proclamation of (not fully united) the Kingdom of Italy.[14] The first Italy’s diplomatic anti-Central Powers move for the sake of realization of the Risorgimento policy at the expense of the Dual Monarchy was to reach an agreement with Russia in October 1909 after the 1908−1909 Annexation Crises when Austria-Hungary annexed the province of Bosnia-Herzegovina (on October 6−7th, 1908) breaking the 1878 Berlin Congress Treaty’s decisions.[15] According to this Italian-Russian agreement, as an introduction to the final change of the political-military side of Italy in April 1915, these two states will not tolerate any more any additional territorial changes at the Balkans – an agreement directly pointed against Austria-Hungary.[16] For that reason, for instance, Italy disagreed on Vienna-Budapest intentions to attack Serbia in the spring of 1913[17] during the Balkan Wars[18] what also very much contributed to Italy’s alienation from the Central Powers.

Italy realized into practice a full implementation of the London Treaty in 1941 after the Axis Powers’ war against the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in April and her occupation and territorial division by Germany, Italy, Bulgaria and Hungary alongside with creation of a Greater Albania and (Greater) the Independent State of Croatia. However, after the capitulation of Italy on September 8th, 1943 all Italian possessions at the Yugoslav side of the Adriatic Sea (except Zarra) became included into the Independent State of Croatia, now supported only by Berlin.[19] What happened after the Italian capitulation is a real masterpiece of the Croat diplomacy. The British policy of Winston Churchill, supporting both Croat nationalistic movements in Yugoslavia – a fascist creation of the Independent State of Croatia and the communist-partisan movement of Croat-Slovenian Josip Broz Tito, from the end of 1943 bombed the Italian-populated city of Zara (Zadar) which at that time had around 20,000 inhabitants, in order to transform it into the “empty space” for the sake to annex the city into the post-WWII Greater Croatia within Tito’s Yugoslavia enlarged by the Italian pre-war possessions. The destruction of Zara is comparable with the 1945 destruction of Dresden.[20]

Finally, all East Adriatic lands afforded to Italy according to the 1915 London Treaty, except the Trieste area (Zone A), became included into Croatia (except small Istrian littoral given to Slovenia) within the Socialist Yugoslavia with massive ethnic cleansing of the Italian-speaking population. Therefore, as a final result of the WWII, Croatia became the only Nazi Germany ally that finished the war with enlarged state’s territory. Present-day Croatia, alongside with Albania and Kosovo, are the only almost totally ethnically cleansed and homogeneous states in Europe. Nevertheless, it is only up to Italy to decide when to start the process of reaffirmation of the 1915 London Treaty’s articles regarding it own historical and ethnic possessions at the East Adriatic.

Prof. Dr. Vladislav B. Sotirovic

© Vladislav B. Sotirovic 2016


[1] On the WWI, see [S. F. Meaker, World War One: A Concise History. The Great War, Kindle edition, 2013; C. Falls, The First World War, Barnsley, South Yorkshire: Pen & Sward Military, 2014; J. S. Levy, J. A. Vasquez (eds.), The Outbreak of the First World War: Structure, Politics, and Decision-Making, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014].

[2] М. Радојевић, Љ. Димић, Србија у Великом рату 1914−1918, Београд: СКЗ−Београдски форум за свет равноправних, 2014, 167.

[3] On the Bolshevik Revolution, see [S. Fitzpatrick, The Russian Revolution, Oxford−New York: Oxford University Press, 2008; A Rabinowitch, The Bolsheviks Come to Power: The Revolution of 1917 in Petrograd, Haymarket Books, 2009; S. Engdahl, Bolshevik Revolution, Greenhaeven Press, 2013].

[4] On Lenin’s biography, see [R. Service, Lenin: A Biography, London: Pan Books, 2002; M. Black, Lenin: A Very Brief History, Kindle edition, 2013; T. Krausz, Reconstructing Lenin: An Intellectual Biography, New York: Monthly Review Press, 2015].

[5] On the 1918 Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty, see [J. W. Wheeler-Bennett, Brest-Litovsk: The Forgotten Peace. March 1918, W W North & Co Inc, 1971; Y. Felshtinsky, Lenin, Trotsky, Germany and the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk: The Collapse of the World Revolution, November 1917−November 1918, Russell Enterprises, 2012].

[6] J. Anisimov, Rusijos istorija nuo Riuriko iki Putino. Žmonės. Įvykiai. Datos, Vilnius: Mokslo ir enciklopedijų leidybos centras, 2014, 346.

[7] On this issue, see [N. G. Levin, Woodrow Wilson and the Paris Peace Conference, Health, 1972; A. Walworth, Wilson and His Peacemakers. American Diplomacy at the Paris Peace Conference, 1919, New York−London: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1986; W. Wilson, Fourteen points, Books, 2013].

[8] On the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, see [E. M. House (ed.), What Really Happened at Paris: The Story of the Peace Conference, 1918−1919 by American Delegates, New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1921; M. MacMillan, Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World, New York: Random House, Inc., 2002].

[9] On his biography, see [L. Hughes-Hallett, Gabriele D’Annunzio: Poet, Seducer, and Preacher of War, New York: Anchor Books a Division of Random House LLC, 2013].

[10] On this issue, see more in [V. Bratulić, „Politički sporazumi Kraljevine Italije i Kraljevine SHS odnosno Jugoslavije nakon Rapala“, Jadranski zbornik, 6, 1966; B. Krizman, Vanjska politika Jugoslavenske države 1918−1941, Zagreb, 1975].

[11] Vatican was in essence against the dissolution of the Roman Catholic Austria-Hungary and creation of the Orthodox dominated Yugoslavia [B. Petranović, Istorija Jugoslavije 1918−1988. Prva knjiga. Kraljevina Jugoslavija 1914−1941, Beograd: NOLIT, 1988, 25] and for that reason supported any territorial claim of the Roman Catholic Italy against all kinds of the Yugoslav states.

[12] On Benito Mussolini’s biography, see [J. Ridley, Mussolini. A Biography, New York: Cooper Square Press, 2000; R. J. B. Bosworth, Mussolini, New Edition, London: Bloomsbury, 2002; Ch. Hibbert, Mussolini. The Rise and Fall of Il Duce, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008].

[13] J. M. Roberts, The New Penguin History of the World. Fourth edition, London−New York: Allen Lane an imprint of the Penguin Press, 2002, 892

[14] On the Italian Risorgimento, see [D. Beales, E. F. Biagini, The Risorgimento and the Unification of Italy, Second edition, New York: Routledge, 2002; F. C. Schneid, The Second War of Italian Unification 1859−1861, Osprey Publishing, 2014; G. Darby, The Unification of Italy, Second Edition with Additional Documentary Material, CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2014].

[15] В. Ћоровић, Историја Срба, Београд: БИГЗ, 1993, 697−702.

[16] М. Радојевић, Љ. Димић, Србија у Великом рату 1914−1918, Београд: СКЗ−Београдски форум за свет равноправних, 2014, 61.

[17] Ј. М. Јовановић, Стварање заједничке државе Срба, Хрвата и Словенаца, књига 1, Београд, 14.

[18] On the Balkan Wars, 1912−1913, see [J. G. Schurman, The Balkan Wars: 1912−1913, Third edition, CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2015].

