Kosovo ISIL – A Photo Documentation

6siptarskiuckteroristasafantomkom

index

Jihad4

Jihad5

Jihad6

Jihad8

Jihad14

Jihad12

61 spaljena srpska crkva konaci

Јихад

9 Samodreza

Јужна Косовска Митровица 2015 новембар

Monah na rusevinama crkve

terorista-pripadnik-ovk-uck

OVK-терористи

Spaljeni konaci

gracanica u bodljikavoj zici

ChurchRoof

Baceni krst sa crkve

images

NokosovounescoJPG

Picture9

siptarska devojcica i natpis u Djakovici smrt

21 devic manastir marta 2004

63 raspeto kosovo1

64 raspeto kosovo 2


Join the debate on our Twitter Timeline!

All The American Lies About Serbs – Some Of The Worst War Crimes Have Been Committed By Reporters

vucicevi-prijatelji-790x481

In the sea of misinformation sloshing around the Western media during the Yugoslav civil wars, Serbs fared the worst. As a rule, they were accused even of atrocities that never happened, or were committed by others. The real truth would usually emerge several years later, from the mouths of international officials who at the time held important and responsible positions.

Jack Kelley.jpg

Jack Kelley: Thousands of Serbs died due to his fabricated stories; that puts him on war criminal list

American press and electronic media have “discovered” that the Serbs weren’t the “bad guys” to the extent the American reporters from the Balkans made them out to be. Even though Jack Kelly, a correspondent of USA Today, resigned  years ago because his employers decided he had deceived his editors and fabricated information in his reports from over 90 countries, including Serbia, his lies remained ‘cemented’ and not even a matter of questioning and examinations anymore.  However, the cause for investigating Kelly was his article, “UN: Reports connect Serbs to war crimes,” which Kelly filed from Belgrade on July 14, 1999.

In the article, Nelly said he talked to a human rights activist in Belgrade, who had allegedly received a confession from a Serbian soldier that he had orders to commit ethnic cleansing. Internal investigation established that Kelly never met the activist. Kelly claimed to have interviewed the activist, but as he could not find the translator who was supposedly present at the conversation to confirm the story, he asked a friend – also a translator – to lie to the editors and pass herself off as the witness. Kelly explained this fraud by “panic” that had seized him because of the investigation.

Reporters in CIA Service

In the sea of misinformation sloshing around the Western media during the Yugoslav civil wars, Serbs fared the worst. As a rule, they were accused even of atrocities that never happened, or were committed by others. The real truth would usually emerge several years later, from the mouths of international officials who at the time held important and responsible positions

Jackson KLA.jpg

British general Mike Jackson with Albanian terrorists in the province of Kosovo i Metohija, 1999. On the picture:  British general Jackson, war criminal, mafia leader Ramush Haradinai, Albanian  and Croatian general involved in genocide of Serbs both in Krajina and Kosovo i Metohija, Rahim Ademi

When Serbs captured a British mercenary, Robert Allan Lofthouse, in February 1993 on Mt. Majevica, he confessed to Serb counter-intelligence agents that he had been in satellite communication with an American reporter. The reporter was Roy Gutman, former Reuters correspondent in Belgrade, later reporting for Newsday from Zagreb and Sarajevo. According to Lofthouse, the American told him he was a CIA agent “2-IC”.

Gutman’s first war report was in 1991. He filed a story from Herceg-Novi [Montenegro], reporting on the Serb destruction of Old Town Dubrovnik as if he witnessed it first-hand. He later reported the same way on Serb “massacres” and “mass rapes” in Bosnia.

Sources for his reports were the Islamic Community, Turkish-American Women’s Society, manager of Tuzla television Dr Arif Tanović, and the mercenary, Robert Allan Lofthouse

crni kvartet.jpg

Bill Clinton, Madeleine Albright, Tony Blair;  US Secretary of Defense William Cohen claimed to the world that Serbs had killed “100,000 Albanians” in Kosovo. KFOR has so far exhumed less than 3000 dead, mostly Serbs; meanwhile several thousands Serbs are still missing. 

Another arrested reporter, American David Rohde, was deported from the Serb Republic win late 1995. As a correspondent of the Boston-based Christian Science Monitor, Rohde used CIA sources to locate places near Srebrenica where Muslims had supposedly been massacred.

Born in Hartford, Kentucky in August 1967, Rohde was “always there when America defended its national interests – Cuba, Syria, USSR, Estonia, and Bosnia,” say his parents, Harvey and Carol.

Pulitzer for a deception

Rohde came to the Serb Republic with falsified documents and no reporter card. His predecessor, Jonathan Landay, was expelled from Pale after he was caught sending information to the CIA. In Srebrenica, Rhode found “blood on the walls and scattered documents of the missing,” but no mass graves he was looking for at CIA’s behest. Having been presented as a “victim of the Serbs” upon returning to the US, Rohde received the 1995 Pulitzer Prize for his report on mass graves in Srebrenica (which were never found).

US Army analyst, Lt. Col John E. Sray wrote in his wartime diary that famous reporters Christiane Amanpour and Peter Jennings accepted Muslim propaganda as unvarnished truth, and sent anti-Serb reports from Bosnia.

Amanpour

Serbs were blamed for the atrocities in Vase Miskina street [breadline] and Markale [marketplace], where several dozen innocent civilians were killed. This led to sanctions against Serbia (from 1992 onward), and the bombing of Bosnian Serb military positions [in 1995]. Almost a decade later, then-UNPROFOR commander, UK General Michael Rose explained in his memoirs that Serbs were falsely accused, and that the fatal shells most likely came from Muslim positions in order to provoke a reaction of the West.

Islamistii Albanci

Invisible for global media presstitutes – Severed Serb heads, both in Bosnia and Kosovo, seem to be media – invisible. 

Concerning the 1993 massacre at the Sarajevo Markale marketplace, future US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright not only lied, but in her effort to deceive the world also declared the evidence “classified.” The evidence she tried to suppress has revealed beyond any doubt that Bosnian Muslims butchered their own people to win world sympathy. That lie has subsequently cost the Serbs thousands of innocent lives.

Olbrajtka.jpg

The Western public calmly ignores the fact that many Pulitzer laureates built their careers on Serb-slandering lies. Reporters of the British ITN, who shot the exclusive footage of “starving Bosniaks in Serb concentration camps,” did not confess until 1997 that the footage was a deception. CNN’s star reporter Christiane Amanpour often reported from Pale, claiming to be “live from Sarajevo,” and solicited outrage against the “Chetniks who raped 50,000 Bosniak women.” No one in the West seemed interested for the epilogue of such stories, such as the case of one of the allegedly “raped” Bosniak women, who was given asylum in Switzerland and there gave birth to an African baby. Similar monstrous lies were repeated during the Kosovo war, again demonizing the Serbs.

article-1338412-0C79227B000005DC-432_634x498.jpg

Richard Hoolbroke joins KLA terrorists involved in organized crime including organ harvesting

Walker’s Salvador Experiences

US Secretary of Defense William Cohen claimed to the world that Serbs had killed “100,000 Albanians” in Kosovo. KFOR has so far exhumed less than 3000 dead, one-third of which are Serbs.

capt_yugoslavia_kosovo_52j.jpg

William Walker with his hands in his pockets conducting a so-called “investigation of the massacre”. Walker refused to allow representatives of the domestic media to be present during his “investigation process” and personally selected the teams of reporters who could accompany him

The most grotesque lie was the staged “massacre” in Račak, in January 1999, when Serbs were accused of executing 45 Kosovo Albanians. That there was no blood at the alleged “murder scene,” and that US Ambassador William Walker [of the OSCE mission] three times prevented the Serbian forensic pathologist, one Dr. Marinković, from investigating the scene, indicates that the justification for bombing [and invasion] of Serbia was nothing but a Big Lie.

Ambassador Walker told the media the purported massacre was “the most of horrific thing he has ever seen.” No one seemed to recall the fact that during Walker’s mandate in El Salvador [in the 1980s], the Death Squads decapitated thousands of victims. According to the testimony of priest Daniel Santiago, the heads would then be mounted on pikes. Walker Voker kept silent about these atrocities because the perpetrators were trained by the US and sponsored by the CIA

Paddy Ashdown selling arms to Albanian aggressors in the province of Kosovo i Metohija

Wesley Clark’s claim that NATO air force had “destroyed the Serb army” should also be counted among the lies of Western propaganda. It was debunked when several hundred undamaged Serb tanks left Kosovo. The truth was that during the 78-day bombing campaign, which cost American taxpayers tens of billions of dollars, only 13 Serbian vehicles were destroyed.

Replacing Rose

Reporting from Gorazde, writes Lt. Col. Sray, both Amanpour and Jennings claimed that “Serbs are devastating the town, house by house,” deliberately omitting the fact that Muslim troops had mined the houses and then left, abandoning their civilians. According to Lt. Col. Sray, CNN’s correspondents assassinated the character of General Michael Rose, accusing him of being a “Serb-lover.” Rose was also accused of surrendering Gorazde to Serbs, because he “did not want to defend a Muslim town.” After a fierce media campaign, the British general was forced to leave Sarajevo in disgrace.

“A Great Job”

“In the past three years, the [American] media has done a great job of buttressing the negative image of the Serbs and Serbia, so much so that on dozens of occasions it actually helped achieve political results that went a long way in inflicting deadly injury to the Serbs in Croatia, Bosnia, and in Serbia. In the end, unless the United States policy of ‘punish the Serbs’ – especially through sanctions against Serbia – is revised, it will have succeeded in its aim, namely, to destroy a country and demoralize a nation,” wrote in 1995 Norma von Ragenfeld-Feldman, a Ph. D in history, in the San Francisco magazine Unity Herald

Let’s hope that some of these dishonest men and women who caused so much death and desaster  will pay for all their crimes.


2016-11-19

By Grey Carter

Source: There Must be Justice

Join the debate on our Twitter Timeline!

tony-blair_wash_hands

The Destabilization Of Macedonia? Greater Albania And The Process Of “Kosovization”

kosovo-isil-ridvan-haqifi-and-lavdrim-muhaxheri

Introduction

The last open armed conflict in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia – FYROM (former Socialist Republic of Macedonia as one of six federal republics of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) in the May 2015 was just an expected continuation of constant tensions between the ethnic Albanians and the Macedonian Slavs during the last quarter of century.[i] However, these tensions are time to time transformed into the open armed conflicts of the Albanian extremists, usually coming from Kosovo, with the Macedonian security forces.

The most notable conflict incidents in Macedonia after the Kosovo War in 1998−1999, when the Kosovo Albanians started to export Kosovo revolution to Macedonia, up to 2015 are recorded in 2001 that was ended by the EU/USA sponsored Ohrid Agreement, in 2007 when on November 7th, Macedonian special police forces liquidated six armed Albanians from the neighboring Kosovo on the Shara Mt. in the North Macedonia – the region known from 1991 as the most nationalistic and separatist Albanian area at the Balkans after Kosovo and in 2008 after the parliamentary elections in June.

In the 2007 case, for instance, police found a large amount of hidden arms and ammunition on one location at the Shara Mt. (brought from Kosovo). The Balkan political analysts are kin to speculate that what is happening in Macedonia after 1999 is just a continuation of the export of the 1998-99 Kosovo revolution. 1998−1999. It basically means that Macedonia is scheduled by the Kosovo Albanian “revolutionaries” (i.e., by the political leadership of the Kosovo Liberation Army−the KLA) to be the next Balkan country which will experience a “Kosovo syndrome” that was successfully finished by the proclamation of the Kosovo independence in February 2008. It is as well as assumed that Montenegro is going to be the third Balkan country infected by the process of Kosovization.

The pre-1991 “Macedonian Question”

Macedonia always was the crossroad of the Balkans having a vital strategic position at the peninsula. The geostrategic importance of Macedonia was probably expressed the best by the German kanzellar Otto von Bismarck: “Those who control the valley of the River Vardar are the masters of the Balkans”.[ii]

A whole historic-geographic territory of Macedonia was formerly part of the Ottoman Empire from 1371 to 1912. Macedonia was the first Yugoslav land to be occupied by the Ottomans and the last one to be liberated from the Ottoman yoke. Before the Ottoman lordship, Macedonia was governed by the Byzantine Empire, Bulgaria and Serbia. A Bulgarian sponsored the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (the IMRO) was established in 1893 in Thessaloniki with the ultimate political goal to include whole Macedonia into Bulgaria. After the Balkans Wars of 1912−1913 a territory of historic-geographic Macedonia was partitioned between Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria. During WWI Macedonia became a scene of fierce fighting between the Central Powers and the Entente (the Macedonian front). Allied forces landed at Thessaloniki in October 1915 to be soon accompanied with approximately 150.000 Serbian soldiers who escaped from the occupied Serbia. In September 1918 under the French General Franchet d’Esperey, a joint British, French and Serbian army advanced against Bulgaria and soon liberated Serbia.[iii]

After the WWI the Treaty of Neuilly confirmed the Vardar Macedonia as a part of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, while the Aegean Macedonia with Thessaloniki remained the Greek and the Pirin Macedonia the Bulgarian. In the 1920s a large population movement transformed the ethnic composition of the population of the historic-geographic Macedonia. The crucial exchange of population occurred after the Treaty of Lausanne as some 350.000 Muslims from Macedonia were exchanged with Turkey by around 1.200.000 ethnic Greeks from Anatolia. In the interwar time a Bulgarian sponsored IMRO terrorism activity increased in the Yugoslav Macedonia seeking to destabilize the country in order to finally annex Macedonia into Bulgaria.[iv] After 1945 the Vardar Macedonia became a socialist republic within the Yugoslav federation with recognized a separate Macedonian nationality, Macedonian language and alphabet which was standardized for the first time in history. Up to 1991 the Yugoslav authorities fostered Macedonian self-identity and nationalism at the expense of the Serb and Bulgarian national interests.[v] Therefore, for the very reason to keep a territorial integrity of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia, her Albanian minority was not granted a status of an autonomous province like the Kosovo Albanians in Serbia who had, according to the last Yugoslav constitution in 1974, their own president, government, assembly, police, university and academy of sciences – a state within the state.

The post-1991 “Macedonian Question”

During the violent destruction of ex-Yugoslavia, in November 1991 the Socialist Republic of Macedonia proclaimed independence that was firstly recognized by Bulgaria. However, Bulgaria never recognized a separate Macedonian language and ethnicity as for Bulgarians up to today all Macedonian Slavs are ethnolinguistic Bulgarians.[vi] Of course, when Skopje decided to declare independence, the Macedonians decided at the same time to deal alone with the Albanian nationalism and separatism in Macedonia without help by the Serbs.

The government in Skopje believed that the West will protect a territorial integrity of Macedonia and therefore yet in 1991 NATO’s troops were invited to be deployed in this newly proclaimed independent state which became internationally recognized in 1993 but with a provisional state’s name of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia – a unique case in world history. Nevertheless, a new Macedonian constitution, a constitutional state’s name (the Republic of Macedonia) and the state’s symbols created immediately extremely tense and hostile relationships with a neighboring Greece as Skopje developed rival (and unjust) claims to the ethnohistorical heritage of the ancient Macedonians and the Kingdom of Macedonia.[vii] Greece and the FYROM recognized each other five years after the Macedonian official proclamation of independence when Greece lifted economic blockade against the FYROM as well.

However, the crucial challenge to the post-1991 “Macedonian Question” is coming from the ethnic breakdown of the country and historical background of interethnic relations between the Macedonian Slavs and the Macedonian Albanians. The later are the biggest and most nationalistic ethnic minority in the FYROM composing today about 30% of total population. Their number increased during the Kosovo War in 1998−1999, especially during the NATO’s “a prominent example of unauthorized humanitarian intervention”[viii] against Serbia and Montenegro, as the Kosovo Albanians, formally as the refugees, came to Macedonia followed by their compatriots from Albania – a country out of any warfare at that time. Majority of those Albanian “refugees”[ix] in fact never returned back to their homeland. Inter-ethnic tensions between the Macedonian Slavs and the Macedonian Albanians soon became increased due to both worsening economic situation and the uncompromised Albanian nationalism as an effect of the exported “Kosovo syndrome”.

The “Kosovo syndrome”

The export of the Kosovo revolution after 1999 as a direct outcome of the “Kosovo syndrome” to neighboring Macedonia is in direct connection with much serious regional problem of creation of a Greater Albania from 1878 up today. After June 1999 when the NATO’s troops occupied and divided Kosovo into five occupation zones, transforming this region into their colony,[x] West Macedonia became a stronghold for the rebel Albanian terrorist forces which in fact came from Kosovo.

The Macedonian Albanian separatism backed by the KLA paramilitary troops in the area of Tetovo, Kumanovo and Gostivar in the North-West Macedonia became directly encouraged by the fact that neighboring Kosovo Albanians finally succeeded to separate Kosovo from the rest of Serbia with direct NATO’s and EU military and diplomatic support. The same or very similar scenario was drawn now and for the West Macedonia with Skopje as a capital of the Albanian independent state of the Republic of Ilirida – a state proclaimed by the local Albanian nationalists twice after the destruction of ex-Yugoslavia: in 1992 and in September 2014. Of course, an ultimate goal is pan-Albanian unification with Tirana as a capital of a Greater Albania as it was during the WWII. Here it has to be stressed that between Kosovo, West Macedonia and Albania in fact there is no cross-border checking as it is formally controlled by the Albanians themselves, if it is controlled at all. Therefore, in practice a Greater Albania already exists. Furthermore, the traffic connections between Tirana and Prishtina are planned to be radically improved as the Kosovo Albanian government recently agreed with the government of Albania to connect their two capitals with a modern highway probably financially sponsored by the western economies.

isis, albania, map.jpg

Perspectives

The “Macedonian Question” has always been at the heart of Balkan politics and of interest to the Great Powers. Macedonia – the small, landlocked territory of the South Balkans has been contested during the last 150 years by all of its four neighbors – Serbia, Bulgaria, Albania and Greece. A Socialist Yugoslavia of Josip Broz Tito claimed to have solved the “Macedonian Question” by the establishment of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia as a part of the Yugoslav Federation from 1945 to 1991. Nonetheless, the destruction of the second Yugoslavia in 1991 reopened the issue of the future of the territory of the Vardar Macedonia – a Serbian-Yugoslav part of a geographic-historic Macedonia given to the Kingdom of Serbia by the Bucharest Peace Treaty on August 10th, 1913.[xi] A successor “Republic of Macedonia” has been proclaimed as an independent state in November 1991 but it has not received immediately universal international recognition either of its formal political independence or of its state-flag and state-name.

Basically, after 1991 up today there are three main problems in regard to the “Macedonian Question”:

  1. Will Macedonian state’s territory be divided between the Slavic Macedonians and the ethnic Albanians (who are 30% of Macedonia’s population)?;
  2. Will all members of the international community recognize the name of “Republic of Macedonia” (according to the Macedonian Constitution of 1991) or they will continue to call this country as it is today officially named by the UNO – the “Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” (the FYROM); and
  3. Will the FYROM have territorial claims on other parts of geographic-historic Macedonia included into Greece (the “Aegean Macedonia”) and Bulgaria (the “Pirin Macedonia”) after the Second Balkan War in 1913?

The Macedonian independence from 1991 created an extremely tense relationship with the Greek government, since Macedonia developed rival claims for ethnicity and statehood. This rivalry was epitomized in a dispute about the state’s name, as Greece objected to the use of Macedonia, whose historical heritage it claimed. These two countries eventually recognized each other in 1995, and the Greek economic blockade against Macedonia was lifted.

Nevertheless, the crucial problem in this country is that the ethnic make up of the FYROM continued to change as the Albanian refugees poured in from Kosovo and Albania increasing the size of the Albanian minority de facto to 30%.

Tensions were increased through the worsening economic situation, which escalated as a result of international sanctions and the war against its main trading partner – ex-Yugoslavia. As the situation in Kosovo escalated and war erupted in 1998−1999, Macedonia became an important stronghold for the moderate Albanian opposition from Kosovo, but also for the rebel KLA. Extremely encouraged by the recognition of the Albanian required rights in Kosovo from June 1999 by the West, the Albanian minority in the West Macedonia became more assertive and politically aggressive.