[19] S. Srkulj, J. Lučić, Hrvatska povijest u dvadeset pet karata. Prošireno i dopunjeno izdanje, Zagreb: Hrvatski informativni centar, 1996, 105−107.

[20] М. Самарџић, Крвави Васкрс 1944. Савазничка бомбардовања српских градова, Београд: UNA Press, 2011, 99.

”The Time Of The Kurds” (Documentary Film)

This video is part of the Council on Foreign Relations’ InfoGuide Presentation, “The Time of the Kurds”:

The Kurds are one of the world’s largest peoples without a state, making up sizable minorities in Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey. Their history is marked by marginalization and persecution. Yet some Kurds may be on the verge of achieving their century-old quest for independence in a Middle East undergoing the convulsions of Syria’s civil war, Iraq’s destabilization, and conflict with the self-proclaimed Islamic State.

Watch video here: THE TIME OF THE KURDS

Duration: 10 min.

The Hague Tribunal: Only The Serbs Are Prosecuted – KLA And Croatian War Crimes Ignored

Long live the European court, the most humane court in the world! 

That is why seven times as many Croat and more than ten times as many (Kosovar) Albanian war crimes suspects, in percentage terms relative to Serbs, were acquitted by the Hague Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, with Radovan Karadzic being just its latest victim. (Source via this recent infographic from Russian newspaper Komsomolskaya Pravda).

No matter that well before Srebrenica you had Sisak, where 595 Serb civilians of which 120 were women were disappeared by Croatian paramilitaries in 1991-1992. Everyone has heard of Srebrenica; almost nobody has heard heard of Sisak. The largest ethnic cleansing action of the entire war occurred in the wake of Operation Storm, when 200,000 Serbs were removed from the territories of Serbian Krajina to create the homogenous Croatia we have today. Croatia’s wartime leader Tudjman died peacefully and was buried with full honors and with no protests from the West.


It’s hard to think of an ethnic group, barring the Jews and possibly the Armenians, that has had a more traumatic 20th century. 25% of Serbians died in World War I. Another 25% died again in WW2 at the hands of the Nazis’ rabid hounds, the Ustaše. They were then incorporated into a federal state headed by an ethnic Croat whose internal divisions stranded many Serbs outside of Serbia’s borders. When in the wake of Yugoslavia’s collapse those stranded Serbs took up arms to defend themselves against revived nationalisms in Croatia and Bosnia – and ultimately, in their own country, against the metastasized Molenbeek that was Kosovo – they were steadily pushed back to their bombed out heartlands, unable to mount a sustained resistance against the Clinton clique’s sponsorship of the Croats and the Kosovars, cowardly betrayals from the Yeltsin regime in Russia, and the vaccilating Milosevic himself, always seeking to make deals with the “Western partners” (he only wised up to the fact that you can never trust the West by the time he was on the dock).

To round it all off, it was Serbia that had to send all its wartime leaders and generals off to the absolutely fair and impartial judgments of the Hague Tribunal – so fair and impartial that three times as many Serbs received prison sentences than all the other combatant parties combined – to be sacrificed on the altar of promised Euro-Atlantic integration.

A promise that now rings as almost completely hollow, the only result since then being the accession of Croatia to the EU, while Serbia has continued falling apart with the loss of Montenegro. And as of today, it is increasingly clear that the only additional peoples the EU is interested in integrating – or trying to, anyway – are young male Muslim refugees.

But not all hope is yet lost.

Perhaps Karadzic will eventually be seen not as the last knight of a dying order, but as one of the first heralds of a new dawn. It was NATO’s attack on Serbia more than anything else that lifted Russia from its blind-drunk 1990s pro-Western stupor, and it has become more and more active at countering further Western designs on its territories – in Crimea and Novorossiya, and in the sovereign state of Syria. The pushback against the globalist cabal will continue and this time Serbia will no longer be alone should it rejoin the struggle.

It is not beyond the realm of possibility that Karadzic, despite his advanced age, will live long enough to see the wrongs done unto his people this past century avenged and to set foot one last time on a liberated Serbia.

The Destruction Of Yugoslavia: International Justice Or NATO “Battering Ram”

With the March 24 ICTY decision condemning Former Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic for war crimes, exactly 17 years after NATO began its bombing spree on Serbia,  international criminal justice revealed itself once again as an instrument of US and NATO foreign policy.

[They chose that the 24th of March to render judgment regarding Karadzic iquite deliberately with a view to erasing the history of NATO crimes.]

If any doubts persist, it is worth remembering how the Former US Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues, David Scheffer, perceived that tribunal. Writing about it in his memoirs, Scheffer wrote unabashedly:

the tribunal was an important judicial tool, and I had enough support from President Clinton, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Secretary of Defence William Cohen, and other top officials in Washington to wield it like a battering ram in the execution of US and NATO policy. (All the Missing Souls: A Personal History of the War Crimes Tribunals, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2012, p. 321. Our emphasis)

Justice Belied

Justice Belied, The Unbalanced Scales of International Criminal Justice provides essential background to understand how the whole international criminal law movement, of which the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia is a part, has in fact undermined international criminal law.

The late Michael Mandel did groundbreaking work on the question, particularly with his 2004 book, How America Gets Away With Murder: Illegal Wars, Collateral Damage and Crimes against Humanity. David Jacobs knew him well. Following is an excerpt from David Jacobs’s important contribution to Justice Belied, entitled “How the International Criminal LawMovement Undermined International Law— Michael Mandel’s Groundbreaking Analyses.” Read that article and more in Justice Belied, The Unbalanced Scales of International Criminal Justice, edited by Sébastien Chartrand and  John Philpot.

*       *       *

click to order book directly from Baraka books

How the International Criminal Law Movement Undermined International Law— Michael Mandel’s Groundbreaking Analyses

by David Jacobs, (Excerpt)

(…) As Michael put it, it is “the quite massive and unspeakable criminality of the world’s richest countries and particularly that of the United States of America.”[3]

The only rational assumptions are that international criminal law will be firmly subordinated to power, that impunity will be a perk of economic and military hegemony, and that the usual suspects will continue to be rounded up while America gets away with murder.[4]

Michael Mandel

Michael Mandel

Michael surgically eviscerated the foundational pretensions of the international criminal law movement in works such as his 2004 publication, How America Gets Away With Murder: Illegal Wars, Collateral Damage And Crimes Against Humanity. Michael’s view was that the old, anti-war order of international law, which recognised the sovereign equality of nations and anathematised unilateral aggressive war, had to be overthrown to legitimise the “new world order” crystallising after the end of the Cold War. The new order was characterised by the desire of the United States to violently and unilaterally impose “regime change” on governments it held in contempt. This new order needed legal sanction, and the international criminal law movement obliged by fatally undermining the old order governed by the UN Charter and the Nuremberg Principles.

Michael’s argument, made with unassailable logic, is that given the context of NATO’s illegal attack on Yugoslavia in 1999, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (the “flagship”[5] post-Nuremberg tribunal first promoted by the movement), in turning a blind eye to the illegality of the attack, had no option but to become implicated in “the overthrow of international law and the UN Charter’s fundamental principles.”[6] Thus the ICTY (and by extension the International Criminal Court and the ad hoc tribunals such as the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda) had to fashion a “substitute legality”[7] in the form of the current face of international criminal law promoted by the international criminal law movement.

Michael’s starting points include the Charter of the United Nations: the “fundamental document of the old world order,” [8] the “world’s constitution,”[9]and the Nuremberg Principles.[10] The central tenets of the UN Charter are:

[T]he equality of states and the prohibition of the use of force in international relations. Violence is only permissible when authorized by the Security Council… The only permissible unilateral use of military force is the strictly limited right of self-defence, temporarily available until the Security Council can deal with the situation.[11]

The Preamble to the UN Charter expressly sets out as its goal “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.” Principle IV of the Nuremberg Principles sets out that crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity are punishable as crimes under international law. Principle IV defines crimes against peace, in part, as “planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances.” In a statement often cited by Michael in his writings and speeches, the judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal famously declared:

War is essentially an evil thing. Its consequences are not confined to the belligerent states alone, but affect the whole world. To initiate a war of aggression, therefore, is not only an international crime; it is the supreme international crime differing only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole.[12]

Michael pointed out that collateral to the establishment of the various new international criminal tribunals to try war crimes and crimes against humanity was the 1999 war over Kosovo “fought under the legally preposterous claim of unilateral ‘humanitarian intervention,’” and the “mortal blow” to the UN Charter of the 2001 war against Afghanistan, “under the equally preposterous claim of self-defence.”[13]

It is in the furnace of the NATO attack on Yugoslavia that the ICTY and the “substitute legality,” which the international criminal law movement is enamoured of, were forged. Under the “old world order,” the forcible violation of national sovereignty was a violation of the “sound and precious anti-war principles of the”[14] UN Charter and the supreme international crime. While NATO spokespersons tried to justify the attack on the pretext of “humanitarian intervention” (now renamed with the more soothing soubriquet, “responsibility to protect”[15]) such pretext was itself an admission of criminality:

‘Humanitarian intervention’ by military force finds no place in the Charter of the United Nations, because for the generation who wrote the Charter the ‘scourge’ was war betweenstates, the violation of national sovereignty that was Nuremberg’s ‘supreme crime’… The notion of a ‘humanitarian war’ would have rang in the ears of the drafters of the UN Charter as nothing short of Hitlerian, because it was precisely the justification used by Hitler himself for the invasion of Poland six years earlier.

Michael showed beyond doubt that the NATO attack was a violation of the UN Charter and a crime against peace—a crime punishable under international law. It was a war of aggression, a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, not least in breach of the UN Charter and the NATO Treaty. The latter Treaty including the Preamble and Articles 1 and 7 thereto attests to the primary responsibility of the UN Security Council and the subordination of NATO to the UN Charter. As he explained:

Neither Security Council authorization nor self-defence was even claimed by NATO as justification for the use of force… The preamble of the NATO Treaty (1949) states that the signers of this document are attesting to their commitment to the premises of the United Nations Charter as well as their resolve to live amicably with all human beings.[16]

(…) To purchase Justice Belied, click here.


[3] Speakers’ notes, Michael Mandel, unpublished, 2001.

[4] Michael Mandel, How America Gets Away With Murder, supra, fn. 1, p. 233.

[5] Michael Mandel, “The Legal Institutions of the New World Order: ‘Might Makes Right’ and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,” in Gordana Yovanovich, ed., The New World Order: Corporate Agenda and Parallel Reality, McGill-Queen’s University Press, Montréal, 2003, p. 72.

[6] Ibid. pp. 113-114.

[7] Ibid., p113-114.

[8] Ibid., p. 72.

[9] Michael Mandel, R2P & ICC v. UNC: The Responsibility to Protect and the International

Criminal Court versus the Charter of the United Nations in Costituzione Economia Globalizzazione, Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, Napoli, 2013, p. 1379.

[10] Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal. Adopted by the International Law Commission of the United Nations, 1950.

[11] Michael Mandel, “The Legal Institutions of the New World Order, supra, fn. 6.

[12] Michael Mandel, How America Gets Away With Murder, supra, fn. 1, p. 6.

[13] Michael Mandel, “The Legal Institutions of the New World Order,” supra, fn. 6.

[14] Michael Mandel, How America Gets Away With Murder, supra, fn. 1, p. 113.

[15] See Michael Mandel, R2P & ICC v. UNC: The Responsibility to Protect and the International Criminal Court versus the Charter of the United Nations, pp. 1379-1391.

[16] Michael Mandel, “The Legal Institutions of the New World Order,” supra, fn. 6, p. 75.

Contribution To The 20th Annual Conference Of Central European Political Science Association

Vilnius, a capital of Lithuania, is a host of The 20th Annual Conference of Central European Political Science Association: “Security Architecture in CEE: Present Threats and Prospects for Cooperation”. The conference place is at the Institute of International Relations and Political Science, Vilnius University, from September 25 to 26, 2015. It is organized by the Institute of International Relations and Political Science, Vilnius University and the Lithuanian Political Science Association. The conference sponsors are the Lithuanian Research Council, the Ministry of National Defence of the Republic of Lithuania, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania, and the Lithuanian Political Science Association. The number of participants with their own research papers is more than 30.

Unfortunately, our research paper proposal (abstract), submitted to the conference organizers before the deadline was rejected without a specific explanation of the reasons. Nevertheless, we are using this opportunity to participate to the conference online presenting both the abstract and the text of the research paper bellow:

The Post-Cold War NATO’s World Order and The Russian National Security

Prof. Dr. Vladislav B. Sotirović
Institute of Political Sciences, Mykolas Romeris University, Vilnius, Lithuania


This presentation investigates the Russian foreign politics after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the time of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) World Order as a new global hegemonic power. The particular stress is put on relations between pro-Western and pro-Orthodox approaches of the Russian national interests among the Russian domestic political scene and their attitudes towards the West. The research results are based on critical analyzes of the scientific literature and prime historical sources available for the author at the moment on the topic of the paper. A special stress is put on the internal Russia’s debates on national policy after the Cold War between the pro-western and pro-traditional forces. However, the main research part of the presentation is on Russia’s relations with the West at the time of the post-Cold War NATO’s World Order in regard to the Russian national security and the foreign policy interest.

Keywords – NATO, World Order, Russia, foreign policy, international relations, global politics, Pax Americana, Atlantic Empire

The Post-Cold War NATO’s World Order and The Russian National Security

Research paper

It is a pure historical fact that “in a sharp reversal of its withdrawal from Europe after 1918, after the end of World War II Washington employed all available tools of public and cultural diplomacy to influence the hearts and minds of Europeans”[1] as a strategy of the US-led Cold War policy against the USSR,[2] and after 1991 against Russia up today. Undoubtedly, the US succeeded after 1990 to transform herself into a sole global military-political hegemonic power – an unprecedented case in the world history.[3]

A Post-Cold War Global Politics

By the NATO’s globally aggressive policy and its eastward enlargement after the official end of the Cold War (1949−1989), the Russian state’s security question, reemerged as one of the major concerns in Russia.[4] However, in fact, for the NATO and its motor-head in the face of the USA, the Cold War is still on agenda of the global arena as after 1990 the NATO’s expansion and politics are directly directed primarily against Russia[5] but in perspective against China as well. Nevertheless, a fact that the NATO was not dissolved after the end of the Soviet Union (regardless on all official explanations why) is the crucial argument for the opinion that the Cold War is still reality in the world politics and the international relations.