Following violent clashes in 2001 between the Macedonian police forces and the (Kosovo) Albanian rebels, NATO followed the plea of the pro-western Macedonian government and increased its presence in this South Balkan country. A higher scale of a civil war was narrowly avoided in 2001 when the Macedonian parliament in Skopje agreed, but under direct western (EU/US) pressure and blackmailing, great concessions granting linguistic and limited political autonomy to the Albanian minority in Macedonia.

In return, the KLA rebels in Macedonia (under the official name of the Albanian National Army – the ANA) agreed to give up their arms to NATO’s troops – a gesture that was done more for the TV screens as the main guns’ arsenal of the KLA was returned back to Kosovo to be activated in Macedonia once again on May 9−10th, 2015. This happened regardless of the presence of NATO’s peace-keeping troops in Macedonia which came in the early 1990s following the plea of the Macedonian government after violent clashes between the Macedonian police and Albanian rebels.

Conclusions

The “Macedonian Question” after the 2001 KLA rebellion in Macedonia primarily was dependent on solving the “Kosovo Question”. In the other words, it was logically expected that in the case of “international” (i.e., the western) recognition of Kosovo and by the west sponsored quasi-independence after February 17th, 2008, the Albanians from the West FYROM (likely followed by their compatriots from the East Montenegro) will follow a Kosovo example of regional revolution for the sake of getting territorial-national independence with a final aim to be united with a motherland Albania as it was clearly noticed even in 1997 by the late Kosovo Albanian leader Ibrahim Rugova and more recently in May 2015 confirmed by the PM of Albania, Edi Rama.

Now we are witnessing a process of practical realization of the Greater Albania project that was designed for the first time by the Albanian First Prizren League in 1878. Or better to say, we are today dealing with the revival of a Greater Albania created by Mussolini in 1941 – a real state that existed until the end of the WWII. A difference is only that the WWII Greater Albania was sponsored by the western nazifascism while a present-day Greater Albania is backed by the western self-proclaimed liberal democracies.

The present Macedonian government of Nikola Gruevski (PM from 2006 and a leader of the VMRO-DPMNE) which has confronted the KLA, is punished (May 2015) by US-NATO for two reasons:

  1. A Macedonian policy not to introduce sanctions against Russia.
  2. A Macedonian wish to join Russia’s sponsored “Turkish Stream” of supplying Europe with the Siberian gas.

As the current Greek government is becoming closer to Russia, the Kosovization of Macedonia could be used against Greece, as a means to undermine the Greek pro-Russian policy. Namely, a summer holiday tourism is for Greece one of the most important incomes for the national budget per year. As a huge number of the European tourists are coming to Greece by the highway that is crossing Serbia, Macedonia and exactly the Kumanovo area it can be expected that in the case of conflict situation in the FYROM, the tourist industry in Greece will be affected.

  1. European tourists travelling by land will have to cross conflict areas in Macedonia.
  2. The conflict in Macedonia could spill over into Greece itself and most probably into Serbia.

Finally, the armed KLA rebellion in May 2015 against the state of Macedonia was used as a means to destabilize the government in Skopje in the form of a Colored Revolution, similar to Belgrade in October 2000. As in Serbia after October 2000, a new post-revolution Macedonian government sponsored by the West would be instrumental into transforming Macedonia into another client state of the post-Cold War NATO’s World Order. The success of the US-NATO plan very much depends on the role played by Russia.[xii]

2. Sotirovic 2013Prof. Dr. Vladislav B. Sotirovic

www.global-politics.eu/sotirovic

globalpol@global-politics.eu

© Vladislav B. Sotirovic 2016

____________________

Endnotes:

[i] On this issue, see [L. Danforth, The Macedonian Conflict: Ethnic Nationalism in a Transnational World, Princeton, 1995].

[ii] M. Glenny, The Balkans: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers, 1804−1999, New York: Viking, 1999, 156.

[iii] On the Macedonian front, see [G. W. Price, The Story of the Salonika Army, London 1918].

[iv] On the terrorism by IMRO, see [A. Londres, Terror in the Balkans, London, 1935].

[v] On this issue, see [S. E. Palmer, R. King, Yugoslav Communism and the Macedonian Question, Connecticut, 1971].

[vi] On the question of ethnic background of the Macedonians, see [H. N. Brailsford, Macedonia – Its Races and Their Future, London, 1906; H. Poulton, Who Are the Macedonians?, London, 1995]. On the Bulgarian standpoint, see [Macedonia: Documents and Material, Sofia, 1974].

[vii] On the Greek point of view, see [N. K. Martis, The Falsification of Macedonian History, Athens, 1984]. The fact is that the ancient “Macedonians were located between the Thracians and the Greeks, inhabiting the fertile plains drained by the Vardar and Struma rivers. From antiquity to the present the question has been debated as to whether these early Macedonians were Greeks or barbarians” [L. S. Stavrianos, The Balkans since 1453, New York: Rinehart & Company, Inc., 1958, 18]. However, the Macedonian kings and aristocracy have been the Greeks in language, culture and outlook who were inviting the Greeks of learning from Greek world to their courts. On the Macedonian point of view, see [S. Konechni, V. Georgieva, Historical Dictionary of the Republic of Macedonia, Skopje, 1998].

[viii] J. L. Holzgrefe, R. O. Keohane (eds.), Humanitarian Intervention. Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas, Cambridge−New York, Cambridge University Press, 2005, 1. On the legal aspect of the humanitarian intervention, see [Ch. Gray, International Law and the Use of Force. Fully Updated Second Edition, Oxford−New York, Oxford University Press, 2004].

[ix] Majority of the Kosovo Albanian “refugees” during the Kosovo War 1998−1999 were not real refugees as they left their homes under the agreement with the KLA in order to show to the mainstream western mass media how the Serbian government is oppressive against the Kosovo ethnic Albanians.

[x] H. Hofbauer, Eksperiment Kosovo: Povratak kolonijalizma, Beograd: Albatros Plus, 2009.

[xi] В. Ћоровић, Наше победе, Београд: Култура, 1990, 82.

[xii] On the NATO, Balkans and Russia after 1991, see [V. B. Sotirović, “The NATO’s World Order, the Balkans and the Russian National Interest”, International Journal of Politics & Law Research, Vol. 3, № 1, Sciknow Publications Ltd., New York, NY, 2015]

guilty-ring-call-trade

Videos On Ex-Yugoslavia: Reverse Side Of The Truth



Four Serbian monasteries from the Middle Ages in Kosovo and Metohija still not destroyed by local Albanians

Четири српска средњевековна манастира на Косову и Метохији која још увек нису срушена од стране месних Шиптара


U.S.A. documentary movie about the fabricated lies by Bosnian Muslims and Croats about the civil war in Titoist Bosnia & Herzegovina and Croatia during the time of the destruction of Yugoslavia, 1991-1995. This documentary movie (26 min.) was never publically shown.

Документарни филм у трајању од 26 минута производње Сједињених америчких држава о исфабрикованим лажима од стране босанских муслимана и Хрвата о грађанском рату на просторима титоистичке Босне и Херцеговине и Хрватске за време растурања Југославије 1991.-1995. г. Овај филм није никада нигде јавно приказиван.

Документарни филм о хрватским геноцидним злочинима над Србима током Другог светског рата, а све уз благослов римокатоличке цркве и Ватикана.
Филм садржи потресне сцене и слике, и није препоручљив за малолетне особе и особе са нарушеним здравственим стањем.


In the village of Račak, near Štimlje, Kosovo and Metohia, in the Republic of Serbia, on 16 January 1999, CIA and UCK Albanian separatists staged a “massacre” scene collecting bodies of those killed in UCK battle with Serbian security forces. CIA operative William Walker was immediately sent – with TV cameras and all – to witness “evidence of a massacre” and blame it on Serb forces. Walker’s emotional interviews in front of the cameras were promptly shown on all major TV networks around the world. This “massacre” was soon used by the US government to blackmail Serbia with an ultimatum demanding a complete surrender of its territory to US military forces, which would have a complete freedom of movement across Serbia and would not be accountable for any of their actions, and then in March of 1999 as a justification for NATO to carry out a 78 day-long bombing campaign on Serbia that killed some 3500 people and destroyed the economy of this country. As another consequence a treaty was signed providing for withdrawal of Serbian forces from the province of Kosovo and Metohia in June 1999 and occupation of it by NATO countries, and exodus of about 250,000 of non-Albanians: Serbs, Romany, Turks, Croats and others ensued. Although UN Resolution 1244 guarantees Serbia sovereignty on the territory of Kosovo and Metohia, the Albanians have declared independence in Feb 2008 and actively block the return of the expelled population to their homes, jobs and farms. NATO forces have mostly turned a blind eye to destruction of 172 churches and monasteries, many of them priceless cultural and Christian treasures from 13-17th centuries.

Curiously, at the Hague tribunal the “Račak massacre” was suddenly dropped from charges against Slobodan Milošević, the then president of Serbia.

Another curiosity is that shortly after the Račak operation- and prior to the NATO bombing campaign against Serbia – Gen. Goran Radosavljević, who commanded Serbian forces in the Račak operation, was commended for contribution to peace and awarded a medal for masterful execution of an operation against terrorist forces by NATO Commander Gen. Robertson in Bruxelles.

Рачак (алб. Reçak) је насеље у општини Штимље на Косову и Метохији. Атар насеља се налази на територији катастарске општине Рачак површине 443 ha. Насеље је важило за упориште ОВК. У лето 1998, због непрестаних борби између ОВК и југословенских снага безбедности, већина становништва већ је била напустила село. У време Случаја Рачак (15. јануар 1999), у селу је било само око 400 житеља[тражи се извор од 06. 2010.].

Село Рачак се налази на излазу из клисуре Црнољеве, у близини Штимља. У писаним документима село се помиње 1343. и 1345. године, у повељама српског краља и цара Стефан Душан. По турском дефтеру из 1487. године, у селу је постојао манастир Св. Врачи. Изнад села су остаци темеља цркве из 14. века, за коју тамошњи житељи мисле да је била посвећена Св. Врачима. Црквиште је заштићено законом као значајан споменик српске културе.


Documentary movie about NATO lies upon Kosovo & Metohija case in 1999 for the sake to bomb Serbia and occupy this south Serbia’s province – a cradle of Serbia (parts 1-3).
Документарни филм из три дела о НАТО лажима о Косову и Метохији како би извршили агресију на Србију и окупирали ову јужну србијанску покрајину.


Documentary movie of the truth about Bosnian town of Srebrenica in July 1995 and the destiny of the Serbs in Sarajevo during the civil war in Bosnia & Herzegovina, 1992-1995. Movie is made by Norwegian directors and shown for the first time in Sweden and Norway in summer 2011. Movie is in English and Serbian language.

Документарни филм о Сребреници и догађајима у њој јула 1995. г. који даје истиниту слику о бошњачко-муслиманским војним формацијама у Сребреници и Сарајеву као и о судбини српских цивила у Сарајеву, Сребреници и околини Сребренице. Филм је норвешке производње а први пут је приказан у лето 2011. г. у Шведској и Норвешкој. Језици су енглески и српски.

1. Шиптарски лажови from Vladislav B. Sotirovic on Vimeo.

1. Шиптарски лажови. All copyrights reserved.

2. Шиптарски лажови from Vladislav B. Sotirovic on Vimeo.

Шиптарски лажови. All copyrights reserved.

Western documentary movie in two parts about Kosovo Albanian big lies in 1999 concerning the truth in Kosovo.

Destroyed Serbian villages in Metohija from Vladislav B. Sotirovic on Vimeo.

Video is showing several destroyed Serbian villages in Metohija near the city of Peć. All of them are destroyed by local ethnic Albanians after mid-June 1999. The video is made in April 2005.

Muslim Albanians are setting in flame Serbian church in Kosovo from Vladislav B. Sotirovic on Vimeo.

“March Pogrom” committed by Muslim Albanians against the Serbs in Kosovo & Metohija during three days: March 17-19, 2004. Video is showing how Albanians are setting in flame Serbian Orthodox Church in the town in Podujevo on March 19, 2004. NATO troops around are just watching the scene.


Interview with a French General about the truth why NATO bombed Serbia in 1999


Canadian documentary movie about Kosovo reality under NATO occupation after June 1999


Canadian documentary movie about Yugoslavia: “Weight of Chains”, 2010


Russian documentary movie about Kosovo Serbs and Russian citizenship


Documentary movie about Bosnian Serb Army General Ratko Mladic on Russia Today channel


Documentary movie about Kosovo: “Stolen Kosovo” by the Czech Republic


Western documentary movie about ex-Yugoslavia: “The Roots of War”


Documentary movie about the holocaust against the Jews and Serbs during the WWII


Documentary footage (1-3) about attack on Yugoslav Army unarmed withdrawing forces by Bosnian Muslim fighters in the city of Tuzla, Bosnia, May 15th, 1992. Around 200 young Yugoslav soldiers are killed


City of Vukovar after liberation by Yugoslav Army and volunteers from Croat terrorist forces and Nazi criminals, November 1991. Belgrade TV


British SKY NEWS documentary film about Muslim Mujahedins fighting in Bosnia & Herzegovina on the side of Muslim government in 1992-1995


US documentary movie “RETLINES” with English subtitle from 1991 about Vatican smuggling Croat Nazi Ustashi to South America in 1945

Ratlines were a system of escape routes for Nazis and other fascists fleeing Europe at the end of World War II. These escape routes mainly led toward havens in South America, particularly Argentina, Paraguay, Brazil, Uruguay, and Chile. Other destinations included the United States and perhaps Canada and the Middle East. There were two primary routes: the first went from Germany to Spain, then Argentina; the second from Germany to Rome to Genoa, then South America. The origins of the first ratlines are connected to various developments in Vatican-Argentine relations before and during World War II.

The major Roman ratline was operated by a small, but influential network of Croatian priests, members of the Franciscan order, led by Father Krunoslav Draganović. Draganović organized a highly sophisticated chain with headquarters at the San Girolamo degli Illirici Seminary College in Rome, but with links from Austria to the final embarcation point in the port of Genoa. The ratline initially focused on aiding members of the Croatian Ustashe movement, most notably the Croat wartime dictator Ante Pavelić.
Priests active in the chain included: Fr. Vilim Cecelja, former Deputy Military Vicar to the Ustashe, based in Austria where many Ustashe and Nazi refugees remained in hiding; Fr. Dragutin Kamber, based at San Girolamo; Fr. Dominik Mandić, an official Vatican representative at San Girolamo and also “General Economist” or treasurer of the Franciscan order – who used this position to put the Franciscan press at the ratline’s disposal; and Monsignor Karlo Petranović, based in Genoa. Vilim would make contact with those hiding in Austria and help them across the border to Italy; Kamber, Mandić and Draganović would find them lodgings, often in the monastery itself, while they arranged documentation; finally Draganović would phone Petranović in Genoa with the number of required berths on ships leaving for South America.

The operation of the Draganović ratline was an open secret among the intelligence and diplomatic communities in Rome. As early as August 1945, Allied commanders in Rome were asking questions about the use of San Girolamo as a “haven” for Ustashe. A year later, a US State Department report of 12 July 1946 lists nine war criminals, including Albanians and Montenegrins as well as Croats, plus others “not actually sheltered in the COLLEGIUM ILLIRICUM [i.e., San Girolamo degli Illirici] but who otherwise enjoy Church support and protection.” The British envoy to the Holy See, Francis Osborne, asked Domenico Tardini, a high ranking Vatican official, for a permission that would have allowed British military police to raid ex-territorial Vatican Institutions in Rome. Tardini declined and denied that the church sheltered war criminals.

In February 1947 CIC Special Agent Robert Clayton Mudd reported ten members of Pavelić’s Ustasha cabinet living either in San Girolamo or in the Vatican itself. Mudd had infiltrated an agent into the monastery and confirmed that it was “honeycombed with cells of Ustashe operatives” guarded by “armed youths”. Mudd also reported: “It was further established that these Croats travel back and forth from the Vatican several times a week in a car with a chauffeur whose license plate bears the two initials CD, “Corpo Diplomatico”. It issues forth from the Vatican and discharges its passengers inside the Monastery of San Geronimo. Subject to diplomatic immunity it is impossible to stop the car and discover who are its passengers.” Mudd’s conclusion was the following: “DRAGANOVIC’s sponsorship of these Croat Ustashes definitely links him up with the plan of the Vatican to shield these ex-Ustasha nationalists until such time as they are able to procure for them the proper documents to enable them to go to South America. The Vatican, undoubtedly banking on the strong anti-Communist feelings of these men, is endeavoring to infiltrate them into South America in any way possible to counteract the spread of Red doctrine. It has been reliably reported, for example that Dr. VRANCIC has already gone to South America and that Ante PAVELIC and General KREN are scheduled for an early departure to South America through Spain. All these operations are said to have been negotiated by DRAGANOVIC because of his influence in the Vatican.”

The existence of Draganović’s ratline has been confirmed by a Vatican historian, Fr. Robert Graham: “I’ve no doubt that Draganović was extremely active in syphoning off his Croatian Ustashe friends.” On four occasions the Vatican intervened on behalf of interned Ustasha prisoners. The Secretariat of State asked the U.K. and U.S. government to release Croatian POWs from British internment camps in Italy.

Документарни филм ИСТИНА на руском језику, 2005 from Vladislav B. Sotirovic on Vimeo.

26 мая 2011 года спецслужбами Сербии арестован генерал Ратко Младич, который обвиняется МТБЮ (Международный трибунал по бывшей Югославии) за уничтожение мирных жителей во время югославских войн, а в целом по 11 пунктам, ни одно из которых не имеет доказательств гибели людей в результате расстрела, а не боевых действий. 31 мая 2011 года марионеточные власти Сербии экстрадировали генерала Младича в Гаагу ради вступления Сербии в ЕС. Предана культура и память предков в угоду популистским политическим веяниям. Такие политики скоро предадут собственную мать и отца, нагадят на могилы дедов и прадедов. На саммите «большой восьмерки» в Довиле 2 июня 2011 года Баррозу заявил журналистам, освещающим саммит: «Арест Ратко Младича стал очень позитивным сигналом Европейскому союзу и соседям Сербии». Каких же соседей он имел ввиду, не Россию ли ? Россия так не считает. Хорватский прозападноевропейский марионеточный фашизм и исламский фундаментализм на Балканах как инструмент информационной войны является основной причиной разжигания межнациональных столкновений и разрушения государственности Югославии. Виновны в этом только политики ЕС и стран НАТО ныне в подавляющем большинстве представленные в Гаагском трибунале по бывшей Югославии. А генерал Ратко Младич защищал свой народ от экстремистов и бандитов. Свидельств и доказательств тому множество, в том числе в недалёком прошлом на Балканах в 30-40-е годы 20 века.

REVERSE SIDE OF THE TRUTH (VIDEOS ABOUT EX-YUGOSLAVIA)

Can You Imagine? Readers Оn Еx-Yugoslavia

March Pogrom 2004 Book and Photo Evidence

KOSOVSKA GOLGOTA Intervju 1988

20 Principal Misconceptions on Kosovo Issue

The Srebrenica Massacre Evidence Context Politics Edward S Herman Phillip Corwin

Kosovo Murky Reality

Lista Diane Budisavljevic 1941 Do 1945 by Владислав Б. Сотировић/Vladislav B. Sotirović

Josip Broz Tito Bez Maske! by Владислав Б. Сотировић/Vladislav B. Sotirović

Hayden Mass Killings and Images of Genocide in Bosnia by Sanimideg

CAN YOU IMAGINE?/МОЖЕТЕ ЛИ ДА ЗАМИСЛИТЕ? (Ex-Yugoslavia)

Documentary Movies About Kosovo

Rachak Village in Kosovo 1999- Lies and the truth from Vladislav B. Sotirovic on Vimeo.

Лажи и истине о случају села Рачак на Косову и Метохији у јануару 1999. г.