It has to be noticed that the USSR was simply dissolved by one man-decision – a General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, who, concerning this matter, made a crucial deal in October 1986 with the US administration at two days bilateral meeting with the US President Ronald Reagan in Reykjavik in Iceland.[6] It is a matter of fact that the USSR was the only empire in the world history which became simply dissolved by its own government as the rest of the world empires were destroyed either from the outside after the lost wars or from the inside after the bloody civil wars or revolutions.[7]

There are in our opinion three main hypothetical reasons for Gorbachev’s decision to simply dissolve the Soviet Union:

  1. Personal bribing of Gorbachev by the western governments (the USA and the EC).
  2. Gorbachev’s wish, as the first and the only ethnic Russian ruler of the USSR to prevent a further economic exploitation of the Russian federal unit by the rest of the Soviet republics that was a common practice since the very beginning of the USSR after the Bolshevik (anti-Russian) Revolution and the Civil War of 1917−1921.
  3. Gorbachev’s determination to transform Russian Federation, which will firstly get rid of the rest of the Soviet tapeworm republics, into economically prosperous and well-to-do country by selling its own Siberia’s natural resources (gas and oil) to the West according to the global market prices.

In order not to spoil very good business relations with the West the Russian foreign policy during the last 23 years, up to the 2014 Ukrainian Crisis, was totally soft and even subservient to the West to whose mercy Moscow left the rest of the world including and the ex-Soviet republics with at least 25 million of the ethnic Russian population outside the motherland. For the matter of comparison, Belgrade in 1991 also left all other Yugoslav republics to leave the federation free of charge, at least for the second hypothetical Gorbachev’s reason to dissolve the USSR, but with one crucial difference in comparison with the Russian case in the same year: the ethnic Serbs outside Serbia were not left at mercy, at least not as free of charge, to the governments of the newly (anti-Serb and neo-Nazi) proclaimed independent states emerged on the wreck of (anti-Serb and dominated by Croatia and Slovenia) ex-Yugoslavia.[8] That was the main sin by Serbia in the 1990s and for that reason she was and still is sternly fined by the West.[9]

Russia’s Post-Cold War National Identity and State’s Security

Russia’s security and foreign policy after the dissolution of the USSR is a part of a larger debate over Russia’s “national interest” and even over the Russian new identity.[10] Since 1991, when her independence was formalized and internationally recognized, Russia has been searching for her national identity, state’s security and foreign policy.

The intellectual circles in Russia have debated very much over the content of the Russian national self-identity for centuries:

  1. On the one hand, there were/are those who believe that the Russian culture is a part of the European culture and as such the Russian culture can accept some crucial (West) European values in its development, especially from the time of the emperor Peter the Great (1672−1725).[11] This group, we could call them as the “Westernizers”, have never negated the existence of Russia’s specific characteristics as an Eurasian country, but have always believed that staying within the framework of the “Russian spectrum” is equivalent to the national suicide (a “fear of isolation” effect).
  2. However, on the other hand, there are those who have tried to preserve all traditional Russian forms of living and organizing, including both political and cultural features of the Russian civilization, not denying at the same time that Russia is a European country too. This, we can name them as the “patriotic” group, or the “Patriots”, of the Slavic orientation, partly nationalistically oriented, have believed and still believes that the (West) European civilizational and cultural values can never be adjusted to the Russian national character and that it is not necessary at all for the Russian national interest (a “fear of self-destruction” effect).

A confrontation of these two groups characterizes both the Russian history and the present-day political and cultural development. Very similar situation is, for instance, in Serbia today as the society is sharply divided into the so-called “First” (“patriotic”) and the “Second” (“western”) Serbia supporters.

At the moment, the basic elements of the Russian national identity and state’s policy are:

  1. The preservation of Russia’s territorial unity.
  2. The protection of Russia’s interior integrity and its external (state’s) borders.
  3. The strengthening of Russia’s statehood particularly against the post-Cold War NATO’s Drang nach Osten policy.
  4. The protection of the Russian diaspora at the territory of ex-USSR in order not to experience a destiny of the Serbs outside Serbia after the violent destruction of ex-Yugoslavia by the West and their inner clients.

The post-Soviet Russia (the Gazprom Republic of the “Power of Siberia”) rejected, at least for the time of the 2014 Ukrainian Crisis, the most significant element in her foreign policy that has historically been from the time of the emperor Ivan the Terrible (1530−1584) the (universal) imperial code – constant expansion of its territory or, at least, the position of a power that cannot be overlooked in the settlement of strategic global matters.[12] Therefore, after the Cold War Russia accepted the US’ global role of the new world Third Rome[13] and the US as the only global hegemonic power.[14] For the matter of illustration, the US has today 900 military bases in 153 countries around the world. A (Yeltsin’s) Russian servant position to the West was clearly proved during the NATO’s barbaric destruction of Serbia in 1999 – a fact which simply legitimized the NATO’s policy of the US global imperialism.

From historical point of view, it can be said that the US’ imperialism started in 1812 when the US’ administration proclaimed the war to Great Britain in order to annex the British colony of Canada.[15] However, the protagonists of a “Hegemonic stability theory” argue that “a dominant military and economic power is necessary to ensure the stability and prosperity in a liberal world economy. The two key examples of such liberal hegemons are the UK during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and the USA since 1945”. [16]

At the post-Cold War’s stage of Russia’s history, characterized by very harmonious (symphonic) economic and political relations with the West, at least up to the 2014 Ukrainian Crisis, especially with Germany, Russia in fact became a political colony of the West which is seen in Moscow eyes only as a good source for making money. The results of such kind of Russia-West relations from 1991 to 2014 were the Russian tourists all over the world, an impressive Russian state’s gold reserves (500 billion €), buying real estate properties all over the Mediterranean littoral by the Russians, huge Russian financial investments in Europe and finally, the Russian authorization of the NATO’s and the EU’s aggressive foreign policy at the Balkans, the Middle East and the Central Asia.

Russia’s Post-Cold War’s Foreign Policy

Russia’s foreign policy is surely a part of her national and cultural identity as for any other state in history. From 1991 up to 2014, Moscow accepted the western academic and political propaganda as a sort of the “new facts” that:

  1. Russia is reportedly no longer a global super or even military power, although its considerable military potential is undeniable and very visible.
  2. Russia allegedly has no economic power, although it has by very fact an enormous economic potential.
  3. Russia, as a consequence, cannot have any significant political influence which could affect the new international relations established after 1991, i.e. the NWO (the NATO’s World Order), or better to say – the Pax Americana.[17]

It made Russia a western well paid client state as in essence no strategic questions can be solved without Russian permission, however for certain sum of money or other way of compensation. For instance, the Kosovo status was solved in 2008 between Russia and the NATO/EU on exactly this way as Russia de facto agreed to Kosovo self-proclaimed independence (as the US’s client territory or colony) for in turn the western also de facto agreement to the South Ossetia’s and Abkhazia’s self-proclaimed independence as in fact the Russian protected territories.[18]

Since Russia formally has lost all the attributes of a super power after the dissolution of the Soviet Union (up to 2014), her political elite has in the early 1990s become oriented towards closer association with the institutional structures of the West – in accordance with her officially general drift towards liberal-democratic reform (in fact towards the tycoonization of the whole society and politics, like in all East European transitional countries). Till 1995 Russia had become a member of almost all structures of the NATO, even of the “Partnership for Peace Programme” what is telling the best about the real aims of the Gazprom Russia’s foreign policy up to 2014 when Russia finally decided to defend her own national interest, at least at the doorstep (i.e., in the Eastern Ukraine) of her own home. In May 1997 Russia signed the “NATO’s−Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security”, what meant de facto that she accepted the NATO as the core of the Euro-Atlantic system of security.

For the matter of comparison with the USA, in October 1962, at the height of the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union came to the brink of a real nuclear war over the placement of the USSR’s missiles in the island of Cuba – a courtyard (not even a doorstep) of the USA. It was the closest moment the world ever came to unleashing the WWIII.[19] In the other words, during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis the US’ Kennedy’s administration was ready to invade the independent state of Cuba (with already the US’ military base on the island) and even to go to the WWIII against the USSR if necessary as Washington understood Cuba as a courtyard of the USA.

Whether or not the ruling structures in Russia had expected a more important role for their country in its relations with the new partners, since 1995 there has been certain stagnation in the relations with the West, accompanied by the insistence on the national interests of Russia. In practice, this was manifested in the attempts to strengthen the connections with the Commonwealth of the Independent States (the CIS) with which Russia had more stable and secure relations. However, the state of relations within the CIS, accompanied with a very difficult economic and politically unstable situation in some of the countries in the region, prevented any organizational or other progress in this direction. Still, the CIS has remained the primary strategic focus for Russia, especially when it comes to the insolent expansion of the NATO towards these countries (the NATO’s Drang nach Osten).


At the end we will express several basic conclusions in relations to the topic of contemporary Russian relations with the NATO, or better to say, to the debate of the main issue of the present-day Russian foreign policy – between the West and herself:

  1. The post-Soviet Russia was at least until 2014 Ukrainian Crisis politically very deeply involved in the western system of international relations and cultural values that was basically giving to Moscow a status of the western client partner on the international scene of the NATO’s World Order.
  2. A full victory of the Russian “Westernizers” up to 2014 allow them to further westernize Russia according to the pattern of the Emperor Peter the Great with the price of Russia’s inferiority and even servility in the international relations. For that reason, the West already succeeded (at least up to 2014) to encircle Russia with three rings of Russia’s enemies: the NATO at the West, the Muslim Central Asian states at the South and China at the South-East.
  3. The West was buying Russia’s inferiority at the international scene by keeping perfect economic relations with Moscow that was allowing Russia, especially Russia’s tycoons, to become enormously reach. These harmonious West-Russia political-economic relations are going to be broken in the future only under two circumstances: I. If the Russian “Patriots” with take political power in Kremlin (after the military putsch or new revolution?), or II. If the West will introduce any kind of serious (real) economic-political sanctions against Russia (i.e. to restrict importing Russian gas and oil or to limit business operations of the Russian oil and gas companies outside Russia).
  4. Up to now, concerning Europe, the South-East Europe experienced a full degree of the Washington-led NATO’s World Order policy as it is totally left to the western hands by Moscow and the region is already incorporated into the NATO’s World Order as a part of the western (the NATO & the EU) post-Cold War concept of the Central and East Europe as a buffer zone against Russia.[20] Nowadays, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is on agenda of the US’s punishment for any closer relations with Russia (the “Turkish Stream”). As it was in the case of Serbia in 1999, the US sponsored regional Albanians (exactly from Kosovo) are the instrument of destabilization, in this case, of Macedonia as an overture to the territorial secession of the Albanian-populated West Macedonia which is going to be put, like Kosovo, under the NATO’s total occupation.

Prof. Dr. Vladislav B. Sotirovic

© Vladislav B. Sotirovic 2015



[1] A. Stephan (ed.), The Americanization of Europe. Culture, Diplomacy, and Anti-Americanism after 1945, New York−Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2006, 1.

[2] D. Junker (ed.), The United States and Germany in the Era of the Cold War, 1945−1990: A Handbook, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

[3] D. P. Forsythe, P. C. McMahon, A. Wedeman (eds.), American Foreign Policy in a Globalized World, New York−London: Routledge, 2006, 1.

[4] About history of the Cold War, see in [J. Lewis, The Cold War: A New History, New York: Penguin Books, 2005; M. V. Zubok, A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev, The University of North Carolina Press, 2007].

[5] K. W. Thompson, NATO Expansion, University Press of America, 1998.

[6] J. G. Wilson, The Triumph of Improvisation: Gorbachev’s Adaptability, Reagan’s Engagement, and the End of the Cold War, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014; K. Adelman, Reagan at Reykjavik: Forty-Eight Hours That Ended The Cold War, New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2014.

[7] About the end of the USSR, see in [S. Plokhy, The Last Empire: The Final Days of the Soviet Union, New York: Basic Books, 2014].

[8] About different opinions on the nature of Yugoslavia, see in [J. B. Allcock, Explaining Yugoslavia, New York: Columbia University Press, 2000; R. Sabrina, The Three Yugoslavias: State-Building and Legitimation, 1918−2005, Indiana University Press, 2006].

[9] About the wars of Yugoslavia’s succession in the 1990s, see in [S. Trifunovska (ed.), Yugoslavia Through Documents: From its creation to its dissolution, Dordrecht-Boston-London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1994; S. L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War, Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995; R. H. Ullman, (ed.), The World and Yugoslavia’s Wars, New York: A Council on Foreign Relations, 1996; D. Oven, Balkan Odyssey, London: Indigo, 1996; B. Marković, Yugoslav Crisis and the World: Chronology of Events: January 1990−October 1995, Beograd, 1996; J. Guskova, Istorija jugoslovenske krize, I−II. Beograd: Izdavački grafički atelje „M“, 2003; V. B. Sotirović, Emigration, Refugees and Ethnic Cleansing: The Death of Yugoslavia, 1991−1999, Saarbrücken: LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing, 2013].

[10] M. Laruelle (ed.), Russian Nationalism, Foreign Policy, and Identity Debates in Putin’s Russia: New Ideological Patterns After the Orange Revolution, Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag, 2012.

[11] About Peter the Great and his reforms in Russia, see in [L. Hughes, Russia in the Age of Peter the Great, New Haven−London: Yale University Press, 2000; J. Cracraft, The Revolution of Peter the Great, Cambridge, Mass.−London, England: Harvard University Press, 2003; J. Anisimov, Rusijos istorija nuo Riuriko iki Putino. Žmonės. Įvykiai. Datos, Vilnius: Mokslo ir enciklopedijų leidybos centras, 2014, 203−229].

[12] About the idea of the Holy Russia as a Third Rome, see in [M. R. Johnson, The Third Rome: Holy Russia, Tsarism and Orthodoxy, The Foundation for Economic Liberty, Inc., 2004].

[13] About the US’ post-Cold War imperialism and global hegemony, see in [G. V. Kiernan, America, The New Imperialism: From White Settlement to World Hegemony. London: Verso, 2005; J. Baron, Great Power Peace and American Primacy: The Origins and Future of a New International Order, London−New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.

[14] N. Chomsky, Hegemony or Survival: America’s Quest for Global Dominance, New York: Penguin, 2004.