1. Albanian lies on Kosovo truth in 1998-1999: Western TV documentary material from Vladislav B. Sotirovic on Vimeo.

1. Шиптарски лажови/Albanian lies on Kosovo truth. All copyrights reserved. First part

2. Albanian lies on Kosovo truth in 1998-1999: Western TV documentary material from Vladislav B. Sotirovic on Vimeo.

Шиптарски лажови/Albanian lies on Kosovo truth. All copyrights reserved. Second part

Vladislav B. Sotirovic on Kosovo, Lithuanian national TV (LTV), 2008 from Vladislav B. Sotirovic on Vimeo.

Vladislav B. Sotirovic on Kosovo, Lithuanian national TV (LTV), 2008. In Lithuanian language.

Vladislav B. Sotirovič apie Kosovą. LTV, 2008.

Владислав Б. Сотировић о Косову и Метохији на литванској националној телевизији (ЛТВ) 2008. г. на литванском језику.

Српска деца са Косова и Метохије певају песму “ОЈ КОСОВО, КОСОВО…”, 2009 from Vladislav B. Sotirovic on Vimeo.

Српска деца из Косовске Митровице певају усташи Борису Љубову Францетићу песму “Ој Косово, Косово”. Снимак је начињен 2009. г. и заштићен од стане аутора.
Serbian children from Kosovo and Metohija are singing a song “Oj Kosovo, Kosovo…” in Serbian language. Video is copyrighted by the author.

Serbian Kosovo: Church Bogorodica Ljeviška in Prizren/Српско Косово: Богородица Љевишка from Vladislav B. Sotirovic on Vimeo.

Serbian shrine Bogorodica Ljeviška (Virgin Mary of Ljevishka) is a cathedral church in the city of Prizren in western part of Kosovo & Metohija region. The city was a capital of medieval Serbia. This church is built by Serbian king Milutin between 1307-1309. This church belongs to one of four masterpieces of Serbian sacral architecture in the Middle Ages in Kosovo & Metohija that was a central part of Serbian medieval state. The video is in Serbian language.

Српска богомоља Богородица Љевишка је катедрална црква у стоном Призрену у Метохији. Задужбина је краља Милутина и подигнута је између 1307. г. и 1309. г. Једно је од четири ремек-дела српског средњовековног сакралног градитељства на Косову и Метохији – центру српске срењевековне државе. Видео је на српском језику.

Serbian Kosovo: Pećka Patrijaršija/Српско Косово: Пећка патријаршија from Vladislav B. Sotirovic on Vimeo.

Pećka Patrijaršija (Patriarchate of Pec) is a complex of Serbian medieval sacral buildings near the city of Peć in western part of Kosovo & Metohija. Pećka Patrijaršija was a seat of Serbian Archbishops and Patriarhs from 13th c. up to 1760. This church complex belongs to one of four masterpieces of Serbian sacral architecture in the Middle Ages in Kosovo & Metohija that was a central part of Serbian medieval state. The video is in Serbian language.

Пећка патријаршија је комплекс средњевековних црквених грађевина и налази се у непосредној близини града Пећи у Метохији. Била је седиште српских епископа и патријараха од 13.-ог столећа па до 1760. г. Овај црквени комплекс припада једном од четири ремек-дела српског средњовековног сакралног градитељства на Косову и Метохији – центру српске срењевековне државе. Видео је на српском језику.

Serbian Kosovo: Monastery of Visoki Dečani/Српско Косово: Манастир Високи Дечани from Vladislav B. Sotirovic on Vimeo.

Monastery Visoki Dečani (High Dechani) is built by two Serbian rulers: king Stefan Dečanski and emperor Stefan Dušan between 1327 and 1335. This monastery belongs to one of four masterpieces of Serbian sacral architecture in the Middle Ages in Kosovo & Metohija that was a central part of Serbian medieval state. The video is in Serbian language.

Манастир Високи Дечани је задужбина српског краља Стефана Дечанског и српског цара Стефана Душана. Манастир је грађен између 1327. г. и 1335. г. Манастир је једно од четири ремек-дела српског средњовековног сакралног градитељства на Косову и Метохији – центру српске срењевековне државе. Видео је на српском језику.

Serbian Kosovo: Gračanica monastery/Српско Косово: Манастир Грачаница from Vladislav B. Sotirovic on Vimeo.

Serbian monastery of Gračanica (Grachanica) in Kosovo & Metohija bult by Serbian king Milutin in 1321. The monastery is near Priština and belongs to one of four masterpieces of Serbian sacral architecture in the Middle Ages in Kosovo & Metohija that was a central part of Serbian medieval state. The video is in Serbian language.

Манастир Грачаница је задужбина српског краља Милутина и подигнут је 1321. г. Налази се у близини Приштине. Манастир припада једном од четири ремек-дела српског средњовековног сакралног градитељства на Косову и Метохији – центру српске срењевековне државе. Видео је на српском језику.

Destroyed Serbian villages in Metohija from Vladislav B. Sotirovic on Vimeo.

Video is showing several destroyed Serbian villages in Metohija near the city of Peć. All of them are destroyed by local ethnic Albanians after mid-June 1999. The video is made in April 2005.

Canadian General Lewis Mackenzie about Kosovo & Metohija from Vladislav B. Sotirovic on Vimeo.

TV Interview with retd. Canadian Major General Lewis Mackenzie about Kosovo & Metohija on February 21, 2008. He was UN troops Commander in Chief in Bosnia & Herzegovina in the 1990’s. At the moment of the interview he was an international military analyst.

Muslim Albanians are setting in flame Serbian church in Kosovo from Vladislav B. Sotirovic on Vimeo.

“March Pogrom” committed by Muslim Albanians against the Serbs in Kosovo & Metohija during three days: March 17-19, 2004. Video is showing how Albanians are setting in flame Serbian Orthodox Church in the town in Podujevo on March 19, 2004. NATO troops around are just watching the scene.


Documentary movie about NATO lies upon Kosovo & Metohija case in 1999 for the sake to bomb Serbia and occupy this south Serbia’s province – a cradle of Serbia (part 1)


Documentary movie about NATO lies upon Kosovo & Metohija case in 1999 for the sake to bomb Serbia and occupy this south Serbia’s province – a cradle of Serbia (part 2)

3rd part. NATO’s Illegal War against Serbia. The lies of the “Rachak-village massacre” in January 1999 from Vladislav B. Sotirovic on Vimeo.

3rd part. NATO’s Illegal War against Serbia. The lies of the “Rachak-village massacre” in January 1999


Documentary movie “Kosovo: Can You Imagine?” by Boris Malagurski in 2009


The real Albanian origin – from the Caucasus Albania


Bulgarian politician tears the false flag of Kosovo


“La Guerra Infinita” – Rai Tre (First movie)


“La Guerra Infinita” – Rai Tre (Second movie)


“Бомбардовање Србије” 1 – Пут у рат (Цео филм)


“Бомбардовање Србије” 2 – Како се водио рат (Цео филм)


“Бомбардовање Србије” 3 – Жртве рата (Цео филм)


Забрањени филм: “Смртоносна прашина”

The Vatican Bank Clean Up Is A Cover Up: Nazi Linked Assets Ignored

ustasa20sjekirom20skidafa9

Washington: Cardinal George Pell, who is Vatican Prefect of the Secretariat for the Economy, told The Tablet, a Catholic newspaper on June 17, 2016, that: ““The Vatican is committed to transparency, international cooperation and the use of contemporary international standards in financial reporting.”

Cardinal Pell further praised Jean Baptiste de Franssu, the director of the Vatican Bank as one who had done “an excellent clean out job.”

Pell further stated: “Pope Francis continues to insist that the financial reforms must continue.”

Nowhere in Pell’s message was there any mention of the Nazi linked Ustasha Treasury first identified by the US State department in 1998 as a suspicious World War Two era transaction involving gold and other valuables looted from Serbian, Jewish, and Roma victims of the Holocaust in former Yugoslavia and deposited at the Vatican for safekeeping.

The Ustasha Treasury was the subject of a decade long lawsuit against the Vatican Bank by Holocaust survivors and resulted in the four-day testimony of former US Special Agent William Gowen who investigated a mysterious ten truck treasure convoy that unloaded its contents at St. Peter’s Square in 1946. The lawsuit however was dismissed on jurisdictional grounds. A later inquiry by the European Commission resulted in a referral to the Vatican Financial Intelligence Unit which resisted all efforts by Holocaust survivors to force an inquiry.

This office has filed a canon law petition with the Vatican in an attempt to compel Cardinal Pell to do his job and audit the bank accounts identified with Holocaust loot. Cardinal Pill and the Vatican however have so far denied the Holocaust victims an accounting.

Only further pressure on the Vatican by the international community will have any effect stated Jonathan Levy, one of the lead counsel for plaintiffs since 1999. When asked who might take the lead, Levy suggested, “There are those at the highest levels of the Serbian, Vatican and US governments who have personal knowledge the Ustasha treasury and its facts. It is time they finally act on their conscience. There is a time for diplomacy and a time to call out the cleaners at the Vatican who seek to bury historical facts no matter how painful they may be to acknowledge.”

The canon law petition alleges much of the Ustasha Treasury was recycled through the Vatican Bank to covertly assist CIA backed Croatian nationalists in their decades long effort to reestablish an independent Croatian state.

For a copy of the Canon Law Petition please see:


Dr. Jonathan Levy

info@brimstoneandcompany.com

Join the debate on our Twitter Timeline!

zazbijanje_jugoslavije_1941

The Role of the Catholic Church in Yugoslavia’s Holocaust

Adolf Hitler and Ante Pavelić.
Adolf Hitler and Ante Pavelić. Not many people know about the Ustaše and its leader, Ante Pavelić. Before 1941, the organization was a radical fascist terrorist group. But when Axis powers invaded, it was given control of Croatia by the Nazis. They shared Hitler’s goal of ethnic cleansing

During the Second World War in Yugoslavia, Catholic priests and Muslim clerics were willing accomplices in the genocide of the nation’s Serbian, Jewish and Roma population. From 1941 until 1945, the Nazi-installed regime of Ante Pavelic in Croatia carried out some of the most horrific crimes of the Holocaust (known as the Porajmos by the Roma), killing over 800,000 Yugoslav citizens – 750,000 Serbs, 60,000 Jews and 26,000 Roma. In these crimes, the Croatian Ustasha and Muslim fundamentalists were openly supported by the Vatican, the Archbishop of Zagreb Cardinal Alojzije Stepinac (1898-1960), and the Palestinian Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin al-Husseini. Many of the victims of the Pavelic regime in Croatia were killed in the war’s third largest death camp – Jasenovac, where over 200,000 people – mainly Orthodox Serbs met their deaths. Some 240,000 were “rebaptized” into the Catholic faith by fundamentalist Clerics in “the Catholic Kingdom of Croatia” as part of the policy to “kill a third, deport a third, convert a third” of Yugoslavia’s Serbs, Jews and Roma in wartime Bosnia and Croatia (The Yugoslav Auschwitz and the Vatican, Vladimar Dedijer, Anriman-Verlag, Freiburg, Germany, 1988).

On April 6th 1941, Nazi Germany invaded Yugoslavia. By April 10th, Croatian fascists led by Ante Pavelic were allowed by Hitler and his ally Mussolini to set up an “independent” puppet state of Croatia. Hitler granted “Aryan” status to Croatia as his fascist allies carved up Yugoslavia. Pavelic had been awaiting these developments whilst under the auspices of Mussolini in Italy who had granted them the use of remote training camps on a Aeolian island and access to a propaganda station Radio Bari for broadcasts across the Adriatic. As soon as the new fascist state of Croatia was born, a campaign of cold-blooded terror began, as noted by John Cornwell in his book Hitler’s Pope: The Secret History of Pius XII (Viking, London, UK, 1999):

“(It was) an act of ‘ethnic cleansing’ before that hideous term came into vogue, it was an attempt to create a ‘pure’ Catholic Croatia by enforced conversions, deportations, and mass exterminations. So dreadful were the acts of torture and murder that even hardened German troops registered their horror. Even by comparison with the recent bloodshed in Yugoslavia at the time of writing, Pavelic’s onslaught against the Orthodox Serbs remains one of the most appalling civilian massacres known to history” (p 249)

Furthermore, as Cornwell notes, Pius XII had not only “warmly endorsed” Croat nationalism, he had, before the war in November 1939, described the Croats in a speech as an “the outpost of Christianity” of whom “the hope of a better future seems to be smiling on you”. Pavelic and Pope Puis XII “frequently exchanged cordial telegrams” according to Dedijer, one on New Year’s Day 1943, saw the Pope give his blessing to Pavelic:

Everything that you have expressed so warmly in your name and in the name of the Croatian Catholics we return gracefully and give you and the whole Croatian people our apostolic blessing (Dedijer, p 115).

On April 25th 1941, following his seizure of power, Pavelic decreed that all publications, private and public, of the Cyrillic script was banned. In May 1941, anti-Semitic legislation was passed, defining Jews in racist terms, preventing them from marrying “Aryans”. One month later all Serb Orthodox primary and preschools were closed. As soon as Pavelic had taken power, the Catholic Church in Croatia began compelling Orthodox Serbs to convert to the Catholic religion. But this was, as pointed out by Cornwell, a highly-selective policy: the fascists had no intention of allowing Orthodox priests or members of the Serb intelligentsia into the religion – they were to be exterminated along with their families. However, for those Serbs who were forced to convert, there was no immunity or protection from the Catholic church when the “crazed bloodletting” of the Ustashe began, as indicated by the speech made by the Croatian Nazi Mile Budak, who was a Minister in the Ustasha regime in Gospic, Bosnia during July 1941:

We will kill one part of the Serbs, the other part we will resettle, and the remaining ones we will convert to the Catholic faith, and thus make Croats of them (Dedijer, p 130).

Budak was talking about something that had already started: In an example of savage butchery carried out in the village of Glina on May 14th 1941, hundreds of Serbs were brought to a church to attend an obligatory service of thanksgiving for the fascist state of Croatia. Once the Serbs were inside, the Ustashe entered the Church armed only with axes and knives. They asked all present to produce their certificates of conversion to Catholicism – but only two had the required documents, and they were released. The doors of the church were locked and the rest slaughtered.

Like with the Jews, who had to wear the Star of David in public, the Serbs were forced to wear a blue band with the letter “P” (i.e., Orthodox) on their sleeve. The Nazi regime decreed that the Roma were to be “treated as Jews” and they were forced to wear yellow armbands. (A History of the Gypsies of Eastern Europe and Russia, David M. Crowe, St. Martin’s Griffin, New York, USA, 1994).

Stepinac blesses the puppet Nazi regime in Croatia

When the Nazi’s installed the puppet Ustashi regime in May 1941, Stepinac immediately offered his congratulations to Pavelic, and held a banquet to celebrate the founding of the new nation. After the opening of the Ustasha Parliament, Pavelic attended Zagreb cathedral, where Stepinac offered special prayers for Pavelic and ordered a solemn “Te Deum” to be sung in thanks to God for the establishment of the new regime. In May 1941, Stepinac also arranged to have Pavelic received personally by Pope Pius XII in Rome in the Vatican, where on the same occasion, he signed a treaty with Mussolini. Once Pavelic was in power, Stepinac issued a Pastoral Letter ordering the Croatian clergy to support the new Ustasha State. Stepinac later recorded in his diary on 3rd August 1941 that “the Holy See (the Vatican) recognized de facto the independent State of Croatia”. In the same year, Stepinac himself declared:

“God, who directs the destiny of nations and controls the hearts of Kings, has given us Ante Pavelic and moved the leader of a friendly and allied people, Adolf Hitler, to use his victorious troops to disperse our oppressors… Glory be to God, our gratitude to Adolf Hitler and loyalty to our Poglavnik, Ante Pavelic.”

The involvement of Catholic clergy either in active participation or in blessing the Ustashi involvement in the Holocaust is well-documented. Stepinac himself headed the committee which was responsible for forcible “conversions” to Roman Catholicism under threat of death, and was also the Supreme Military Apostolic Vicar of the Ustashi Army, which effected the slaughter of those who failed to convert. Stepinac was known as the ‘Father Confessor’ to the Ustashi and continually bestowed the blessing of Catholic Church upon its members and actions.

Right from the very beginning, the Vatican knew what was happening in Croatia, and certainly known to Pius XII when he greeted Pavelic in Vatican – just four days after the massacre at Glina. On this visit, Pavelic had a “devotional” audience with Pius XII, and the Vatican granted de-facto recognition of fascist Croatia as a “bastion against communism” – despite the fact that the Vatican still had diplomatic ties with Yugoslavia. Cornwell observes that right from the start it was known that Pavelic was a “totalitarian dictator”, a “puppet of Hitler and Mussolini”, that he had passed racist and anti-Semitic laws, and that he was “bent on enforced conversions from Orthodox to Catholic Christianity”. Effectively, on behalf of Hitler and Mussolini, the Pope was “holding Pavelic’s hand and bestowing his papal blessing” to the new puppet state of Croatia. Thus, it can argued, that the Catholic Cardinals in the Vatican were accomplices of the Holocaust in Yugoslavia and the extermination of the country’s Jews, Serbs and Roma citizens. Indeed, many members of the Croatian Catholic clergy took a “leading part” in the Holocaust.

One leading member of the Catholic church in Croatia was the Nazi collaborator Archbishop Alojzije Stepinac. When he met Pavelic on April 16th 1941, he later noted that he had promised that he would “not show tolerance” to the Orthodox Serbian church – which gave Stepinac the impression that Pavelic “was a sincere Catholic”. By June 1941, when German army units were reporting that the “Ustashe have gone raging mad” killing Serbs, Jews and Roma, Catholic priests, notably Franciscans took a leading part in the massacres, as pointed out by Cornwell:

“Priests, invariably Franciscans, took a leading part in the massacres. Many, went around routinely armed and performed their murderous acts with zeal. A Father Bozidar Bralow, known for the machine gun that was his constant companion, was accused of performing a dance around the bodies of 180 massacred Serbs at Alipasin-Most. Individual Franciscans killed, set fire to homes, sacked villages, and laid waste the Bosnian countryside at the head of Ustashe bands. In September of 1941, an Italian reporter wrote of a Franciscan he had witnessed south of Banja Luka urging on a band of Ustashe with his crucifix.” (p 254).

It is clear now, that other members of the Catholic Cardinals in Europe also knew about the massacres. On March 6th 1942, a French Cardinal Eugène Tisserant, a close confidant of the Pope to the Croatian representative to the Vatican:

“I know for a fact, that it is the Franciscans themselves, as for example Father Simic of Knin, who have taken part in attacks against the Orthodox populations so as to destroy, the Orthodox Church. In the same way, you destroyed the Orthodox Church in Banja Luka. I know for sure that the Franciscans in Bosnia and Herzegovina have acted abominably, and this pains me. Such acts should not be committed by educated, cultured, civilized people, let alone by priests”. (p 259)

The Catholic Church took full advantage of Yugoslavia’s defeat in 1941 to increase the power and outreach of Catholicism in the Balkans – Stepinac had shown contempt for religious freedom in way that even Cornwell says was “tantamount to complicity with the violence” against Yugoslavia’s Jews, Serbs and Roma. For his part, the Pope “was never but benevolent” to the leaders and representatives of fascist Croatia – in July 1941 he greeted a hundred members of the Croatian police force headed by the Zagreb chief of police; in February 1942, he gave gave an audience for Ustashe youth group visiting Rome, and he also greeted another representation of Ustashe youth in December of that year. The Pope showed his true colours when in 1943 he told a Croatian papal representative that he was:

“Disappointed that, in spite of everything, no one wants to acknowledge the one, real and principal enemy of Europe; no true, communal military crusade against Bolshevism has been initiated” (p 260)

Stepinac for one, appears to have been a full supporter of forced conversions – along with many of his bishops, one of whom described the advent of fascist Croatia as “a good occasion for us to help Croatia save the countless souls” – i.e., Yugoslavia’s non-Catholic majority. Throughout the war, Croatian bishops not only endorsed forced conversions, they never, at any point, dissociated themselves from Pavelic’s regime, let alone denounce it or threaten to excommunicate him or any other senior member of the regime. In fact, before Yugoslavia was invaded, Stepinac had told Regent Prince Paul of Yugoslavia in April 1940:

“The most ideal thing would be for the Serbs to return to the faith of their fathers, that is, to bow the head before Christ’s representative (the Pope). Then we could at last breathe in this part of Europe, for Byzantinism has played a frightful role in the history this part of the world” (p 265).