[15] H. B. Parks, Istorija Sjedinjenih Američkih Država, Beograd: Izdavačka radna organizacija „Rad“, 1986, 182−202.

[16] A. Heywood, Global Politics, London−New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, 229.

[17] About the Pax Americana, see in [G. Dorrien, Imperial Designs: Neo Conservatism and The New Pax Americana, London−New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2004; A. Parchami, “The Pax Americana Debate”, Hegemonic Peace and Empire: The Pax Romana, Britanica and Americana, London−New York: Routledge, 2009; A. Roncallo, The Political Economy of Space in The Americas: The New Pax Americana, London−New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2014. On the remaking of the World Order, see [S. P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilization and The Remaking of World Order, London: The Free Press, 2002; H. Kissinger, World Order, Penguin Press HC, 2014]. On the post-Cold War’s US-Russia’s relations up to the 2014 Ukrainian Crisis, see in [A. E. Stent, U.S.−Russian Relations in the Twenty-First Century, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014].

[18] About the “Kosovo precedent” and the ethnopolitical conflicts in the Caucasus, see in [A. Hehir (ed.), Kosovo, Intervention and Statebuilding: The International Community and the Transition to Independence, London-New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2010; V. B. Sotirović, “Kosovo and the Caucasus: A Domino Effect”, Српска политичка мисао (Serbian Political Thought), 41 (3), Belgrade: Institute for Political Studies, 2013, 231−241.

[19] R. F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days: A Memoir of The Cuban Missile Crisis, W. W. Norton & Company, 1999; D. Munton, D. A. Welch, The Cuban Missile Crisis: A Concise History, Oxford−New York: Oxford University Press, 2006; M. Dobbs, One Minute to Midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro on The Brink of Nuclear War, Borzoi Book, 2008; B. L. Pardoe, Fires of October: The Planned US Invasion of Cuba During The Missile Crisis of 1962, Fonthill Media Limited−Fonthill Media LLC, 2013.

[20] About the post-Cold War western supremacy in the global politics and international relations, see in [S. Mayer, NATO’s Post-Cold War Politics: The Changing Provision of Security, London−New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014; K. Pijl, The Discipline of Western Supremacy: Modes of Foreign Relations and Political Economy, III, London−New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014]. About a typical example of the western (the US’) colony in the region, Kosovo-Metohija as a part of the Pax Americana, see in [H. Hofbauer, Eksperiment Kosovo: Povratak kolonijalizma, Beograd: Albatros Plus, 2009]. On the relations between the NATO and the European Union, see in [L. Simon, Geopolitical Change, Grand Strategy and European Security: The EU−NATO Conundrum, London−New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013]. About the history of a greater concept of the East Europe between the Germans and the Russians, see in [R. Bideleux, I. Jeffries, A History of Eastern Europe. Crisis and Change, London−New York: Routledge, 1999; A. C. Janos, East Central Europe in the Modern World. The Politics of the Borderlands from Pre- to PostCommunism, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000].


Complete article published as: “The NATO’s World Order, the Balkans and the Russian National Interest”, International Journal of Politics & Law Research, Sciknow Publications Ltd., Vol. 3, № 1, 2015, New York, NY, USA, ISSN 2329-2253 (print), ISSN 2329-2245 (online), pp. 10−19 (

The Nazi Solution Of The “Serb Question” In The 1990s Croatia

On September 10th, 2015 a City Council of Croatia’s capital Zagreb decided to promote a war criminal General Ante Gotovina to “honorable citizen of the City of Zagreb” for his “contribution to the defending of Croatia’s independence and territorial integrity”. The General, however, as a Commander-in-Chief of Croatia’s army, is directly responsible for a brutal ethnic cleansing and war crimes committed by Croatia’s army, police forces and state authorities over the Serbs during the SS-punishment-style military-police operation “Storm” (Oluja) in August 1995 when around 3000 ethnic Serbs in the Krajina region were killed and 250.000 expelled from their homes. That was the biggest and most terrible ethnic cleansing and genocide committed after the WWII in Europe. The promotion of Gotovina, nevertheless, shows that present-day Croatia is founded on the basis of the WWII Nazi-Ustashi-regime’s Independent State of Croatia (the NDH) that had as its crucial political task to solve the “Serb Question” within its borders (Croatia, Dalmatia, Srem, Slavonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina) according to the German-Nazi pattern of solving the “Jewish Question” during the WWII.

A “Serb Question” and its Nazi solution in Croatia

A question of the Serb existence on the “ethnohistorical” lands of the Croat nation was at least during the last hundred years a very fundamental element of any ultraright Croat ideology, party, organization or movement, but above all of the Ustashi, as the Orthodox Serb were seen and declared as the most dangerous “natural enemy” to both Croatia and the Croat people. The Anti-Serbism became, however, the main cornerstone of making the Croat national unity and gathering all Croats around a common focus of ethnopolitical coherence.[1] The Serbs were accused for the territorial expansionism, occupation of the Croat land and its exploitation at the time of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (1918−1929), the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (1929−1941) and the Socialist Yugoslavia (1945−1991) as all of these three multiethnic states were proclaimed as a Greater Serbia. The Serbs and Serbia were seen as the main cause of all Croatia’s misfortunes and above all as the only obstacle for Croatia’s independence.[2] The Croatia’s Government together with other right-wing nationalistic structures tried from the very beginning of the preparations for the proclamation of the new independence of Croatia in 1991 (the second Independent State of Croatia) formally, but unsuccessfully, to convince the Serbs and Serbia that there was no real “Serb Question” in Croatia and that the Serbs had nothing to fear in independent and democratic post-Yugoslav Croatia. However, for the majority of Serbs from both sides of the Drina River it was completely clear that a new independent Croatia will be just a replica of the WWII Nazi-Ustashi Independent State of Croatia in regard to the “Serb Question” just covered by declarative and formal democracy. It was visible for them either from the practical rehabilitation of the NDH in Tudjman’s Croatia and the harsh anti-Serb rhetoric by the officials or from the very fact that no one political party or official in Croatia did not want to discuss with the Serbs about their cultural and/or political autonomy.

A policy of opposing and hating the Serbs in the HDZ’s Croatia[3] had political, confessional and moral connotation. To fight “natural enemies” was all the time one of the fundamental requirements of any nationalistic ideology. Hence, the national education system has to be rearranged on this way to teach the nation who, and why, is the national enemy and how the nation has to struggle against the enemy. In the case of Tudjman’s Croatia, the main national enemy ware proclaimed to be the Serbs. Subsequently, the Serb traces in Croatia had to be erased by different techniques including the ban of Cyrillic alphabet or cleansing Croatia’s libraries from the Serb authors. Nevertheless, a public vilification of the Serbs as a nation in Croatia had and its own racial dimension as it was exactly during the existence of the WWII NDH. Probably the most racist MP from the HDZ – Shime Djodan, made a very abusing remark on the Serb physiognomy during his speech in the Parliament. Usually, the Serbs were considered as a racially inferior having the “Byzantine” or/and “Turkish” blood as it was noticed, for instance in 1995, by the HDZ’s member Anton Vrdoljak, head of Croatia’s Radio Television (the HRT).[4] The political consequences of a Croat nationalistic picturing of the Serbs as a root of all evil in Croatia lead the nationalists to require the maximal restriction of political rights of the Serbs in Croatia including and the right to citizenship and therefore to vote. Such calling for political discrimination on the ethnic basis was, however, formally not presented in the official party’s statutes in which there was a proclamation of no discrimination on the basis on the national identity, as it was the case, for instance, with the HSP.[5] A leader of this party, Ante Djapic was quite clear about the position of the Serbs in the post-Yugoslav Croatia: “[the Serbs should] either bow down or get out of the way”.[6] Subsequently, all Croat nationalists firmly opposed any kind of political negotiations with Croatia’s (Krajina) Serbs, rejected their representation in the Parliament and arguing that the Serb Orthodox Church in Croatia has to be abolished and instead of it the Orthodox Church of Croatia should be established (like in the WWII NDH). Since the Croat military-police operation “Oluja” (Storm) of ethnic cleansing of the Krajina Serbs in August 1995, all Croat nationalistic parties, including above all the ruling HDZ, did everything in order to prevent the return of the Serb refugees (about 250,000)[7] to their homes. In order to achieve this goal, usually three methods were used:

  1. Demolition of the Serb houses.
  2. Public announcing the Serb names as wanted war criminals.
  3. Physical attacking, or even killing, the Serb refugees.

Nevertheless, either the HDZ or other right-wing Croat parties never recognized the mass exodus of Krajina Serbs from Croatia in August 1995 as the ethnic cleansing as for them it was rather a free choice of homeland as it was officially stated by the President Franjo Tudjman. The official Croatia as well never recognized the existence of the concentration camps for the Serbs in the 1990s on the territory of Croatia like it was in the Pakrac poljana, around Gospic, and in Sisak.[8] According to the Croat nationalists, the problem of depopulated parts of Croatia (once inhabited by the Serbs) after August 1995, should be solved by housing the ethnic Croat diaspora and the Croat refugees. That was exactly the best option of the final solution of the “Serb Question” in Croatia which mostly satisfied Franjo Tudjman who when he took his “freedom train” on August 26th, 1995 from Zagreb to Split via depopulated Krajina region said that the Serbs: “had disappeared ignominiously, as if they had never populated this land. We urged them to stay, but they didn’t listen to us and, well bon voyage”.[9] Regardless that the HSP urged the Government to introduce a special legislation on restricting the return of the Serb refugees, it was, nevertheless, activated a law according to which the refugees had right to reclaim their property during the three-month period. That was a legal mechanism used in order not to create real conditions for the Serb refugees to return back. Therefore, the “Serb Question” in Tudjman’s Croatia was solved on the way that today there are only 4 percent of the Serbs out of total Croatia’s population in comparison to 12 percent according to the 1991 census.[10] The task from 1991, when Croatia’s governmental forces started the war against their own citizens of the Serb origin,[11] was finally realized in August 1995: the Serbs who remained in Croatia became politically not dangerous and under complete governmental control and served as a proof to the international community that Croatia is formally multiethnic society.

Against the western liberalism for conservative order                                                        

The Croat ultranational parties and other organizations expressed a visible form of anomaly in their ideological and programmatic concepts as on the one hand promoted an idea of protection of the West European culture and civilization but at the same time, on the other hand, expressed a great extent of suspicion and even hostility towards the western liberalism.[12] The western liberalism, in their opinion, was speaking in the favor of an individual, his/her freedom, rights and prosperity but not in the favor of a nation and national interest. As for all ultranationalists, a nation was über alles and therefore any ideology that was not speaking primarily in the favor of a nation was not acceptable and even seen as destructive since only the particularity of the nation is giving a real meaning to the life of the individual. A destructive nature of the western liberalism was primarily seen in regard to the liberal approach toward the family question as the ultranationalists reject the liberal emphasis on individual freedom of choice and rights and on personal benefits from such choice. What they support instead of liberal ideology of personal free choice is an ideology which is advocating the promotion of welfare of the nation and realization of the national state policy. As for the Croat ultranationalists the main problem and obstacle for prosperity of Croatia and Croats were the Serbs, their requirement for demographic renewal of the Croat nation was politically pointed against the Serbs. Basically they adopted a demographic (boom) policy of Kosovo Albanians after the WWII in their fight against the local Serbs. For the Croat ultraright parties, a family structure has to be framed within the conservative-patriarchal order as the best way to biologically increase the population of the ethnic Croats as, for instance, Franjo Tudjman stated in one of his speeches in the Parliament.[13] Subsequently, in order to ensure a higher rate of the ethnic Croat population growth, the abortion was seen as a national suicide. Such clear calling for national duties instead of individual right of free choice was a direct rejection of the West European liberal political foundation of the society and state.

The HDZ’s economic policy was as well framed for the sake to subordinate state economy to state-building task. For that reason, the members of HDZ supported an idea and practice of significant state ownership that was also in odd to the western liberalism. However, in the HDZ’s Croatia a process of corruption and taycoonization of economic resources and infrastructure by well-placed HDZ’s political leaders was well-known practice which led to their personal and family enrichment.

As a part of anti-liberal policy, the liberal-democratic notion of the citizenship was crucially challanged by the HDZ’s rulling authority as the voting rights for the state and the other public officials became based on the ethnic (Croat) background rather than on the residence criteria. Therefore, it was practically reserved twelve seats in Croatia’s Parliament for the ethic Croat diaspora for the very reason that the HDZ was and is traditionally supported by the Croat diaspora especially from Bosnia-Herzegovina. The citizenship law was also changed in the favor of the ethnic Croat diaspora as Croatia was proclaimed as the motherland of all ethnic Croats.[14] However, a similar ethno-citizenship/voting law in Miloshevic’s Serbia was never introduced at least for the very political reason that the Serb diaspora in the West opposed his policy as anti-Serbian. In the other words, Miloshevic’s Serbia was seen, by the Constitution, as a homeland of all her inhabitants, rather than only of all ethic Serbs wherever they live.

Probably, the HDZ’s deny of any kind of the regional autonomy in Croatia was the expression of the policy of anti-liberal democracy concept of minority rights. Therefore, the regional parties of Istria, (the Serb populated) Krajina and Dalmatia suffered mostly from such policy of a brutal centralization of Croatia. However, in Miloshevic’s Serbia, two regions of Vojvodina and Kosovo-Metochia enjoyed at least ethno-cultural regional autonomy if not political one as it was fixed at the time of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia according to the 1974 Constitution (up to 1989).

In general, the Croat ultranationalists were against the basic values of the western liberalism but also and against many segments of the western culture especially of the U.S. as they perceived such culture as an attempt to destroy the authentic values of the Croat nation. The West became accused and for the attempts to undermine the independence of Croatia and even to recreate some form of the Yugoslav (or Balkan) confederation with the Serbs and Serbia. Therefore, the U.N.’s UNPROFOR’s detachments, deployed on the territory of the Republic of Serb Krajina (as the U.N.’ protection zone) were called to be removed from the territory of Croatia as the main obstacle for her territorial reunification. Nevertheless, Croatia became finally reunited within the borders of a Greater Croatia of Josip Broz Tito after the WWII when Croatia’s military and police reoccupied the territory of Krajina in August 1995 under the blessing of both the U.S.’s administration and the UNPROFOR’s command. Therefore, for the Croat ultranationalists the suspicions of possible Western designs to recreate a form of Yugoslavia disappeared after the operation “Storm” but their suspicions to the Western political liberalism and cultural and social values of the liberal ideology are present up today.