The Pope was better informed of the situation inside Yugoslavia than he was about any other area of Europe. His apostolic delegate, Marcone, was a regular visitor to Croatia, travelling on military planes between Rome and Zagreb. Cornwell describes Marcone – who was the Popes personal representative in Croatia – as “an amateur who appeared to sleepwalk through the entire bloodthirsty era” (p 257).

The Vatican would also have been aware of frequent BBC broadcasts on Croatia, of which the following (which were monitored by the Vatican State), on February 16th 1942, was typical:

“The worst atrocities are being committed in the environs of the archbishop of Zagreb [Stepinac]. The blood of brothers is flowing in (the) streams. The Orthodox are being forcibly converted to Catholicism and we do not hear the archbishop’s voice preaching revolt. Instead it is reported that he is taking part in Nazi and Fascist parades” (p 256).

And, according to to Dedijer:

Throughout the whole war in more than 150 newspapers and magazines, the church justified the fascist state under Pavelic as the work of God.

Many Roman Catholic priests served the Ustasha state in high positions. The pope appointed the highest military vicar for Croatia. The latter had a field chaplain in every unit of the Ustasha army. The task of this field chaplain consisted among other things of repeatedly goading the Ustasha units in their mass murders of the peasant population. High dignitaries of the Roman Catholic Church and of the Ustasha state together organized the mass conversion of the Orthodox Serbian population. Hundreds of Orthodox churches in Serbia were plundered and destroyed; the three highest dignitaries and two hundred clerics were murdered in cold blood; the remainder of the clergy were driven into exile. In the concentration camp of Jasenovac, hundreds of thousands of Serbs were murdered under the command of Roman Catholic priests.

Execution of prisoners at the Jasenovac concentration camp, which was briefly run by a Franciscan military chaplain, Miroslav Filipović, who was reportedly stripped of his status by the church but was hanged in his clerical robes

The papal emissary Marcone was in Croatia during this entire time. He sanctioned silently all the gory deeds and permitted pictures of himself with Pavelic and the German commanders to be published in the newspapers. After the visit to Pope Pius XII, Ante Pavelic exchanged Christmas and New Year’s greetings with him that were published in the Ustasha press.

Pavelic escapes to Argentina disguised as a Catholic priest

The Catholic Church was not only closely involved with the Ustasha movement in wartime Croatia, it helped many Nazi war criminals escape at the end of the war, including Ante Pavelic, who fled to Argentina via the Vatican and the “ratlines” of the Vatican. In mid-year 1986 the U.S. government released documents of their counter-espionage agency, the OSS. These reveal that the Vatican had organized a safe-flight route from Europe to Argentina for Pavelic and two hundred of his advisors known by name. The fascists hid frequently during their flight in cloisters and in many instances disguised themselves as Franciscan monks (Pavelic himself escaped disguised as a Catholic priest).

Also, at the end of the war, the Ustashe looted some $80 million from Yugoslavia, much of which was composed of gold coins. Here again, they had the total collaboration of Vatican, which according to Cornwell included not only hospitality of a pontifical Croatian religious institution (the College of San Girolamo degli Illirici in Rome), but also provision of storage facilities and safe-deposit services for the Ustashe treasury. During the war, the College of San Girolamo became a home for Croatian priests receiving Vatican-sponsored theological education – after the war, it became the headquarters for the postwar Ustashe underground, providing Croatian war criminals with escape routes to Latin America.

A leading figure at the College of San Girolamo was the Croatian priest and Nazi war criminal Father Krunoslav Draganavic – described once by U.S. intelligence officials as Pavelic’s “alter ego”. His arrival in Rome in 1943 was to coordinate Italian-Ustashe activities, and after the war, he was a central figure in the organising escape routes for Nazi’s to Argentina. It was later claimed that members of the CIA had said that he had been allowed to store the archives of the Croatian legation inside the Vatican, as well as valuables brought out of Yugoslavia by fleeing Ustashe in 1945.

The most famous Nazi mass-murderer who passed through the College of San Girolamo was Klaus Barbie, known as the Butcher of Lyons, the Gestapo police chief in that French city between 1942 and 1944, who had tortured and murdered Jews and members of the French resistance. Barbie lived under Draganavic’s protection at San Girolamo from early 1946 until late 1947, when the US Counter Intelligence Corp helped him escape to Latin America. Another Nazi war criminal, Franz Stangl, the commandant of the Treblinka death camp was assisted with false papers and hiding places in Rome by the Nazi sympathizer Bishop Alois Hudal. Draganavic was expelled from San Girolamo a few days after Pope Pius XII death in October 1958.

g
Ratlines were a system of escape routes for Nazis and other fascists fleeing Europe at the end of World War II. These escape routes mainly led toward havens in South America, particularly Argentina, Paraguay, Brazil, Uruguay, Chile, and Bolivia. Other destinations included the United States, Great Britain, Canada and the Middle East

While it may be true that individual Catholics risked their lives to save the Jews, Roma and Serbs from the Holocaust, the Catholic Church, as an entity, did not. The Vatican also assisted thousands of Nazi war criminals such as Adolph Eichmann, Franz Stangl (the commandant of Treblinka), Walter Rauf (the inventor of the “mobile” gas chamber), and Klaus Barbie (the “Butcher of Lyons”). Pope Pius XII personally authorized the smuggling of Nazi war criminals, which was directed by his political advisor Giovanni Montini (who later became Pope Paul VI). Shortly before his death in Madrid in 1959, Pope John XXIII granted Pavelic his special blessing. On his death bed, Pavelic held a wreath that was a personal gift from Pope Pius XII from the year 1941.

Stepinac found guilty of collaboration

After the war Stepinac was arrested by the Yugoslav government and sentenced to 17 years in prison for war crimes. A parade of prosecution witnesses at his trial in Zagreb testified on October 5, 1946, that Catholic priests armed with pistols went out to convert Orthodox Serbs and massacred them. In one instance, one witness said 650 Serbs were taken into a church under false pretenses, and then were stabbed and beaten to death by Ustashi members after the doors were locked. Stepinac was convicted on all principal counts of aiding the Axis, the Nazi puppet of Ante Pavelic, and of glorifying the Ustashi in the Catholic press, pastoral letters, and speeches. He eventually died under house arrest in 1960 after being sentenced to life imprisonment for collaboration by the postwar communist government in Yugoslavia.

The Investigation by the Yugoslav War Crimes Commission established that Stepinac had played a leading part in the conspiracy that led to the conquest and breakdown of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1941. It was furthermore established that he had played a role in governing the Nazi puppet state of Croatia, that many members of his clergy participated actively in atrocities and mass murders, and, finally, that they collaborated with the enemy down to the last day of the Nazi rule, and continued after the liberation to conspire against the newly created Federal Peoples Republic of Yugoslavia.

Stepinac only served a few years in prison because of the Vatican’s anti-Communist propaganda of the “suffering martyr” and their organizing of “Cardinal Stepinac Associations” which lobbied for his release.

Jews and Serbs say that Stepinac was a Nazi collaborator. Catholic supporters claim he initially backed the regime, but later withdrew his support because of the mass executions and forced conversions of Orthodox Christians to Catholicism – although little credible evidence is presented of this.

Archbishop Stepinac was beatified by Pope John Paul II in Croatia on October 1998. Following the countries succession from Yugoslavia in 1991, the ultra-Nationlist Tudjman regime in Croatia renamed a village in Krajina after him. The late President Tudjman himself is on record as having said that he is “proud that his wife has no Jewish or Serbian blood in her”. Ironically, unlike Pavelic himself, whose wife seems to have been Jewish (Pavelic’s mother-in law, Ivana Herzfeld was said to be was Jewish)

Ante Pavelić giving Nazi salute (far left) with Archbishop Alojzije Stepinac (far right) and other Catholic Church leaders
Ante Pavelić giving Nazi salute (far left) with Archbishop Alojzije Stepinac (far right) and other Catholic Church leaders

Like the French Nazi Jean-Marie Le Pen (who described the Holocaust as a “mere detail of history”), Tudjman also become a Holocaust revisionist. In his book Wastelands of History, he questioned the truth behind the Holocaust and moved to cover up the role of Ustashe regime in the darkest period of Croatia’s history. Worse, Tudjman rehabilitated fascist war criminals and gave them medals, and, as in the case of Stepinac, had streets named after them.

On two occasions in 1970 and 1994, attempts were made to the Yad Vashem Holocaust to get Stepinac added to the “List of the Righteous” – which includes people like Oskar Schindler, but this was turned down. Interestingly, the request was sent by private Jewish citizens from Croatia and not the official Jewish organization in Croatia, which has never sent such a request. Explaining the refusal, an official of the Yad Vashem explained that:

“Persons who assisted Jews but simultaneously collaborated or were linked with a Fascist regime which took part in the Nazi orchestrated persecution of Jews, may be disqualified for the Righteous title”.

Nazi connection to Franciscan Order uncovered near Medjugorje, Bosnia

The Franciscan order has always denied the evidence of its wartime ties to the Ustasha regime in Croatia. They acted as facilitators and middlemen in moving the contents of the Ustasha Treasury from Croatia to Austria, Italy and finally South America after the war. During the Nazi occupation of Bosnia, the Franciscans were closely involved with the Ustashe regime. Not far from Medjugorje in Bosnia (where the Virgin Mary is said to put in nightly appearances for the tens of thousands of Roman Catholic pilgrims), is the Franciscan monastery at Sirkoi Brijeg which has become the centre of allegations linking it to disappearance of the Ustashe treasury after the war.

In San Francisco Federal Court in November 1999, in what was described as “tangible proof” of the Nazi Franciscan connection, was obtained when cameramen working for Phillip Kronzer (who has helped expose the Medjugorje myth) obtained entry to the Monastery and filmed a secret shrine honouring the Ustashe. A plaque dedicated to Franciscan monks who were Ustasha members was filmed along with a massive shrine lining the walls complete with photographs of Ustasha soldiers some in Nazi uniforms. The admonition, “Recognize us, We are yours” can clearly be seen in the video footage. On a later visit to the monastery the shrine had been dismantled but the videotape preserved the evidence and has now been made available by the Kronzer Foundation.

Cold War Era Files May Hold the Key to Holocaust Lawsuit

A Freedom of Information Act lawsuit was filed in August 2000 in San Francisco, USA by California attorneys Jonathan Levy and Tom Easton against the U.S. Army and the CIA. Easton and Levy are also pursuing a Holocaust era lawsuit against the Vatican Bank and Franciscan Order regarding the disappearance of the World War II Nazi Croatian treasury including gold, silver, and jewels plundered from concentration camp victims in Croatia and Bosnia, mainly Serbs, Jews, and Gypsies.

The lawyers are seeking the release of over 250 documents from the files of Draganavic. He is now regarded as one of the principal operators of the so-called Vatican “ratline” that smuggled Nazis and their loot to South America between 1945 and the late 1950’s. Beneficiaries of the ratline included Adolf Eichman, Klaus Barbie “the butcher of Lyons” and the notorious Croatian mass murderer Ante Pavelic as well as thousands of lesser known Nazis and collaborators.

While file releases on the ratline date from as early as the 1983 Barbie case, a core of documents remain withheld on grounds of “national security.” It is these documents the attorneys want from the Army and CIA. They describe him as a “sinister priest” who is alleged to have worked at various times for the secret services of Croatia, the Vatican, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia as well as British and American intelligence.

The attorneys have suggested that the withheld documents, most well over 40 years old are highly embarrassing to the Americans, the British, and Vatican and hold the key to a multinational money laundering scheme that used Holocaust victim loot to finance covert Cold War era operations against the Soviet Union and its allies.

The lawsuit was filed in U.S. District Court in San Francisco.


About the author:

Born in Tralee, Co. Kerry in 1936, Seán Mac Mathúna spent many years working as a teacher before taking up writing full-time in the 80s. His collection of short stories ‘Ding’ established Mac Mathúna as a gifted short story writer and ‘The Atheist’ was nominated for the European Literary Prize.

The original source of the article: http://churchandstate.org.uk/2015/12/the-role-of-the-catholic-church-in-yugoslavias-holocaust/

Join the debate on our Twitter Timeline!

7141316237_ebbc553f2a_b_Jasenovac

Save

Remembering A Magnum Crimen In The Independent State Of Croatia, 1941−1945

182132_093021s3_f

After the April War of 6−18th, 1941, the Germans, Italians, Bulgarians and Hungarians occupied and divided the territory of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia into several parts. The Germans annexed the North Slovenia and put under their direct occupation the Yugoslav part of Banat and the Central Serbia with Kosovska Mitrovica. The Italians occupied the South Slovenia, established their marionette regime in Montenegro and annexed the Gulf of Boka Kotorska, parts of Konavli and Dalmatia. The Hungarians annexed Prekomurje, Baranja and Bachka. The Bulgarians occupied the East and Central Vardar Macedonia and the South-East Serbia. The Italians established their own marionette state of a Greater Albania with the East Montenegro, Kosovo (without its northern part that was occupied by the Germans for economic reasons) and the West Vardar Macedonia.

However, the most important post-April War creation on the territory of ex-Kingdom of Yugoslavia was an Independent State of Croatia that was officially proclaimed on April 10th, 1941. It was composed by Croatia, Slavonia, parts of Dalmatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and the East Srem (today in Serbia). The official name of the state was Neovisna država Hrvatska (the NDH) with a capital in Zagreb. It had 6.663.157 inhabitants according to the last pre-war census and covered the territory of 102.725 sq. km. According to the Rome Treaties from May 1941 the NDH gave to its patron Italy Kastav and Sushak with its hinterland, the islands of Krk and Rab, the North Dalmatian and parts of the Central Dalmatian littoral, the biggest part of the Adriatic islands and a part of Konavle. Therefore, Italy realized all paragraphs of the secret London Treaty signed between Italy and the Entente in April 1915. Nevertheless, after the capitulation of Italy on September 8th, 1943 the NDH tried to incorporate parts of Dalmatia but did not succeed to establish a real state-administrative sovereignty over these territories due to the German obstruction.

The collapse of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1941 was very rapid for at least three reasons:

1. The country was not prepared for the war at all.
2. The aggressors were much stronger from all points of view.
3. The Croat treachery during the April War.

As a consequence of the military defeat, some 375.000 officers and soldiers of the Yugoslav army, but only of the Serb origin, fell into the Axis hands and became the prisoners of war in Germany. Nevertheless, on the territory of the NDH fanatical Serb-hating Croat Nazi-Ustashi were on the loose, perpetrating appalling massacres which very soon led to the Serb uprising and the loss of de facto control over the large areas. Destruction of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, her occupation followed by the creation of a Greater NDH and massacres of its Orthodox and Jewish population were the historical triumph of Vatican and the Roman Catholic separatism.

After the April War in 1941 and the occupation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, as a leading pre-war Croat politician Vladimir Vladko Machek refused the Italian and German offer to become a head of the new quisling state of the NDH, the Croat Nazi-Ustashi leader, Ante Pavelic was brought back from Italy to lead this Independent State of Croatia. V. Machek himself clearly noted that the declaration of the NDH on April 10th 1941 was greeted with “a wave of enthusiasm” in Zagreb “not unlike that which had swept through the town in 1918 when the ties with Hungary were severed”. The territory of NDH, as the rest of ex-Kingdom of Yugoslavia was divided between the German and Italian zones of influence and administration. When the Nazi-Ustashi Poglavnik (Führer) Ante Pavelic was returned from Italy to be appointed by the Italians as the leader of the NDH he came with some 300 supporters, but it turned out soon that he got a silent massive support by the ethnic Croats in the country. The Ustashi movement, established in 1929, found their ideological roots in the mid-19 century chauvinistic Roman-Catholic and Serbophobic ideologist Ante Starchevic – a founder of nationalistic Croat Party of Rights. A. Starchevic was exactly the person who formulated within the ideological framework of a Greater Croatia the Nazi-Ustashi-committed brutal and sadistic genocide against the Serbs during the WWII on the territory of the NDH.

 photo ustasa20sjekirom20skidafa9.jpg

The Italian installation of the Ustashi regime in the NDH meant nothing else than the Serbophobic Roman Catholic fanatics were now in power in a state where the law and order were framed on the pattern of the Nazi Germany’s anti-Jewish law and order – in a state whose population was barely 50 per cent Croat followed by 12 per cent Muslims (today Bosniaks) and at least one-third the Serbs whose destiny was to disappear by these or other means. The Bosnian-Herzegovinian Muslims officially were declared by the Ustashi regime as the “flower of the Croat nation”, i.e., as the ethnic Croats of the Islamic faith and as such the Bosniaks took a full participation in the Croat-run four years sadistic genocide against the Orthodox Serbs. During the war the most infamous Bosnian-Herzegovinian Muslim military unit was the SS Hanjar Division that was inspected by H. Himler himself. However, differently to the Muslim case in the NDH, the implacable extreme Serbophobic regime in Zagreb sought to exterminate all Serbs on the territory of the NDH according to the self-proclaimed principle by the NDH Minister of Education, Mile Budak on June 22nd, 1941: one third to kill, one third to expel and one third to convert to the Roman Catholicizm (to Croatize). The first laws in the NDH were to ban the Cyrilic script and to outlaw the Serbs who had to wear a special sign on their cloths that they are the Orthodox. The Serb Orthodox churches and schools were firstly closed and later destroyed. The Ustashi organized bloody massacres of the Serbs even inside the churches (in Glina in August 1941) or the schools (in Prebilovci in August 1941). Deportations of the Serbs to Serbia were part of the Ustashi-designed “Final Solution” of the Serb Question in the NDH – in 1945 there were around 400.000 Serb refugees in Serbia from the NDH.

We do not have right to forget that the essence of the NDH was that this state was the first Vatican-sponsored state in the Balkans. The Roman Catholic Church in the NDH put itself to the full exposal to the new Nazi Roman Catholic Ustashi authorities and even participated directly in the massacres of the Orthodox Serbs. For the Roman Catholic clergy in the NDH one of the most controversial demands of the Ustashi authorities was the conversion of the Serbs to the Roman Catholicism. In principle, the clergy was uncomfortable with this policy of direct conversion, without the converts first accepting the Union act (recognizing the Pope as a head of the church but keeping Slavonic liturgy). Nevertheless, the Roman Catholic Church in the NDH accepted a forced conversion of the Serbs under the formal pretext of saving their lives. It is estimated that a total number of converted Orthodox Serbs in the NDH was around 300.000, but it is recorded also that many of already converted Serbs became anyway murdered by the Ustashi detachments. In the spring of 1943 the Ustashi government created a Croatian Orthodox Church that was headed by Bishop Hermogen – the Russian Orthodox priest who escaped from the USSR.

The first organized massive massacre of the Serbs in the NDH was committed on April 28th, 1941 when 187 Serbs from the village of Gudovac and its surroundings were massacred. Among the most brutal and sadistic massacres at the beginning of the NDH was in Glina on August 5th, 1941 when some 1.200 Orthodox Serbs dressed in their Sunday best were called to the local Orthodox church from surrounding villages to be converted into the Roman Catholicism. However, instead of the conversion they were locked inside the church and slaughtered by knives. In August 1941 occurred and the Prebilovci massacre of the local Serbs in the East Herzegovina including and the children in the village school. A report on this event by the local Italian commander to Mussolini is very sensitive and anti-Catholic as the commander noticed that after the Prebilovci massacre is shameful to be a Roman Catholic. The organized Ustashi genocide against the Serbs very soon became rapid and efficient that according to the U.S. official reports up to August 1942 there were some 600.000 killed people in the NDH, overwhelming majority of them the Serbs. The massacres of Croat-Muslim Ustashi forces were to such extent that even Adolf Hitler was forced to personally intervene in this case in order to restrain the Ustashi barbarism. It is also recorded that the German troops were in some cases in Bosnia-Herzegovina opening fire on the Ustashi solders in order to save the lives of the Serbs. That was a fact that the Serbs and the Jews were fleeing from the German to the Italian occupation zone of Yugoslavia for the very reason as the Italians protected them from the Ustashi knives.

In the attempt to finally solve the Serb Question westward the Drina River, the Ustashi government established a network of death camps among all Jasenovac (a Yugoslav Auschwitz) nearby the Sava River on the very border with Bosnia-Herzegovina became the most infamous in which perished around 700.000 people among them 500.000 the Serbs. The extermination techniques included a slaughtering of the prisoners by a special type of knife known as the Srbosjek (a Slaughterer of the Serbs) made in the Solingen factory in Germany under the Ustashi design or making the hand-washing soaps of alive boiled human bodies sold in the shops in Zagreb. The evidences of extermination of the Serbs were sent by the local executors to Zagreb and from Zagreb later to Vatican. The most enduring of this genocide is for sure the scene described by the Italian journalist and writer Curzio Malaparte in his book Kaputt. This book is account of his wartime experiences as a war correspondent. Therefore, several months after the NDH became proclaimed Malaparte went to make an interview with Ante Pavelic – a head of the state and a leader of the Ustashi movement. On this occasion he was joined by the Italian minister in Zagreb, Raffaele Casertino. What he wrote as a witness is:

“While he spoke, I gazed at a wicker basket on the Poglavnik’s desk. The lid was raised and the basket seemed to be filled with mussels, or shelled oysters – as they are occasionally displayed in the windows of Fornum and Mason in Piccadilly in London. Casertano looked at me and winked, “Would you like a nice oyster stew?” “Are they Dalmatian oysters?” I asked the Poglavnik. Ante Pavelic removed the lid from the basket and revealed the mussels, that slimy and jelly-like mass, and he said smiling, with that tired good-natured smile of his, “It is a present from my loyal Ustashis. Forty pounds of human eyes.”

 photo 3.Ustase2.jpg

The NDH was internationally recognized by Germany, Italy, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Japan, Spain, National China, Finland, Denmark and Manchuria. It existed from April 10th, 1941 to May 15th, 1945. In the other words, the NDH existed a whole week after the German capitulation as the last Nazi state in Europe. After the war a new communist authorities in Yugoslavia, led by Josip Broz Tito of the Croat and Slovenian origin, did everything to eliminate the evidences of the Croat-Muslim Magnum Crimen against the Serbs during the war. A most notorious case happened with the death camp of Jasenovac that was totally demolished. Very soon after the war simply nothing left as an evidence of the 9th Circle of Dante’s Hell followed by destruction of the written and other documents. After 1990 a new nationalistic government of Franjo Tudjman in Zagreb did everything to disgracefully whitewash a history of the NDH directly supported by the official scientific institutions in Croatia. In this context, one of the most shameful “scientific” publications was published in several languages by the Croatian Institute of History in 1997.

Today, it is much more reliable to consult the German and Italian sources on the NDH than the archival material from the Yugoslav archives. Therefore, the most useful reports to Berlin and Rome are by the German and Italian embassies in Zagreb, German General Artur von Flebs, German dr. Josef Fessl, German Wilhelm Hetl, German Lothar Rendulitz, German Herman Neubacher, German dr. Josef Matl, Italian General Pitzio Biroli, Italian General Mario Roata, Italian Colonel Guisepe Angelini, Italian Enzo Cataldi or Italian historian Salvatore Loi who published an extremely valuable anthology of the Italian documents and reports on the Italian military operations in Yugoslavia in 1978. S. Loi’s account on the NDH is probably one of the most relevant and realistic. According to him, the NDH became transformed into the lake of Serb blood until the mid-August 1941. The Croat-Muslim genocide against the Serbs was, according to the same author, the most barbaric part of the WWII, even more barbaric than the holocaust against the Jews.

Subsequently, it is not of any surprise that the U.S. President Th. F. D. Roosevelt told in 1944 that after the war the Croats as a nation has no any right to their own national state as they showed to be the animals during the war. For such nation as the Croats were, Roosevelt anticipated an international monitoring but not any kind of Croatia. However, after the war a Croat led the Communist Party of Yugoslavia created even bigger Croatia within Yugoslavia than it was before the war reducing Serbia into the borders before the Balkan Wars of 1912−1913. Finally, the Croats backed by Vatican and Germany continued a policy of the NDH in 1991 and in essence succeeded as today in Croatia there are only up to 4 per cents of the Serbs in comparison to 25 per cents in 1940 or 12 per cents in 1990.

2. Sotirovic 2013

Prof. Dr. Vladislav B. Sotirovic

www.global-politics.eu/sotirovic

globalpol@global-politics.eu

© Vladislav B. Sotirović 2016

Join the debate on our Twitter Timeline!

ustasa20sjekirom20skidafa9

The Ustasha And The Rising Tide Of Neo-Nazi Politics In Croatia

ustasa20sjekirom20skidafa9

Over the past several years, analysts and commentators have noticed a rising tide of domestic support for the Croatian homegrown Nazi movement of the Second World War, the Ustashe, which actively exterminated Serbs, Jews, and Roma in the territory it controlled from 1941-45. Far from condemning this alarming development, the Croatian government, the European Union, and non-state actors within it have tacitly and actively supported the rising tide of sympathy towards the Ustashe.

This disconnect between the ostensible “European values” of human rights and tolerance that the European Union claims to represent, and its tacit support of trends towards extremist politics in Croatia will have a significant impact on the increasing trend of Euroscepticism in Serbia and other Balkan states. Furthermore, the Union’s unabashed condemnation of legitimate populist movements in Europe, including but not limited to the Brexit campaign, as “racist” and “xenophobic,” while quietly supporting genuinely extremist political elements will contribute to the increasingly popular perception of the EU as a hypocritical entity.

Surge in Ustasha Sympathy

The Republic of Croatia has, since its independence, often reverted to the imagery of its Second World War predecessor; the Independent State of Croatia (NDH). The NDH was a puppet state sponsored by Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, and was administered by the Ustashe.

During its brief four-year lifespan, the NDH made use of a form of clerical fascism built on the basis of discrimination and systematized liquidation of non-Croatian elements within its boundaries. It was responsible for the deaths of anywhere between 300,000 to 600,000 Serbs and tens of thousands of Jews and Roma.

While restricted by law, Ustashe symbolism is freely exhibited at sporting events, political rallies, and all manners of public gatherings. The penalties for these displays are often restricted to a small monetary fine. By comparison, German law (Strafgesetzbuch section 86a) stipulates that a fine and/or a sentence of up to three years imprisonment will be administered.

Ustasha support among football hooligans (including a recent event during Euro 2016 where Croatian fans openly brandished swastikas) has been popular for decades; a more alarming trend is the active and tacit support of the Ustashe movement and legacy coming from the Croatian government. Earlier this year, the government of Croatia was condemned for appointing Zlatko Hasanbegovic, a prominent and open admirer of the Ustashe regime to be the country’s minister of culture. Croatia’s president, Kolinda Grabar-Kitarovic, is an avid fan of the pro-Ustashe musician Marko Perkovic “Thompson” and, while describing the Ustashe regime as “criminal”, also stated in the past that the NDH “at least protect[ed] the interests of the Croatian people” during its short and incredibly violent reign.

Silence at Best, Encouragement at Worst

Despite ongoing reports by international NGO’s of state-sponsored discrimination against Croatian Serbs and routine desecrations of Serbian churches and cultural monuments at the hands of pro-Ustashe elements in the country, the European Union has remained almost completely silent on the issue of growing pro-Ustashe sympathies in the Croatian government and political scene.

Rather than condemn the rising tide of Ustashe sympathy in the country or denounce the appointment of Ustashe sympathizers to some of the Croatian government’s highest ministries, the European Union has chosen to tacitly support the creeping return of political extremism to Croatia. On June 15th, an exhibition dedicated to Cardinal Alojzije Stepinac was held at the European Parliament, one of the EU’s most important institutions of governance. Cardinal Stepinac, who served as the Croatian Catholic Archbishop of Zagreb from 1937 to 1960, was an active supporter of the Ustashe regime and according to prominent Balkan historian Bernd Jurgen Fischer “had close association with the Ustashe leaders as the archbishop of the capital city, had issued proclamations celebrating independent Croatia, and welcomed the Ustashe leaders.”

The European Union has yet to respond to any of the criticisms lodged against it for hosting an event dedicated to a key supporter of a Nazi-backed regime that murdered hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians during the Second World War.

A recent definition (pictured below) of the Ustashe regime in the leading German language dictionary ‘Duden’ as a “movement which fought against ‘Serbian centralism’” has also provoked a firestorm of controversy and a rapidly growing online petition sponsored by the humanitarian organization 28 Jun. (full disclosure: we are both members of this organization). The definition makes no reference to any of the Ustashe’s well-documented and numerous crimes against civilian populations, giving it the appearance of a legitimate political movement with reasonable aims. These recent events are contributing to the growing sentiment among many Serbs who feel alienated by the European Union, and as if a double standard is being applied with regards to Serbia.

Loss of Credibility

Since Serbia attained candidate status in 2011, the European Union has imposed on it a host of requirements and stipulations that ostensibly deal with human rights and unresolved issues stemming from the Yugoslav Conflicts of the 1990’s. The Serbian government has largely complied with the conditions imposed on it by the European Union and has committed itself to the EU through acts such as extraditing members of its own government and “normalizing” relations with the Republic of Kosovo (a self-declared state which unilaterally declared independence from Serbia in 2008) at the behest of the European Union. Additionally, many EU states voted in favour of a failed UN resolution that sought to classify the controversial events in Srebrenica in 1995 as “genocide”.

Given the fact that the European Union has both passively supported the rise tide of extremist political inclinations in one of its member states by refusing to condemn it and actively supported it by hosting exhibitions in its honor, Serbs’ enthusiasm for joining the EU will likely continue to wane. The European Union has demonstrated a lack of integrity and even-handedness in upholding its stated human rights values by enforcing relatively harsh standards for Serbia while imposing virtually none on Croatia, even going as far as openly supporting some of Croatia’s worst historical human rights abusers. Coupled with growing Eurosceptic sentiments in both Serbia and Europe as a whole, the European Union’s quiet support of radicalized politics in Croatia could jeopardize the EU’s strategic goals of acquiring Serbia as a member.

Furthermore, the double standard shown by the European Union in its dealings with Croatia and Serbia represent yet another example of the moral hypocrisy of the European Union. While top EU officials were quick to denounce legitimate populist movements such as the Brexit campaign as racist and xenophobic, those same officials and institutions have done nothing but tacitly support genuinely extremist politics in Croatia. Eurosceptic parties such as Front Nationale and the Austrian Freedom Party are routinely branded as “far right” and “radical” while political extremism in Croatia is allowed to flourish. If the European Union does not take steps to meaningfully combat this moral hypocrisy, then it is likely that the trend of increasing skepticism towards the Union will continue to rise unabated.


About the authors:

Nenad Dumanovic is the founder and principal of Impressify, an Alberta-based content marketing company. He is a graduate of the University of Alberta’s Honours political science program and wrote his thesis on Bitcoin and the political, legal, and regulatory ramifications of digital currency and financial technology. Nenad is an active member of 28. Jun, a Canada- based not-for- profit organization and is launching Konstantine, a digital magazine about current events in the Balkans in Winter 2016.

Daniel Jankovic is a graduate of the University of Alberta’s History and Economics program. He studies history and economics, and has an avid interest in political discourse and international relations, especially in regard to the Balkans of Southeastern Europe. He recently completed an in-depth analysis on the death of the residential bar and its social impact in the Balkans. The paper is slated to be published in several academic journals in the upcoming year. He is an active member of 28. Jun, a Canada-based not-for- profit organization and is launching Konstantine, a digital magazine about current events in the Balkans in Winter 2016.

13-07-2016

Crimes Of Genocide Against The Serbian People

4682axe

The controversial film director has been reported to authorities by the Antifascist League.

A criminal complaint against film director Jakov Sedlar has been filed due to historical counterfeits that he used during the production of his documentary “Jasenovac – The Truth”. The complaint has been filed by the Antifascist League of Croatia due to criminal offense of incitement to violence and hatred, reports tportal.hr on July 15, 2016.

In the explanation of the compliant, the Antifascist League states that Sedlar in the film publicly denied and significantly reduced the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, primarily directed against members of Serbian national minority, using mistaken concepts, false arguments, counterfeits, concealment of historical facts, in a way which can encourage violence or hatred against the group and its members.

The film denies, according to the Antifascist League, and significantly reduces the scope of genocide committed against Jews, Serbs and Roma, and entices hatred primarily against Serbs.

The League finds that the film, by expressing untruths about the Serbian minority, creates extremely negative atmosphere of hatred, intolerance and demonization of certain groups and their members, which is a typical process of creating the preconditions for promoting animosity and hatred in the public as well.

They also hold that the director clearly presented demonizing and discriminatory attitude towards an entire community based on their ethnic identity and ethnicity. “With the distribution of the film throughout Croatia, in particular in schools, and abroad within the Croatian communities, the organizers seek to encourage others to adopt the ideas presented in the film and create feelings of deep animosity and hatred towards the Serbian minority group. Based on all the above, we urge the responsible authorities to carry out the actions prescribed by the Criminal Procedure Code in order to raise official criminal charges against the accused”, states the criminal complaint.

Vedran Palvic

Croatian Director Reported for Jasenovac Camp Film

Sven Milekic

The Anti-Fascist League of Croatia filed a criminal complaint to the state attorney’s office on Friday, accusing film director Jakov Sedlar of “public incitement to violence and hatred”.

The League claimed that Sedlar used his film Jasenovac – The Truth, focusing on the Croatian fascist WWII concentration camp at Jasenovac, to target the country’s ethnic and religious minorities, particularly Serbs.

The movie premiered in Zagreb in April, at a screening attended by the controversial culture minister Zlatko Hasanbegovic, and sparked negative reactions from Croatian Jews.

The Israeli ambassador to Croatia, Zina Kalay Kleitman, wrote in an open letter that the film “attempts to revise historical facts and offends the feelings of people who have lost their loved ones in Jasenovac”.

According to the list made by the memorial site at Jasenovac, while the country was ruled by the Nazi puppet Independent State of Croatia, NDH, Croatian Ustasa fascist units killed 83,145 people at the camp between 1941 and 1945. The vast minority of victims were Serbs, Roma and Jews.

The Anti-Fascist League of Croatia filed a detailed criminal complaint in which it claimed that Sedlar had falsified the death toll at the camp, rejecting both memorial site numbers, as well as figures given by Yad Vashem centre in Jerusalem, the Simon Wiesenthal Centre in Vienna and the Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington.

The League claimed that by doing this, Sedlar tried to prove that the Communist authorities killed more people at the camp after the NDH was ousted than the Ustasa between 1941 and 1945 – an allegation which has never been substantiated.

“[Sedlar] concealed the scientifically-established facts of the genocidal character of the NDH,” says the League’s criminal complaint.

It accuses Sedlar of avoiding mention of the Ustasa units and NDH government’s involvement in genocide and crimes against humanity and trying to portray Jasenovac as “a communist myth”.

The League also said that in the film, Sedlar used a faked photo-montage of a 1945 front page of the Croatian newspaper Vjesnik in his attempts to show that the Communists falsified facts about Jasenovac.

The front cover used by Sedlar was proven to be a fake in April by journalist Lovro Krnic, who went through all the issues of the newspaper from that period.

Sedlar rejected this however, claiming it was the original front page that “can’t be found in the archives”. He also insisted that the Jasenovac death toll had been inflated by the Communists.

The Leaguealso claimed that in the film, Sedlar used forged letters allegedly sent by NDH leader Ante Pavelic, among other inaccuracies.

“Therefore, by creating untruths, he says something extremely negative regarding the Serb minority in the film, creating an atmosphere of hatred and intolerance and demonising certain groups and their members in a typical process of creating the preconditions for promoting animosity and hatred among the public,” the criminal complaint alleges.

Sedlar has not yet commented on the complaint.


Linguistic Engineering: New “Boshnjak” Identity and “Bosnian” Language

10481028976_9aeab4bcd3_b_Bosnia

On November 21st, 2015 it was the 20th anniversary of the 1995 Dayton Peace Accord – a treaty signed by four Presidents (the USA, Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina) that led to an end of the civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

As a result of the Dayton Peace Accord a new “independent and internationally recognized state” emerged: Bosnia-Herzegovina as a confederation of two political entities (the Republic of Srpska and the Muslim-Croat Federation) but ethnically strictly divided into three segments composed by the Serb, Croat and Muslim (today Boshnjak) controlled territories. In contrast to the Republic of Srpska (49% of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina) the Muslim (Boshnjak)-Croat Federation is cantonized on the ethnic basis.

However, Bosnia-Herzegovina is today just another non-functional western project – a country that is not independent; it is a Western protectorate, a territory, fully dependent on international financial donations and credits. The country is ethnically divided as imposed by US-NATO without any inter-ethnic cooperation between the three leading ethnic groups.

Nevertheless, one of the most important features of post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina is a creation and existence of a new ethnolinguistic and ethnonational identity – the (Muslim) “Boshnjaks” who speak the “Bosnian” language as a separate and independent language from the family of the South Slavic languages. This is an artificial construct with a view to creating ethnic and linguistic divisions.

The political consequences of  the “Boshnjak” project are of international significance: this ethnonational identity is based Islam and Muslim political ideology as all other identity components, including the language which in the 1980s was Serbo-Croatian. Subsequently, the Muslim Boshnjaks accepted all components of political Islam ideology and as a consequence the world is today faced with the fact that the Muslim part (cantons) of Bosnia-Herzegovina is the first European Islamic State (the second one is Muslim Albanian Kosovo) – a country that is a main European recruitment center for the Middle East Jihad fighters.

Nevertheless, the political project of making the “Boshnjak” ethnonation required and the creation of a separate ethnolanguage for such ethnonation in order to prove that the Boshnjaks deserved to be treated as a separate nation with their own independent state.

The object of this article is to present the process of making separate (from Serbian, Croatian and Montenegrin) Boshnjak ethnolinguistic national identity by using the technique of “linguistic engineering/chirurgic” in the process of creation of an independent (from Serbian/Montenegrin and Croatian) Bosnian language as a national language of Bosnian-Herzegovinian South Slavic Muslims (former speakers of common Serbo-Croat language). We will present as well the ways in which various elements of linguistic diversity within former Serbo-Croat language have been “emblematized” and taken as markers of ethnonational and political identity of Muslim Boshnjaks in multicultural/multiconfessional Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1993, when official Boshnjak ethnonational identity was introduced, up today.

The relationship between language, nation and state is a part of an ideological composition either in Bosnia-Herzegovina or in the rest of the Balkans (similarly to majority of European regions). Bosnia-Herzegovina is a Balkan historical province where the consequences of the clash between national ideologies, which are both domestically rooted and imported from outside with more or less autonomous currents of thinking and behaviour, have been deep and extreme.

Importedideology of the 19th century German Romanticism of linguistically rooted ethnonational identity and solving the national-state problem (“Eine sprache, ein folk, ein staat”) is fused with more autonomous currents that were heavily imbued with “bloody memories” from WWII and resulted in what is labelled  to be  “post-Communist nationalism”. Such amalgamation became a basis for the creation of increasingly homogeneous states with rejuvenation of inter-ethnic intolerance.