Prof. Dr. Vladislav B. Sotirovic

© Vladislav B. Sotirovic 2015



[1] The same ethnopolitical role of national coherence played anti-Semitism in the ideology of the Nazi Germany. In the Croat case, the anti-Semitism was not important factor in the ultranationalist ideology, at least up to the WWII.

[2] For instance, see: J. Jareb, Pola stoljeća hrvatske politike: Povodom Mačekove autobiografije, Zagreb: Institut za suvremenu povijest, 1995, V−X.

[3] The HDZ = A Croat Democratic Union, a political ruling party of Franjo Tudjman.

[4] Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: Eastern Europe, 1995-08-10.

[5] Temeljna načela i statut, Hrvatska stranka prava, 1991-02-24.

[6] Interview with Ante Djapic, Glas Slavonije, 1995-08-19.

[7] В. Ђ. Мишина (уредник), Република Српска Крајина: Десет година послије, Београд: Добра воља, 2005, 48.

[8] J. Guskova, Istorija jugoslovenske krize (1990−2000), 1, Beograd: Izdavački grafički atelje “M”, 2003, 223.

[9] J. A. Irvine, “Ultranationalist Ideology and State-Building in Croatia, 1990−1996”, Problems of Post-Communism, July/August 1997, 40. It is clear from the transcripts of the meeting between Croatia’s Government and military officials at Brioni just before the operation “Storm” started that Tudjman’s requirement was that the Serbs have to disappear from Croatia [].

[10] On the present-day territory of Croatia there were 24 percent of the Serbs before the WWII.

[11] That Croatia’s Government launched the war against the Serbs in 1991 in order to provoke them is confirmed by Tudjman’s first minister of police, Josip Boljkovac in his interview in 2014 [].

[12] On the western liberalism, see [L. Mises, Liberalism in the Classical Tradition, San Francisco, California: Cobden Press, 1985; E. Fawcett, Liberalism: The Life of an Idea, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014; M. Freeden, Liberalism: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2015].

[13] F. Tudjman, S vjerom u samostalnu Hrvatsku, Zagreb: Narodne novine, 1995, 79−90.

[14] On the concept of citizenship, see: W. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights, Oxford−New York: Oxford University Press, 1995; R. Bellamy, Citizenship: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford−New York: Oxford University Press, 2008; É. Balibar, Citizenship, Cambridge, UK−Malden, USA: Polity Press, 2015. The same citizenship concept, for example, is accepted by all three Baltic States after the collapse of the Soviet Union: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

Drama At The UN Security Council: Israel’s Illegal Settlements

Loss of land in Palestine under Israeli occupation

“The United States has been sending a message that the settlements must stop privately and publicly for nearly five decades.

Samantha Power, US Ambassador to the UN

Christians following the Gregorian calendar are getting busy to celebrate Christmas, but the business of diplomacy continued in the United Nations.  In the Security Council, anticipation about a particular resolution was greater than usual.

On Friday, interest was piqued by what the Obama administration’s representative, Samantha Power, would do about a particular resolution that had riled Israeli politicians, US president-elect Donald Trump, and various members of the US Congress.

Resolution 2334, as worded, demanded that Israel “immediately and completely cease all settlement activities in the occupied Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem” claiming that the establishment of Israeli settlements had “no legal validity and constitutes a flagrant violation under international law and a major obstacle to the achievement of the two-State solution and a just, lasting and comprehensive peace.”

The resolution further reiterated that no recognition would be afforded to “any changes to the 4 June 1967 lines, including with regard to Jerusalem, other than those agreed by the parties through negotiations.” States were also “to distinguish, in their relevant dealings, between the territory of the State of Israel and the territories occupied since 1967”.

The resolution had already danced a jig into hasty retreat after Egypt expressed second thoughts on whether it should go head.  On Thursday, Danny Danon, Israel’s ambassador to the UN, breathed a sigh of relief at Cairo’s change of heart – momentarily.  “The delaying of the vote is an important step.  However, we realize that this issue is not yet resolved.”[1]

On that score, Israeli pressure had proven to be effective, mounted aggressively by Netanyahu, the Foreign Ministry and the National Security Council.  Donald Trump’s huffing had also convinced the Egypt to desist, though the exact form of that persuasion is unclear. It was left to New Zealand, Malaysia, Venezuela and Senegal to take the wheels of the resolution and drive it to a vote.

Would traditional US form prevail?  The traditionalists, initially taken off guard, thought so.  (In 2011, the Obama administration used its veto against a similar resolution.)  Trump certainly hoped so.  “As the United States has long maintained,” claimed the president-elect in a statement on Thursday, “peace between the Israelis and the Palestinians will only come through direct negotiations between the parties, and not through the imposition of terms by the United Nations.”[2]

For Trump, mounting the soapbox in favour of such a position was prejudicial – to Israel.  “This puts Israel in a very poor negotiating position and is extremely unfair to all Israelis.”  Trump had already signalled his position on Israeli affairs with his nomination for the post of US ambassador to Israel, David Friedman.

Friedman’s record behind encouraging the settlement program is known. He rejects any notion that a two-state solution is viable and has suggested that Israel fob off all international criticism and annex part of the West Bank.[3]  He has excoriated morally troubled Jews supporting a two-state solution as “kapos,” the dark term used to describe Jews dragooned into assisting the extermination of their own people by the Nazis.  In some instances, his views make those of Netanyahu moderate.

An answer finally came: an abstention by the US was registered, meaning that it passed with 14 votes.  Power’s statement suggested that the goals of continuing settlement programs being pursued by Israel, and the negotiations on a two-state solution, were mutually exclusive.

“One cannot simultaneously champion expanding Israeli settlements and champion a viable two-state solution that would end the conflict.” The choice had to be made “between settlements and separation.”

This stark view was not one shared by such pro-Israeli stalwarts as Republican Senator John McCain.  In these circles, Israel remains the perennial, noble victim, permanently at the mercy of forces it needs to control, and even repel.

Noble victims, armed to the teeth with the most modern of weaponry and nuclear weapons, indifferent to thieves masquerading as squatters, tend to spout gibberish before the canons of international law.  “By voting yes in favour of this resolution,” claimed Danon, “you have in fact voted no.   You voted no to negotiation, you voted no to progress and a chance for better lives for Israelis and Palestinians, and you voted no to the possibility of peace.”[4]  Bully knows best.

In abstaining, the United States marked “a troubling departure from our nation’s long, bipartisan history of defending our ally Israel in the United States.”[5]  A defence was always to be mounted for that beleaguered state, right or wrong.

The office of the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu promised in rejecting “this shameful anti-Israel resolution at the UN” that it would “not abide by its terms”.  Asserting a sacred proprietary lease, if not right, on US political good will, Netanyahu’s office also looked “forward to working with president-elect Trump and with all our friends in Congress, Republicans and Democrats alike, to negate the harmful effects of this absurd resolution.”

That stance has been a long standing one: legal writ, ill-fitting for Israel’s foreign and domestic policy, will be disregarded.  Washington’s buffering support can be counted upon.  With a Trump presidency, support for such a stance will be forthcoming – in bucket loads.