The land of Bosnia-Herzegovina is probably the best Balkan example of a crucial interface between language and nationalism. For the purpose that they are separate nations all three major ethnoconfessional players in Bosnia-Herzegovina legally proclaimed their own national languages to be disconnected with Serbo-Croatian.  That was of especial importance to the Muslims/Boshnjaks as without “evidence” that their native language is different from Serbian and Croatian they will hardly convince the international community that they are not originally Serbs or Croats, which was a crucial justification of their claims to live in internationally independent “national” state organization.[1]

The Bosnian language (de facto of only Muslim Boshnjaks), as a separate (South) Slavic one, was officially inaugurated in 1996 by publishing the book: S. Halilović, Pravopis bosanskog jezika (Orthography of Bosnian Language) in the capital of Bosnia-Herzegovina – Sarajevo. According to the Orthography… (and other similar publications), Bosnian language is different in comparison with “relative” Serbian and Croatian because of the following main reasons:

  1. The use of phoneme “h” in certain words differently from Serbian, Croatian and Montenegrin. For instance, the word coffee” is written and pronounced in these languages as: in Bosnian: kahva; Serbian/Montenegrin: кафа/kafa; Croatian: kava; in Bosnian hudovica (widow), in Serbian/Croatian udovica, etc.
  2. Greater use of “Turkish” words (i.e. of Oriental origin) like ahbab (friend); amidža (uncle); adet (custom/habit), akšam (twilight), etc. (all of these words are known in Serbian, Montenegrin and Croatian languages but not used regularly as they are replaced by the Slavic words).[2]
  3. Using of only one form of the Future tense: “ja ću kupiti/kupit ću” (I will buy) that is used in standard Croatian as well, but no use of forms “купићу/ја ћу да купим” as in standard Serbian/Montenegrin.[3]
  4. The use of Ijekavian sub-dialect of the Shtokavian dialect but not the Ekavian one of the same dialect.[4] However, Ijekavian sub-dialect is used in spoken and standard language by all Serbs, Croats and Boshnjaks westward from Drina River (historically and politically separating Serbia from Bosnia-Herzegovina) and by Serbs in Western Serbia and by all Slavs in Montenegro.

Nominally, the Bosnian language is written in both Latin and Cyrillic scripts. However, in practice it is only in Latin (like Croatian) for the purpose to break any link with the Serbs for whom the Cyrillic script is (by language law) the first, while Latin is the second national alphabet.[5]

48 a 1994 etnicka BiH

It has to be emphasised that Croatian, Bosnian, Montenegrin and Serbian Latin script is identical. In a historical context, the native language of the inhabitants of Bosnia-Herzegovina (claimed to be Bosnian one) was written by three alphabets: “latinica” (Latin), “bosančica/bosanica” (Cyrillic) and “arabica” (Arabic). However, with regard to “bosančica”, the fact that this script came to mediaeval Bosnia-Herzegovina from Serbia and during the Ottoman rule is not recognized. It was known within the Bosnian Muslim feudal circles as “Old Serbia” up to the mid-19th century. At the same time Croatian philology claims that “bosančica” is Croatian national Cyrillic script. By “arabica”, undoubtedly, it was written in one of the most beautiful profane lyric, religious and fine literature – “književnost adžamijska”.[6]

Regardless of official domestic and international recognition of a separate Bosnian language, linguistically speaking, grammar and spelling of Serbian, Montenegrin, Croatian and Bosnian languages are broadly the same. [7] It shows that all four of them have the same origin, process of development and linguistic essence. Even the fact that there are 8% of lexical differences between them does not imply practical obstacles for understanding and communication in everyday life.

The common link that is connecting in practice and even in literature Bosnian with neighbouring Croatian, Serbian, Macedonian and Montenegrin languages are about 3000 Oriental words (“turcizmi”). For many of them there is no domestic Slavic alternative.[8]

One of the main problematic issues concerning ethno-linguistic-statehood reality of Boshnjaks is the fact that their ethnic, language and state names do not have the same terminology as in the majority of European nations (ex. Polish nation; Polish state; Polish language, etc.). In the other words, their ethnonational name – “Boshnjaks” does not correspond to the name of their national state – “Bosnia-Herzegovina” and both do not correspond to their national language name – “Bosnian”. In this context, why do Boshnjaks not speak the Boshnjak language but rather speak Bosnian? In this regard, it has to be said that originally from 1991 up to 1996 Boshnjaks pretended to officially speak theBoshnjak language (but never tried to rename Bosnia-Herzegovina into “Boshnjakia”). Such practice was even internationally sanctioned by the Dayton Peace Treaty in November 1995 when the text of the agreement was signed in four languages: English, Croatian, Serbian and Boshnjak (not Bosnian!).

However, very soon the ideologists of the Boshnjak ethnonational identity understood that international science of Slavonic philology is very suspicious upon the use of Boshnjak language as it is not at all rooted in the historical sources in which from the year 1300 up to 1918 is mentioned only the Bosnian language (in fact as a provincial language spoken by the Orthodox, Catholic and from 1463 Muslim communities).[9] The Bosnian language, as a mother tongue of all inhabitants of Bosnia-Herzegovina was especially promoted at the time of Austro-Hungarian administration in this province from 1878 to 1918.[10] However, such solution was decisively rejected by the Serbs and Croats from Bosnia-Herzegovina who called their languages after their ethnic names. Thus, the idea of the Bosnian language at that time (as today as well) was accepted only by local Muslim inhabitants.[11]

Nevertheless, the Austro-Hungarian policy of the Bosnian language as a native one of all inhabitants of Bosnia-Herzegovina is accepted today by those who advocated the Bosnian language as a mothertongue of Serbs, Croats and Boshnjaks from Bosnia-Herzegovina and of the Boshnjaks from Sandžak area (Рашка in Serbian language and historiography). The last one was devided after 1913 between Serbia and Montenegro but before 1878/1908 being a part of the Ottoman province (pashaluk in Serbo-Croat) of Bosnia (not of Bosnia-Herzegovina!) which existed from 1580 to 1878/1908.[12]

The truth is that in the 15th and the 16th centuries “Bosnian” (or “Serbo-Croat” or “Serbian” or “Croat”) language was the second diplomatic and official language at the court in Istanbul (after the Turkish one) due to the fact that at that time there were many high Ottoman officials and the Janissaries[13] in Istanbul (including and Grand Vizirs) originating from Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, this fact became the basis for the claims that the  Bosnian language was at that time some kind of Balkan lingua franca and a diplomatic language in Europe. Nevertheless, the sources are telling us that in the most cases the local South Slavic population of ex-Serbo-Croat language (especially those from Dubrovnik) have been calling their language as  “our language”, “Slavic language”, “Illyrian language”, etc., but only in very rear cases by ethnic names.[14]

The creators and promoters of a separate Bosnian language, in order to prove their standpoint, have applied the technique of “linguistic engineering”, similar to their Croatian colleagues concerning the Croatian language.[15] In both cases, it was and is done for the very purpose to prove that their ethnic groups are linguistically independent which enables them to call themselves separate nations  internationally recognized as independent nation states according with the right to self-determination. However, in contrast to Croatian case, Bosnian “linguistic engineering” is not based on the introduction of neologisms[16] but rather on the re-introduction of Oriental words which had been brought to the Balkans by the Ottoman authorities (those words are of Turkish, Arab and Persian origin).

In conclusion, we can say that the problem of official recognition of a separate Bosnian language of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian Boshnjaks can be solved taking into consideration two standpoints:

  1. Linguistic standpoint.
  2. Socio/polito-linguistic standpoint.

De facto (linguistically), Serbian, Croatian, Bosnian and Montenegrin languages are part of one standard-linguistic system. They express unity in orthography, grammar, morphology, syntax, phonology and semantics. For instance, all of them have 30 phonemes (25 consonants and 5 vocals). Between them there are only app. 8% lexical differences (including and “neologisms”). However, there is a tendency to create lexical differences with a view to creating barriers, in order to firmly justify ethno-linguistic and state-political differentiation. The obvious fact is that the level of understanding is almost 100% (excluding the most newest neologisms).

De Jure (in socio/polito-linguistic point of view) these four languages are separate ones and  internationally recognised. While Serbian, Croatian, Bosnian and Montenegrin are considered separate languages in essence they are they same language.

The crucial technique of “linguistic engineering” pertaining to the Bosnian language is its lexical Orientalization with the three sociolinguistic and ethnonational tasks to be achieved:

  1. Inner homogenization of Boshnjak nation
  2. Denacionalization of Croats and Serbs within Bosnia-Herzegovina (by suggestion that all inhabitants of this state speak the Bosnian language)[17]
  3. External heterogenization of ethnoconfessional Boshnjak nation in relation to the neighbouring Serbs and Croats.[18]

The politics of “linguistic engineering” in the case of the Bosnian and Croatian languages was implied for the final aim to create firstly independently standardized national languages within officially common Serbo-Croatian one (during ex-Yugoslav (con)federation) and later (after collapse of Yugoslavia in 1991) internationally recognized separate languages by deepening and using as much as the dialectical/regional differences of the same spoken Serbo-Croatian language. The ultimate result was that minor speaking differences were proclaimed for the national characteristics and as such have been used to be lay the foundations of the newly declared autonomous national languages. Consequently, the common Serbo-Croatian language has ceased to exist together with a common Serbo-Croatian nationality.

Finally, the Muslim community in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the 20th century is no longer a religious community. It has been categorized and internationally recognized as a national identity with its own national language. However, Boshnjaks, Croats and Serbs from Bosnia-Herzegovina (likewise from Montenegro, Sandžak or ex-Republic of Serbian Krayina) all speak the same language which in the 20th century came to existence as Serbo-Croatian with a shared historical past.

If one were to apply a German Romanticist criteria upon ethnonational identity Serbs, Montenegrins, Boshnjaks and majority of the Croats would be considered as a single ethnolinguistic nation with the right to live in a unified nation state organization with a common identity.

2. Sotirovic 2013

Prof. Dr. Vladislav B. Sotirovic

www.global-politics.eu

globalpol@global-politics.eu

© Vladislav B. Sotirovic 2016

_____________________

Endnotes:

[1] An extra ordinary feature of Bosnia-Herzegovina is that it covers the fault lines between three major confessions: Roman Catholicism, Orthodoxy and Islam. From this point of view, local nationalism(s) are not only ethnic; they are even more confessional ones.

[2] Lexical differences have been a primary criterion for the establishment of a separate Bosnian language.

[3] However, both Serbs from Eastern Herzegovina (regularly) and Western Serbia (in many cases) are using future tense construction “ja ću kupiti/kupit ću” like in standard Bosnian and Croatian.

[4] Former Serbo-Croat language was composed by (officially) three dialects: Chakavian, Kajkavian and Shtokavian. The last one became standardized literal language for Serbs, Croats, Montenegrins and Muslims/Boshnjaks. Shtokavian dialect was/is subdivided into three sub-dialects: Ijekavian (mlijeko = milk), Ikavian (mliko) and Ekavian (mleko). Ikavian is not standardized.

[5] Similar policy of using alphabet in Bosnian language was pursued by Austro-Hungarian authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1878–1918.

[6] Besides these mentioned, historically, on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina have been used and Glagolitic and Greek scripts.

[7] According to the Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina official languages are: Bosnian, Serbian and Croatian. Such constitutional-linguistic situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina is quite similar to the Swiss one – Italian, French and German (plus Romansh, spoken by very small community).

[8] During the Bosnian-Herzegovinian civil war of 1992–1995 Bosnian-Herzegovinian Serbs tried unsuccessfully to purify their language by elimination of the “Turkish” words. However, in many cases it was impossible without creation of new neologisms (ex: čarape=socks, šećer=sugar, pamuk=cotton, etc.). It is interesting that common nickname for Bosnian Muslims given by the local Christians, but also and as a group name used by Bosnian-Herzegovinian Muslims to identify themselves, was Turci (the Turks). The Bosnian-Herzegovinian Christians used and the term poturice (those who became the Turks, i.e. convertors). The Bosnian-Herzegovinian Muslims, on the other hand, called the real ethnolinguistic Turks (Turkish language speakers) from Anatolia as Turkuše or Turjaši.

[9] In historical sources the name Bosanski jezik (Bosnian language) is mentioned for the first time in the year of 1300. It is true that the earliest Slavonic philologists like P. J. Šafaŕík, J. Dobrovský and J. Kopitar used the term Bosnian language but only as provincial speech of all inhabitants of the Ottoman Pashaluk of Bosnia but not as a language of Bosnians in ethnic term.

[10] For instance, according to the decree of 1880 for Austro-Hungarian administration in Bosnia-Herzegovina existed only Boshnjaks who are by confession divided into those of Muslim, Catholic and Orthodox denominations. In general, Austro-Hungarian administration in Bosnia-Herzegovina very much favored local Roman Catholic and Muslim inhabitants at the expense of the Orthodox.

[11] It has to be emphasized that even before Austro-Hungarian administration in Bosnia-Herzegovina the local population used the terms Bosnian (“bosanski”) for the language and Bosnians (“Bosanci”) for themselves as inhabitants of this province alongside with more pure ethnic names Serbian/Serbs and Croatian/Croats.

[12] Ottoman Pashaluk of Bosnia before 1683 encompasses and parts of historical territories of Croatia and Dalmatia.

[13] Vinko Pribojević, a Dominican friar from the island of Hvar in Dalmatia in his De origine successibusque Slavorum (Venice, 1532) pointed out that Ottoman sultans appointed many South Slavs as the commanders of his army and that 20.000 of his guard (the Janissaries) are recruited among the Thracians, Macedonians and Illyrians (for Pribojević all of them have been South Slavs – aboriginal Balkan people, speaking one language that was later on called “Serbo-Croat”). With the help of them the Ottomans subjugated many states and peoples in Europe.

[14] Mavro Orbini, a Benedictine abbot from Dubrovnik, in his famous pan-Slavic book (“the Bible of pan-Slavism”) De regno Sclavorum (in Italian version Il regno degli Slavi), printed in Pesaro in 1601, was very clear telling that all South Slavs are speaking the same language and composing one nation within a wider network of united ethnolinguistic Slavdom. More precisely, he inclined to call all speakers of ex-Serbo-Croat language of Shtokavian dialect as the Serbs. However, a Croatian nobleman of German origin from Senj, Pavao Ritter Vitezović (1652–1713) in his political-ideological-programmatic book Croatia rediviva: Regnante Leopoldo Magno Caesare, Zagreb, 1700 claimed that all Slavs, including and those in the Balkans, originated from the Croats and speaking in the essence Croatian language with regional dialects. The essence of both Orbini’s and Ritter’s (likewise Pribojević’s) writings is that all South Slavs (especially the Shtokavians) are composing one ehnolinguistic group (in modern sense – nation).

[15] “Linguistic engineering” of Croatian language can be followed even from 1967 when a majority of the most important Croatian scientific, literal and cultural institutions signed a Declaration upon the name and position of Croatian literal language (“Deklaracija o nazivu i položaju hrvatskog književnog jezika”) requiring to be officially separated from Serbian one and purified from the so-called “srbizmi” (the words of a Serbian origin).

[16] Croatian neologisms in fact have to replace both the international words (not translated in Serbian) and common Croato-Serbian words in order to make a deeper distance between Croatian and Serbian languages for the sake of lesser understanding as a crucial proof that these two languages and ethnic groups are separated. For instance: korjenoslovstvo (etymology), narječoslovstvo (dialectology), točnozor (sniper), vrhoskuplje (summit), odmoridbenik (tourist), veleprevrat (revolution), etc. There were and such proposals for neologisms which hardly took roots like: okolotrbušni hlačodržač (belt for trousers), uljudba (civilization), vrtolet (helicopter), prosudba (mark), etc.

[17] The first President of post-Yugoslav independent Bosnia and Herzegovina and a leader of ruling Muslim political Party of Democratic Action (SDA), Alija Izetbegović, was known as an author of nationalistic Islamic Declaration from 1970 according to which any form of multiculturalism and multiconfessionalism was not possible for the Muslims who have to establish pure Islamic society firstly by Islamization of the whole Muslim community.

[18] The most problematic and unproved in the sources hypothesis upon the ethnic origins of the Boshnjaks (supported by, for instance, Bosnian linguist Dževad Jahić) is that they are posteriors of the mediaeval Bosnian Bogumils who allegedly have been a separate ethnic group, i.e. not Serbs or Croats.

Balkan geographic map

From The History of Anti-Russian Policy: The First Balkan Alliance (1866−1868)

800px-Imperial_Standard_of_the_Emperor_of_Russia_(1858–1917).svg

The creation of the First Balkan Alliance against the Ottoman Empire in 1866–1868 in the light of territorial requirements of the Balkan states and nations at the expense of the decreasing power of the Ottoman authorities and the Ottoman state integration was the first political-military treaty on the mutual cooperation by the Christian Balkan states and nations. The secret paragraphs of bilateral military-political contracts between Greece and Serbia and Serbia and Montenegro in regard to territorial inheritance of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans are the most important points of the treaty.

Serbia became a leader of the Balkan coalition and the main champion of the idea that the “Eastern Question” had to be resolved by the Balkan peoples in the war against the Ottoman Empire without interference of the great European powers. The pivotal impetus for the making of the First Balkan Alliance came from the side of Serbia’s prince Mihailo I Obrenovic (1860−1868) whose predominate political task in the foreign policy was to create a South Slavic state under the Serbian leadership, which would be composed by all South Slavic territories in the Ottoman Empire. For that purpose he needed a cooperation of the other Balkan Christian states and the peoples as Serbia was not strong enough to solely defeat the Ottoman Empire. The most reasonable solution was to create a joint Balkan military-political defensive-offensive coalition which will military defeat the Ottoman Empire and expel the Ottoman authorities from the Balkans as a fundamental precondition for the creation of the united South Slavic state in the Balkans.  

Surely, the main diplomatic efforts of the Balkan Christian states from 1860 to 1868 was put to create a joint Balkan political-military alliance against the Ottoman Empire. The purpose of this defensive-offensive pact was to solve the “Eastern Question” without interference of the great European powers in the Balkan affair implementing the principle “the Balkans to the Balkan peoples!” This principle was founded on the axiom that each European nation, smaller or bigger, has a right to self-determination and ethnic unification into a single national state. Subsequently, the “Eastern Question” had to be resolved by expulsion of the Ottomans from the Balkans and division of their Balkan possessions among the Balkan Christians. The chief initiator for the negotiations, which should lead to the agreement of the common Balkan alliance was the Principality of Serbia. The idea of Balkan federation or confederation emerged during the negotiations as well as the plan to make in the future a united South Slavic state composed by Principality of Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia, Bulgaria, Kosovo-Metohija, Thrace, Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Either the Balkan Federation/Confederation or the South Slavic/Yugoslav Empire had to be a principle guarantee for the real independent life of the Balkan nations freed from the tutorship and control by the European states especially Russia, Italy and the Habsburg Monarchy. However, in fact, such South Slavic state would be under protectorship of France and Great Britain as their Balkan colony and bulwark against especially Russian influence into the region.

The negotiations passed through two phases: I) from 1860 to 1865, and II) from 1866 to 1868. In both of them the crucial bone of contention became how to share the inheritance of the Ottoman territorial possessions in Europe. To fix the exact borders between the Balkan states after the defeat of the Ottoman army has been from that time till the end of the Second Balkan War in 1913 always a principle obstacle for the fruitful cooperation of the Balkan nations. Especially as an apple of discord appeared to be Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The First Balkan Alliance was finally created in 1866, 1867 and 1868 by signing bilateral agreements between Serbia and Montenegro, Serbia and Romania, Serbia and Greece and by reaching the oral agreements between Serbia and the Croatian National Party, Serbia and the Bulgarian revolutionaries, Serbia and the Christian Albanian representatives and finally Romania and the Bulgarian representatives in Bucharest. The prime importance of these either signed or oral agreements is that they represent for the first time in the

17 Balkans after Berlin Congress 1878

Balkan history a regional unity politically directed towards the national liberation. These agreements were reached principally because of the two reasons:

  1. All Balkan Christian states and nations had a common enemy – the Ottoman Empire; and
  2. All of them became afraid that the foreign powers, on the first place Russia and Austria, will resolve the “Eastern Question” in their favor by dividing the spheres of influence in the region not taking into consideration the wishes and interests of the Balkan nations.

The core of the First Balkan Alliance was Serbia and the pivotal advocate of it was her ruler prince Mihailo I Obrenovic. However, the alliance was not effectuated because the general Balkan revolution and war against the Ottoman Empire was to be postponed, in fact till 1912, for three reasons:

  1. Prince Mihailo I was assassinated in Belgrade on June 10th, 1868 and the new Serbian monarch prince Milan Obrenovic, a minor at that time, followed other options to solve the “Eastern Question”;
  2. Neither Balkan state was prepared enough in military and diplomatic points of view to wage the war at that moment against the Ottoman Empire; and
  3. Austria-Hungary (from 1867) became extremely hostile towards the idea of the Balkan revolution which will lead to the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and unification of the Serbs by inclusion of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo-Metohija, Macedonia and Montenegro into a greater/united Serbia.

After the Habsburg military debacle in the Prusso-Austrian and the Italo-Austrian Wars of 1866 the main concern of Austrian foreign policy became to annex Bosnia-Herzegovina that means direct collision with Serbia and the deterioration of diplomatic relations with Russia. In essence, the idea of Austria-Hungary concerning the Balkan affairs was that the Ottoman Empire should not be dismissed in Europe, but just reformed.

Nevertheless, the First Balkan Alliance gave two fundamental attainments to the Balkan peoples, which were realized at the beginning of the 20th century:

  1. An inspiration for a union of their forces for the national liberation against the Ottoman Empire, which was achieved after the First Balkan War of 1912–1913 won by the members of the Second Balkan Alliance; and
  2. A notion of united South Slavic lands, which was mainly realized after the First World War by creation of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes on December 1st, 1918.

However, the First Balkan Alliance from the 1860s was clearly French design and primarily anti-Russian. Namely, the Polish uprising against the Russian authorities in 1863 influenced Napoleon III to create a new plan for redrawing European national borders which would have great consequences for the Balkan affairs in the case of its implementation. More precisely, in March of 1863 the French emperor informed the Austrian ambassador in Paris, count Metternich, regarding his idea of a new political map of Europe:

  1. The historical Kingdom of Poland would be reestablished within the borders which Poland had before its First partition in 1772;
  2. The reestablished united Kingdom of Poland (including and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania) would be governed by one Habsburg archduke;
  3. Italy would gain the province of Venice from Austria;
  4. Austria would be territorially compensated by annexation of Silesia and Serbia;
  5. France would annex the region of the Rhine;
  6. Prussia would, as territorial compensation, annex the Kingdom of Saxony and the Kingdom of Hanover; and finally
  7. The European possessions of the Ottoman Empire would be divided between the Balkan states.

Clearly, such Napoleon’s plan to remap Europe was in essence anti-Russian and creation of some „Yugoslavia“ at the Balkans was a part of his anti-Russian policy. Nevertheless, Franz Joseph I (1830–1916, the emperor of Austria and the king of Hungary from 1848 to 1916) rejected this plan because the British diplomats saw in this plan Napoleon’s intention to reestablish French supremacy in Europe.[1] At the same time, the Serbian government became acquainted with Napoleon’s new plan to cede Serbia to Austria in July 1863 through Italian deputy in parliament, Vegezzi-Ruscal.[2]As a consequence of these events Serbia lost confidence in France’s Balkan policy.

As a kind of political answer Belgrade intensified its own propaganda among the South Slavs and developed a network of agencies for the preparation of an anti-Ottoman revolution, especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The fundamental task for intensification of the Serbian national work in the Ottoman province of Bosnia-Herzegovina (the so-called Pashalik of Bosnia that also included the territory of Rashka/Sanjak) at the time of the Polish uprising of 1863–1864 was Serbia’s intention to impede the realization of Napoleon’s idea of ceding this Ottoman province to Austria as a compensation for Austrian evacuation of Venezia Giulia – an idea that was contrary to the Serbian national interest. For this reason, Serbian national propaganda and other activities in the Pashalik of Bosnia were developed to such extent that in February 1864 the governor of this province, Osman-pasha, warned the Sublime Porte in Istanbul that Belgrade had already completed preparing the Bosnian Serbs for the uprising: 1) Serbia had armed them with weapons and ammunition produced in Serbia; 2) Serbia had established a revolutionary network within the whole territory of the province; and 3) Serbia had concentrated its own military forces along its border with Bosnia. By the spring of 1864 the Ottoman authorities were so convinced that the Balkan revolution would soon break that they started concentrating their forces along the Serbian and Romanian borders in Bulgaria, Rumelia and Bosnia. As a part of military preparations against Serbia and Romania the Porte instituted obligatory military service in both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Albania. According to the Russian diplomatic reports from Albania, the Ottoman policy towards the Albanian tribal aristocracy became softer and many Albanian feudal lords (beys) returned to state offices.[3] A new number of the Muslim Tatars and the Cherkezs were settled in Bulgaria along the Serbian border as a protective measure against the Serbian aggression on the Ottoman Empire in addition to 150,000 Tatars and Muslim Circassians living in Bulgarian territory after the Crimean War (1853–1856).[4]The Ottoman military plan was to have these Muslim settlers, expelled by the Russian authorities from the Caucasus area, serve as frontiersmen along the Ottoman military frontier in the Balkans. Nevertheless, the Ottoman military intervention against Serbia and Romania was finally thwarted only because of the French diplomatic intervention in Istanbul in 1864.[5]

 

2. Sotirovic 2013Prof. Dr. Vladislav B. Sotirovic

www.global-politics.eu

globalpol@global-politics.eu

© Vladislav B. Sotirovic 2016

Endnotes:

[1] Seton-Watson R. W., “Les relations de l’Autriche-Hongrie et de la Serbie entre 1868. et 1874”, Le Monde Slave, № 2, Paris, 1926, p. 433; Bourgeois E., Manuel Historique de Politique Entrangère, III, Paris, 1924, p. 369.
[2]Diplomatic Archives of Serbia, Archives of Ilija Garašanin, “Ilija Garašanin to Vegezzi-Ruscal”, concept, August 27th, 1863, Belgrade.
[3]Diplomatic Archives of Serbia, Archives of Ilija Garašanin, Belgrade, “A copy of report of Russian consul in Rumelia and central Albania to the director of the Asiatic Department of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs”, Bitola (Monastir), March 15th/27th, 1864, № 77 (translated from Russian).
[4] Poulton H., The Balkans. Minorities and States in Conflict, London, 1994, p. 117.
[5]Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Paris, vol. Turquie, Belgrade, “Botmillian to de Lhuys”, August 23rd, 1864, Belgrade, № 85.

4122823192_fed122294d_b_Russia

The 1878 San Stefano Treaty and the Albanians

32-bg-berlincongress

After the Russian military victory over the Ottoman Empire in the 1877−1878 Russo-Ottoman War it was signed the San Stefano Treaty between these two states on March 3rd, 1878. According to the treaty, a Greater “San Stefano” Bulgaria, under the direct protection by Russia, had to be established within the borders of the Ottoman Empire. However, an idea of “San Stefano Bulgaria” directly affected three Balkan nations: the Serbs, Greeks and Albanians as some of their ethnic and historical territories had to become part of a Greater Bulgaria. The “San Stefano Bulgaria” was projected by the Russian authorities to cover territory from the Danube River to the Aegean Sea and from the present-day Albania to the Black Sea, including all of geographic-historical Macedonia, the present-day East Serbia and the present-day Southeast Albania. As a result, the Albanian nation living in the present-day Southeast Albania and the West Macedonia would become part of a Greater Bulgaria that would be governed by the Russian authorities.[1]

It is characteristic of both the San Stefano Treaty and the Berlin Congress that they conceived parts of the Albanian-populated Balkan territories to be given to the other Balkan states according to the principle of ethnic and historical rights. The remained Albanian ethnic space would be within the borders of the Ottoman Empire but without any “special status”, i.e., autonomous rights and ethno-political privileges.

The Ottoman government itself was feeble to protect the Albanian populated territories consisted of more than 80% of the Muslim population, which showed high degree of political and ideological loyalty towards the Sultan and the Sublime Porte in Istanbul. Nevertheless, the decisions of the 1878 San Stefano Treaty resulted in the organization of the Albanian self-defence system by their (Muslim) political leadership, which considered an autonomous status of Albania, similarly to the status of Serbia, Moldavia and Wallachia, as only guarantee for a justifiable administration over the Albanians in the future.

The San Stefano Treaty accorded to the Slavic Bulgaria a portion of the following Albanian-settled lands: the district of Korçë and the Debar area. According to the same treaty, Montenegro was granted with several municipalities at the present-day North Albania and the areas of Bar and Ulcinj. The border between Ottoman Albania and Montenegro was fixed on the Bojana River and the Scodra Lake. Nevertheless, an official representative of the Principality of Montenegro, Radonjić, required in Adrianople (Edirne) the city of Scodra to be included into enlarged Montenegro.[2]

However, what was exactly regarded at that time as Albania, and the Albanians as an ethnic identity, it was not clear to anybody in Europe. The main reason was the fact that the official Ottoman censuses became quite unreliable source to fix such problems because they were based rather on the religious identity than on strict ethno-national (i.e., ethno-linguistic) belonging. Practically, all Ottoman Islamic population, either they were the Albanians, Bosnians or Turks, were selected to one category – the Muslims. A national/ethnic differences were not marked in the Ottoman censuses at all. Nevertheless, regardless on the lack of the official statistics, it is possible to reconstruct the dispersion of the Albanian ethnicity at that time by using other historical sources. One of such sources is a report to the Austro-Hungarian authorities about the northern boundaries of the Albanian language written by the Austro-Hungarian consul F. Lippich in the mid-1877 during the Great Eastern Crisis and the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877−1878. According to this report, a northern linguistic border of the Albanians run from the city of Bar on the Montenegrin Adriatic littoral towards the Scodra Lake, then through two Montenegrin regions of Kolašin and Vasojevićs, after that towards the Ibar River and the city of Novi Pazar in Sanjak (Raška) up to the area of the South Morava River at the present-day Serbia. The Albanian linguistic borderland was fixed on the East and South-East to be around the Ochrid Lake, the cities of Bitola (Monastir) and Debar, and the upper Vardar River.[3] However, in many of these areas the Albanian language was spoken together with the Slavonic languages as they are today the Serbian, Montenegrin and Macedonian.

Surely, the San Stefano Treaty provoked the Albanian nationalism and forged the Albanian national renaissance movement. A germ of the Albanian national movement was growing from the 1840’s to the time of the Great Eastern Crisis of 1875−1878 when the first requirements for the establishment of the Albanian-language schools and the preservation of national language were requested by the Albanian public workers in the Ottoman Empire (Naum Panajot Bredi, Engel Mashi, Josiph Kripsi, John Skiroj, Hieronim de Rada, Vincenzo Dorsa, etc). However, the Albanian national renaissance received a new impetus during the Balkan crisis of 1862 at the time of a new Montenegrin-Ottoman war when several members of the so-called “Scodra group” (Zef Ljubani, Pashko Vasa and others) propagated the uprising of the North Albanian tribes in the Mirditë region against the Montenegrin territorial pretensions on the Albanian-populated areas. They also opposed the Ottoman authorities as they relied on the support by the French Emperor Napoleon III (1852−1870). In the case of successful result of the rebellion the independent and united principality of Albania would be created at the Balkans. It would include all Albanian-populated territories in the Balkans. The main Albanian ideologist from that time was Zef Jubani, born in Scutari in 1818, who claimed that the Albanian population already became a nation at that time.[4] His primary political goal was a creation of an autonomous united Albania within the Ottoman Empire. Others, like Thimi Mitko and Spiro Dineja, favoured Albania’s separation from the Ottoman Empire and creation of a dual Albanian-Greek confederation state similar to Austria-Hungary. During the Great Eastern Crisis of 1875−1878, the Albanian uprising in Mirditë in 1876−1877, led by the Albanian patriots from Scodra, had as its ultimate political goal a creation of an autonomous Albania in the Ottoman Empire. The leaders of the uprising visited Montenegrin court in order to obtain a financial support from the Montenegrin Prince Nikola I (1860−1910; King 1910−1918). Such support was promised to the leader of the Albanian delegation, Preng Dochi. What is important to stress is that the Montenegrin Prince stated on this occasion that Montenegro does not have any territorial aspirations towards the “Albanian” territories. At the same time, the Russian diplomat in Scodra, Ivan Jastrebov, pointed out that Europe faced the “Albanian Question”.

At the same time, the Albanian tribal chieftains from the South Albania and the North Epirus under the presidency of a prominent Muslim Albanian feudal lord Abdul-beg Frashëri convoked in 1877 a national meeting in the city of Jannina when they required from the Sublime Porte in Istanbul to recognize a separate Albanian nationality, and therefore to give them a right to form an autonomous Albanian province (vilayet) within the Ottoman Empire. They required, in addition, that all officials in such Albanian vilayet should be of the Albanian ethnic origin (but only the Muslims), the Albanian-language schools to be open and finally the Albanian-language courts to be created. The memorandum with such demands was sent to the Sublime Porte, but this supreme Ottoman governmental institution rejected to meet any of these Albanian national requirements.

A publishing of the San Stefano Treaty’s articles caused a great unrest and dissatisfaction among the Albanian people.[5] From that time onward, a previous Albanian movement just for improvement of the social conditions of the Albanians living in the Ottoman Empire became, however, now transfigured into the Albanian national movement (but in essence it was rooted into the Islamic tradition and political dogmatism) requiring either the creation of politically autonomous province of Albania within the Ottoman Empire or a making of an independent Albanian national state (based on the Islamic tradition).[6]

Especially the Northeast and East Albania experienced massive unrest and protests against the San Stefano Treaty that were addressed to the Great European Powers.[7] Thus, in April 1878 the Albanians from the city of Debar sent a telegram to the British and Austro-Hungarian ambassadors to the Ottoman Empire, Layard, Zichy respectively, protesting against the annexation of the region of Debar by a newly projected San Stefano Bulgarian principality. It was emphasized in the telegram that the people from Debar are the Albanians but not Bulgarians. Furthermore, according to the protest memo, the district of Debar encompassed 220,000 Muslims and 10,000 Christians; all of them were the ethnic Albanians.[8] Finally, it was required that the Great European Powers would not allow Bulgaria to annex the Debar region; instead, it should be left in the Ottoman Empire (as a “national” state of all Muslim Albanians).[9]

Similarly to the Albanians from Debar, their compatriots from the city of Scodra and the Northwest Albania asked the Austro-Hungarian authority to foil inclusion of the Albanian territories into Montenegro (whose independence was recognized by the Berlin Congress in 1878).[10] The Albanians from several districts in Kosovo-Metochia (Prizren, Đakovica, Peć) protested in a memorandum to Vienna against partition of their lands between Serbia and Montenegro.[11] On May 8th, 1878 when “…today, we learned from the newspapers that the Ottoman government, unable to resist the pressure of Russia, has been obliged to accept our annexation by the Montenegrins…” a protest of Albanian population of Scodra, Podgorica, Spuž, Žabljak, Tivat, Ulcinj, Gruda, Kelmend, Hot and Kastrat was addressed to the ambassador of France in Istanbul against the annexation of the Albanian lands by the Principality of Montenegro.[12] The Albanian people from the North Albania and Kosovo-Metochia, either the Muslims or the Roman Catholics, started to organize their own self-defence detachments (a territorial militia) and the local committees against incorporation of these territories into either Serbia or Montenegro. Another task of those numerous committees was to help to the Albanian refugees from the areas already taken by the Serbs and Montenegrins according to the San Stefano Treaty.[13] Thus, for example, on June 26th, 1878 from Priština was issued a protest of 6,200 Albanian emigrants expelled from the districts of Niš, Leskovac, Prokuplje and Kuršumlija, addressed to the Berlin Congress against the mass murders and rapes committed by Serbia’s army and the Bulgarian military units.[14]

However, such official protests by the Albanians were much more a way of a propaganda work but not the reality on the ground at least not to such extend as presented. The fact was that majority of the (Muslim) Albanian „refugees“ in fact voluntary left those lands ascribed by the Russian-Ottoman Treaty of San Stefano to a Greater Bulgaria for the reason that the Muslims can not, in principle, to leave under non-Muslim government – i.e., the government of the „infidels“.

IMG_20160218_162405

Prof. Dr. Vladislav B. Sotirovic

Mykolas Romeris University

Institute of Political Sciences

Vilnius, Lithuania

globalpol@global-politics.eu

 

ENDNOTES:

[1] Parliamentary Papers, series “Accounts and Papers”, Vol. LXXXIII, Turkey, № 22, London, 1878, 10.

[2] “Article № 1” of the San Stefano Peace Treaty in Parliamentary Papers, series “Accounts and Papers”, Vol. LXXXIII, Turkey, № 22, London, 1878, 9−10; Sumner B. H., Russia and the Balkans, 1870−1880, Oxford, 1937, 410−415.

[3] Haus-Hof-und Staatsarchiv, Politisches Archiv, XII/256, Türkei IV, Lippich F., “Denkschrift über Albanien”, Wien, June 20th, 1877, 8−9.

[4] According to M. Jevtić, the Albanians have not been formed as a nation in a modern European sense of the meaning of the term at that time or they are not a nation even today as the main framework of the Albanian national identity was and is primarily Islam – a religion which does not recognize existence of any ethno-linguistic identity among the Muslims who are considered to be one (confessional) “nation” [Јевтић М., Албанско питање и религија, Београд: Центар за проучавање религије и верску толеранцију, 2011; Јевтић М., „Исламска суштина албанског сецесионизма и културно наслеђе Срба“, Национални интерест, Vol. 17, No. 2, 2013, 238]. On the Islamic tradition and political doctrine, see in [Itzkowitz N., Ottoman Empire and Islamic Tradition, Chicago−London: The University of Chicago Press, 1980].

[5] Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Paris, “Ceccaldi to Waddington, April 27th, 1878”, № 213, Turquie, Correspondance politique des consuls, Scutari, 1878−1879, Vol. XXI.

[6] On the strong confessional-political division and even religious wars between the Albanians later on in 1915, see in [Pollo S., Puto A., Histoire d’Albania des origines á nos jours, Roanne, 1974, 183−186; Јевтић М., Проблеми политикологије религије, Београд: Центар за проучавање религије и верску толеранцију, 2012, 159−161].

[7] An academic concept of a Great Power is defined as a state “deemed to rank amongst the most powerful in a hierarchical state-system. The criteria that define a great power are subject to dispute, but four are often identified. (1) Great powers are in the first rank of military powers, having the capacity to maintain their own security and, potentially, to influence other powers. (2) They are economically powerful states… (3.) They have global, and not merely regional, spheres of interests. (4) They adopt a ‘forward’ foreign policy and have actual, and not merely potential, impact on international affairs” [Heywood A., Global Politics, New York−London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, 7].

[8] The numbers of people of the Debar district was drastically exaggerated. The ethnic Albanians have not been the only districts’ inhabitants.

[9] Parliamentary Papers, series “Accounts and Papers”, “Layard to Salisbury, Therapia, May 4th, 1878, Vol. LXXXIII, Turkey, № 41, London, 1878, 60−61; Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Paris, “Ceccaldi to Waddington, Scutari, May 4th, 1878”, № 214, Turquie, Correspondance politique des consuls, Scutari, 1878−1879, Vol. XXI.

[10] Novotny A., Österreich, die Türkei und das Balkan-problem im Jahre des Berliner Kongresses, Graz−Köln, 1957, 246.

[11] Ibid, 37, 247−253; Parliamentary Papers, series “Accounts and Papers”, 1878, Vol. LXXXI, Turkey, № 45, London, 1878, 35−36.

[12] Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Paris, French Embassy at the Sublime Porte, Turkey, Vol. 417, 51−54, Supplement to the Report № 96 (original in French); Pollo S., Pulaha S., (eds.), Pages of the Albanian National Renaissance, 1878−1912, Tirana, 1978, 12−13.

[13] Parliamentary Papers, series “Accounts and Papers”, “Green to Salisbury, May 3rd, 1878”, Vol. LXXXIII, Turkey, № 40, London, 1878, 60; Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Paris, “Ceccaldi to Waddington, Scutari, May 4th, 1878”, № 214, Turquie, Correspondance politique des consuls, Scutari, 1878−1879, Vol. XXI; Ibid, a copy of telegram signed by the Montenegrin Prince Nikola I Petrović-Njegoš, Cetinje, June 5th, 1878, as annexe № 1 to Dèpêche, June 9th, 1878, № 218.

[14] Politisches Archiv des Auswartigen Amtes, Bonn, Turkey 129, Vol. 2, The Acts of the Congress of Berlin, 2, 1878, document № 110 (telegram); Pollo S, Pulaha S., (eds.), The Albanian League of Prizren, 1878−1881. Documents, Vol. I, Tirana, 1878, 73−74.

31 san_stefano_bg

Serbia Under The EU’s Ultimatum On Kosovo’s Independence

kosare-albanians

Serbia entered on December 14th, 2015 a final stage of negotiations with Brussels on the EU’s membership. It is known, however, that the EU gave an informal ultimatum to Serbia to recognize Kosovo’s independence for the exchange of becoming a full Member State of the EU. The western (the USA/EU) client Serbia’s Government is currently under the direct pressure from Brussels to recognize an independence of the narco-mafia Kosovo’s quasi state or to give up an idea to join the EU. It is only a question when a western colony of Serbia has to finally declare its official recognition of Kosovo’s independence. The President of Serbian Academy of Science and Arts, like all other western bots in Serbia, already publicaly announced his official position in regard to this question: Serbia’s Government has to finally inform the Serbian nation that Kosovo-Metochia is not any more an integral part of Serbia and therefore the recognition of Kosovo’s independence by Belgrade is only way towards a prosperous future of the country that is within the EU (and the NATO’s pact as well).

In the following paragraphs we would like to present the most important features of the “Kosovo Question” for the better understanding of the present political situation in which the Serb nation is questioned by the western “democracies” upon both its own national identity and national pride.

Prelude

The south-eastern province of the Republic of Serbia – under the administrative title of Kosovo-Metochia (in the English only Kosovo), was at the very end of the 20th century in the center of international relations and global politics too due to the NATO’s 78 days of the “humanitarian” military intervention against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (The FRY which was composed by Serbia and Montenegro)[1] in 1999 (March 24th–June 10th). As it was not approved and verified by the General Assembly or the Security Council of the United Nations, the US-led operation “Merciful Angel” opened among the academicians a fundamental question of the purpose and nature of the “humanitarian” interventions in the world like it was previously in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995, Rwanda in 1994 or Somalia in 1991−1995.[2] More precisely, it provoked dilemmas of the misusing ethical, legal and political aspects of armed “humanitarian” interventions as the responsibility to protect for the very reason that it became finally obvious in 2008 that the NATO’s “humanitarian” military intervention in 1999 was primarily aimed to lay the foundation for Kosovo’s independence and its separation from Serbia with transformation of the province into the US−EU’s political-economic colony.[3]

Balkan geographic map

The Balkan Peninsula

Kosovo as contested land between the Serbs and the Albanians

The province of Kosovo-Metochia (Kosova in the Albanian), as historically contested land between the Serbs and the Albanians, did not, does not and will not have an equal significance for those two nations. For the Albanians, Kosovo was all the time just a provincial land populated by them without any cultural or historical importance except for the single historical event that the first Albanian nationalistic political league was proclaimed in the town of Prizren in Metochia (the western part of Kosovo) in 1878 and existed only till 1881. However, both Kosovo as a province and the town of Prizren were chosen to host the First (pan-Albanian) Prizren League[4] only for the very propaganda reason – to emphasize allegedly predominantly the “Albanian” character of both Kosovo and Prizren regardless to the very fact that at that time the Serbs were a majority of population either in Kosovo or in Prizren.[5] Kosovo was never part of Albania and the Albanians from Albania had no important cultural, political or economic links with Kosovo’s Albanians regardless the fact that the overwhelming majority of Kosovo Albanians originally came from the North Albania after the First Great Serbian Migration from Kosovo in 1690.[6]

However, quite contrary to the Albanian case, Kosovo-Metochia is the focal point of the Serbian nationhood, statehood, traditions, customs, history, culture, church and above all of the ethno-national identity. It was exactly Kosovo-Metochia to be the central administrative-cultural part of the medieval Serbia with the capital in Prizren. The administrative center of the medieval and later Ottoman-time Serbian Orthodox Church was also in Kosovo-Metochia in the town of Peć (Ipek in the Turkish; Pejë in the Albanian). Before the Muslim Kosovo’s Albanians started to demolish the Serbian Christian Orthodox churches and monasteries after June 1999, there were around 1.500 Serbian Christian shrines in this province.[7] Kosovo-Metochia is even today called by the Serbs as the “Serbian Holy Land” while the town of Prizren is known for the Serbs as the “Serbian Jerusalem” and the “Imperial town” (Tsarigrad) in which there was an imperial court of the Emperor Stefan Dushan of Serbia (1346−1355). The Serbs, differently to the Albanians, have a plenty of national folk songs and legends about Kosovo-Metochia, especially in regard to the Kosovo Battle of 1389 in which they lost state independence to the Ottoman Turks.[8]

Nevertheless, there is nothing similar in the Albanian case with regard to Kosovo. For instance, there is no single Albanian church or monastery in this province from the medieval time or any important monument as the witness of the Albanian ethnic presence in the province before the time of the rule by the Ottoman Sultanate. Even the Muslim mosques from the Ottoman time (1455−1912) claimed by the Albanians to belong to the Albanian national heritage, were in fact built by the Ottoman authorities but not by the ethnic Albanians. The Albanian national folk songs are not mentioning the medieval Kosovo that is one of the crucial evidences that they simply have nothing in common with the pre-Ottoman Kosovo. All Kosovo’s place-names are of the Slavic (Serb) origin but not of the Albanian. The Albanians during the last 50 years are just renaming or adapting the original place-names according to their vocabulary what is making a wrong impression that the province is authentically the Albanian. We have not to forget the very fact that the word Kosovo is of the Slavic (the Serb) origin meaning a kind of eagle (kos) while the same word means simply nothing in the Albanian language. Finally, in the Serbian tradition Kosovo-Metochia was always a part of the “Old Serbia”[9] while in the Albanian tradition Kosovo was never called as any kind of Albania.

The province became contested between the Serbs and the Albanians when the later started to migrate from the North Albania to Kosovo-Metochia after 1690 with getting a privileged status as the Muslims by the Ottoman authorities. A Muslim Albanian terror against the Christian Serbs at the Ottoman time[10] resulted in the Abanization of the province to such extent that the ethnic structure of Kosovo-Metochia became drastically changed in the 20th century. A very high Muslim Albanian birthrate played an important role in the process of Kosovo’s Albanization too. Therefore, after the WWII the ethnic breakdown of the Albanians in the province was around 67 percent. The new and primarily anti-Serb Communist authorities of the Socialist Yugoslavia legally forbade to some 100.000 WWII Serb refugees from Kosovo-Metochia to return to their homes after the collapse of the Greater Albania in 1945 of which Kosovo was an integral part. A Croat-Slovenian Communist dictator of Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito (1892−1980), granted to the province of Kosovo-Metochia a considerable political autonomous status in 1974 with a separate Government, Provincial Assembly, President, Academy of Science, security forces, independent university in Prishtina and even military defense system for the fundamental political reason to prepare Kosovo’s independence after the death of his Titoslavia.[11] Therefore, Kosovo-Metochia in the Socialist Yugoslavia was just formally part of Serbia as the province was from political-administrative point of view an independent as all Yugoslav republics. A fully Albanian-governed Kosovo from 1974 to 1989 resulted in both destruction of the Christian (Serb) cultural monuments[12] and continuation of mass expulsion of the ethnic Serbs and Montenegrins from the province to such extent that according to some estimations there were around 200.000 Serbs and Montenegrins expelled from the province after the WWII up to the abolition of political autonomy of the province (i.e. independence) by Serbia’s authority in 1989 with the legal and legitimate verification by the Provincial Assembly of Kosovo-Metochia and the reintegration of Kosovo-Metochia into Serbia.[13] At the same period of time, there were around 300.000 Albanians who illegally came to live in Kosovo-Metochia from Albania. Consequently, in 1991 there were only 10 percent of the Serbs and Montenegrins who left to live in Kosovo-Metochia out of a total number of the inhabitants of the province.[14]

6siptarskiuckteroristasafantomkom

A member of the KLA in 1998

Fighting Kosovo’s Albanian political terrorism and territorial secession

The revocation of Kosovo’s political autonomy in 1989 by Serbia’s central Government was aimed primarily to stop further ethnic Albanian terror against the Serbs and Montenegrins and to prevent secession of the province from Serbia that will result in the recreation of the WWII Greater Albania with the legalization of the policy of Albanian ethnic cleansing of all non-Albanian population what practically happened in Kosovo after June 1999 when the NATO’s troops occupied the province and brought to the power a classical terrorist political-military organization – the Kosovo’s Liberation Army (the KLA). Nevertheless, the Western mainstream media as well academia presented Serbia’s fighting Kosovo’s Albanian political terrorism and territorial secession after 1989 as Belgrade policy of discrimination against the Albanian population which became deprived of political and economic rights and opportunities.[15] The fact was that such “discrimination” was primarily a result of the Albanian policy of boycotting Serbia’s state institutions and even job places offered to them in order to present their living conditions in Kosovo as the governmental-sponsored minority rights oppression.

In the Western mainstream mass media and even in academic writings, Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, a political leader of Kosovo’s Albanians in the 1990s, was described as a person who led a non-violent resistance movement against Miloshevic’s policy of ethnic discrimination of Kosovo’s Albanians. I. Rugova was even called as a “Balkan Gandhi”.[16] In the 1990s there were established in Kosovo the Albanian parallel and illegal social, educational and political structures and institutions as a state within the state. The Albanians under the leadership of Rugova even three times proclaimed the independence of Kosovo. However, these proclamations of independence were at that time totally ignored by the West and the rest of the world. Therefore, Rugova-led Kosovo’s Albanian national-political movement failed to promote and advance the Kosovo’s Albanian struggle for secession from Serbia and independence of the province with a very possibility to incorporate it into a Greater Albania. I. Rugova himself, coming from the Muslim Albanian Kosovo’s clan that originally migrated to Kosovo from Albania, was active in political writings on the “Kosovo Question” as a way to present the Albanian viewpoint on the problem to the Western audience and therefore, as a former French student, he published his crucial political writing in the French language in 1994.[17]

One of the crucial questions in regard to the Kosovo problem in the 1990s is why the Western “democracies” did not recognize self-proclaimed Kosovo’s independence? The fact was that the “Kosovo Question” was absolutely ignored by the US-designed Dayton Accords of 1995 which were dealing only with the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina.[18] A part to the answer is probably laying in the fact that Rugova-led Albanian secession movement was in essence illegal and even terroristic. It is known that Rugova himself was a sponsor of a terroristic party’s militia which was responsible for violent actions against Serbia’s authorities and non-Albanian ethnic groups in Kosovo.[19] For instance, in July 1988, from the graves of the village of Grace graveyard (between Prishtina and Vuchitrn) were excavated and taken to pieces the bodies of two Serbian babies of the Petrovic’s family.[20] Nevertheless, as a response to Rugova’s unsuccessful independence policy, it was established the notorious KLA which by 1997 openly advocated a full-scale of terror against everything what was Serbian in Kosovo.

The KLA had two main open political aims:

  1. To get an independence for Kosovo from Serbia with possibility to include the province into a Greater Albania.
  2. To ethnically clean the province from all non-Albanians especially from the Serbs and Montenegrins.

However, the hidden task of the KLA was to wage an Islamic Holy War (the Jihad) against the Christianity in Kosovo by committing the Islamic terror similarly to the case of the present-day Islamic State (the ISIS/ISIL) in the Middle East. Surely, the KLA was and is a part of the policy of radicalization of the Islam at the Balkans after 1991 following the pattern of the governmental (Islamic) Party of Democratic Action (the PDA) in Bosnia-Herzegovina.[21]

That the KLA was established as a terrorist organization is even confirmed by the Western scholars[22] and the US administration too. On the focal point of the Kosovo’s War in 1998−1999 we can read in the following sentence:

Aware that it lacked popular support, and was weak compared to the Serbian authorities, the KLA deliberately provoked Serbian police and Interior Ministry attacks on Albanian civilians, with the aim of garnering international support, specifically military intervention”.[23]

Conclusions

It was true that the KLA realized very well that the more Albanian civilians were killed as a matter of the KLA’s “hit-and-run” guerilla warfare strategy, the Western (the NATO’s) military intervention against the FRY was becoming a reality. In the other words, the KLA with his Commander-In-Chief Hashim Thaci were quite aware that any armed action against Serbia’s authorities and Serbian civilians would bring retaliation against the Kosovo Albanian civilians as the KLA was using them in fact as a “human shield”. That was in fact the price which the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo had to pay for their “independence” under the KLA’s governance after the war. That was the same strategy used by Croatia’s Government and Bosnian-Herzegovinian Muslim authorities in the process of divorce from Yugoslavia in the 1990s. However, as violence in Kosovo escalated in 1998 the EU’s authorities and the US’s Government began to support diplomatically an Albanian course – a policy which brought Serbia’s Government and the leadership of the KLA to the ceasefire and withdrawal of certain Serbian police detachments and the Yugoslav military troops from Kosovo followed by the deployment of the “international” (the Western) monitors (the Kosovo Verification Mission, the KVM) under the formal authority of the OSCE. However, it was in fact informal deployment of the NATO’s troops in Kosovo. The KVM was authorized by the UN’s Security Council Resolution 1199 on September 23rd, 1998. That was the beginning of a real territorial-administrative secession of Kosovo-Metochia from Serbia sponsored by the West for the only and very reason that Serbia did not want to join the NATO and to sell her economic infrastructure to the Western companies according to the pattern of “transition” of the Central and South-East European countries after the Cold War. The punishment came in the face of the Western-sponsored KLA.

2. Sotirovic 2013

Prof. Dr. Vladislav B. Sotirovic

www.global-politics.eu/sotirovic

globalpol@global-politics.eu

© Vladislav B. Sotirovic 2016

Join the debate on our Twitter Timeline!

__________________________

Endnotes:

[1] The FRY became renamed in February 2003 into the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro (the SCG) and finally the federation ended in June 2006 when both Serbia and Montenegro became independent states.

[2] On the “humanitarian” military interventions, see [J. L. Holzgrefe, R. O. Keohane (eds.), Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas, Cambridge−New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003; T. B. Seybolt, Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure, Oxford−New York: Oxford University Press, 2007; D. Fassin, M. Pandolfi, Contemporary States of Emergency: The Politics of Military and Humanitarian Interventions, New York: Zone Books, 2010; A. Hehir, The Responsibility to Protect: Rhetoric, Reality and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention, London−New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012; G. Th. Weiss, Humanitarian Intervention, Cambridge, UK−Malden, MA, USA: 2012; A. Hehir, Humanitarian Intervention: An Introduction, London−New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013; B. Simms, D. J. B. Trim (eds.), Humanitarian Intervention: A History, Cambridge−New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013; D. E. Scheid (ed.), The Ethics of Armed Humanitarian Intervention, Cambridge−New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014].

[3] H. Hofbauer, Eksperiment Kosovo: Povratak kolonijalizma, Beograd: Albatros Plus, 2009.

[4] On the First Prizren League, from the Albanian viewpoint, see [S. Pollo, S. Pulaha, (eds.), The Albanian League of Prizren, 1878−1881. Documents, Vol. I−II, Tirana, 1878].

[5] In 1878 the Serbs were about 60 percent of Kosovo population and 70 percent of Prizren inhabitants.

[6] On the First Great Serbian Migration from Kosovo in 1690, see [С. Чакић, Велика сеоба Срба 1689/90 и патријарх Арсеније III Црнојевић, Нови Сад: Добра вест, 1990].

[7] On the Serbian Christian heritage of Kosovo-Metochia, see [M. Vasiljvec, The Christian Heritage of Kosovo and Metohija: The Historical and Spiritual Heartland of the Serbian People, Sebastian Press, 2015].

[8] On the Kosovo Battle of 1389 in the Serbian popular tradition, see [Р. Пековић (уредник), Косовска битка: Мит, легенда и стварност, Београд: Литера, 1987; R. Mihaljčić, The Battle of Kosovo in History and in Popular Tradition, Belgrade: BIGZ, 1989; Р. Михаљчић, Јунаци косовске легенде, Београд: БИГЗ, 1989]. The President of Serbia – Slobodan Miloshevic, started his patriotic policy of unification of the Republic of Serbia and promulgation of the human rights for the Kosovo Serbs exactly on the 600 years anniversary of the Kosovo Battle that was celebrated on June 28th, 1989 in Gazimestan near Prishtina as the place of the battle in 1389. However, this event was commonly seen by the Western academia and policy-makers as an expression of the Serb nationalism [R. W. Mansbach, K. L. Taylor, Introduction to Global Politics, London−New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2012, 429] and even as the Serb proclamation of the war to the rest of Yugoslavia.

[9] Р. Самарџић et al, Косово и Метохија у српској историји, Београд: Друштво за чување споменика и неговање традиција ослободилачких ратова Србије до 1918. године у Београду−Српска књижевна задруга, 1989, 5; Д. Т. Батаковић, Косово и Метохија: Историја и идеологија, Београд: Чигоја штампа, 2007, 17−29.

[10] See, for instance, a Memorandum by Kosovo and Macedonian Serbs to the international peace conference in The Hague in 1899 [Д. Т. Батаковић, Косово и Метохија у српско-арбанашким односима, Београд: Чигоја штампа, 2006, 118−123].

[11] From Josip Broz Tito, however, the Serbs in Croatia or Bosnia-Herzegovina did not receive any kind of political-territorial autonomy as Kosovo Albanians or Vojvodina Hungarians enjoyed in Serbia. Nevertheless, for the matter of comparison with Kosovo Albanians in Serbia, the Kurds in Turkey are not even recognized as a separate ethno-linguistic group.

[12] For instance, the Muslim Albanians tried to set arson on the Serbian Patriarchate of Pec’s church in the West Kosovo (Metochia) in 1981, but just accidentally only the dormitory was burnt.

[13] J. Palmowski (ed.), A Dictionary of Contemporary World History From 1900 to the Present Day, Oxford−New York: Oxford University Press, 2004, 428.

[14] On the history of Kosovo from the Western perspective, see [N. Malcolm, Kosovo: A Short History, New York: New York University, 1999; T. Judah, Kosovo: What Everyone Needs to Know, Oxford−New York: Oxford University Press, 2008].

[15] T. B. Seybolt, Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure, Oxford−New York: Oxford University Press, 2007, 79.

[16] Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi (1869−1948) was an Indian national leader against the British colonial occupation of India. He became well-known as a leader who organized an Indian civil disobedience movement against the British colonial authorities which finally led to the independence of India. On his biography, see [J. Lelyveld, Great Soul: Mahatma Gandhi and his Struggle with India, New York: Knopf Borzoi Books, 2011].

[17] I. Rugova, La Question du Kosovo, Fayard, 1994. It has to be noticed that Rugova’s father and grandfather were shot to death by the Yugoslav Communist authorities at the very end of the WWII as the Nazi collaborators during the war.

[18] On the Dayton Accords, see [D. Chollet, The Road to the Dayton Accords: A Study of American Statecraft, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005].

[19] On this issue, see more in [В. Б. Сотировић, Огледи из Југославологије, Виљнус: приватно издање, 2013, 190−196].

[20] We can not forget as well that the KLA-led “March Pogrom” of Serbs in Kosovo (March 17−19th, 2004) was executed when I. Rugova was a “President” of Kosovo. The pogrom was in fact “…a systematic ethnic cleansing of the remaining Serbs…together with destruction of houses, other property, cultural monuments and Orthodox Christian religious sites” [D. Kojadinović (ed.), The March Pogrom, Belgrade: Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Serbia−Museum in Priština (displaced), 2004, 8].

[21] On the threat of radical Islam to the Balkans and Europe after 1991, see [Sh. Shay, Islamic Terror and the Balkans, Transaction Publishers, 2006; Ch. Deliso, The Coming Balkan Caliphate: The Threat of Radical Islam to Europe and the West, Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007].

[22] T. B. Seybolt, Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure, Oxford−New York: Oxford University Press, 2007, 79.

[23] Ibid.

Tusk2